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Is Islam really a development blockade?  
 
12 predictors of development, including membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference, 
and their influence on 14 indicators of development in 109 countries of the world with 
completely available data 
   3
 
 
Abstract: With all the talk in Europe about “Islam” and “Muslim culture” it is surprising how little 
hard-core empirical evidence exists on the compatibility of “Muslim culture” with positive patterns of 
political, social, and ecological development in the world system in the 1980s, 1990s, and beyond. 
This article tries to close this gap by using latest (United Nations and other data) and multivariate 
techniques, investigating the determination of 14 indicators of development in 109 countries with 
complete data by 12 determinants of development, including membership in the 57 member and 3 
observer Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), comprising 57 members and 3 observer 
states. The empirical record, presented in this essay, speaks a clear language in favor of Islamic 
democracy and against those in the West that attempt to treat Islamic cultural heritage as a general 
development burden. It should be also clear that a reliance on the “Washington Consensus” alone 
will not “fix” the performance of countries beyond a better and more predictable “development 
stability”. The most consistent consequence of the “dependency” analysis of this essay is the 
realization that a reliance on foreign capital in the short term might bring about positive 
consequences for employment – especially female employment – but that the long-term negative 
consequences of dependence in the social sphere, but also for sustainable development, outweigh the 
immediate, positive effects. Our three-fold empirical understanding of the process of globalization – 
reliance on foreign savings, MNC penetration and unequal transfer, - goes beyond the average 
analysis of the workings of dependency structures and shows how different aspects of dependency 
negatively affect development performance. The integration of the countries of the periphery into 
larger currency blocs – quite contrary to what the “Washington Consensus” has to say about 
“competitive currencies” - will be one of the most important tasks for international development 
strategies for years to come. EU membership, by contrast, under the present institutional conditions of 
the EU – not as it should be but as it is - fails to have sufficiently enough dynamic effects and its 
democratic deficits become ever more clear. In terms of the size of the quantitative effects on the 14 
dimensions of development under investigation here, it is shown that the new political structures 
associated with political feminism that substituted patriarchic structures inherent in practically all 
world regions for much of the 19th and the early 20th Century have a very considerable effect on the 
development outcomes of today. Feminism in power – i.e. the share of women in positions of political 
decision making - achieves to transform many aspects of development, but, as other “distribution 
coalitions” before it, creates certain aspects of stagnation as well and thus is not free from the effects 
of the logic of “collective action”. Islamic culture is not a development blockade; on the contrary. 
Membership in the Islamic Conference has – ceteris paribus – a very positive effect on political 
democracy, on life expectancy, and on our indicators of the Kyoto-process and the eco-social market 
economy. Far from being a “religion of the Middle Ages” Islam has an important message for the 21st 
Century. The article also analyses recent trends in the structure of international saving, pension 
systems and the dynamics of “unequal transfer”. It emerges that the European Center is going to 
become the main loser in the structural changes that affect the position of Europe in the 21
st Century. 
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Recent debates about globalization among decision makers and social scientists have coined the term 
“pathfinders of globalization” (Harss and Maier, 1998). A good segment of the international social 
scientific community would be in accordance with such a role-description, while an equally important 
and growing segment of the social scientific community would vehemently oppose the basic axioms of 
globalization in its present form. 
 
Conventional wisdom of the “Washington Consensus” has it that it is always the periphery or semi-
periphery country that got it all wrong during a crisis, like in East Asia, Russia or recently in Turkey 
and that a good combination of economic freedom, privatization, tight monetary policies and above all 
private foreign direct investment will “fix” it, once the forces of the market are properly at work.
2
 
The “Washington Consensus” has been summarized by Raffer (pp. 305 – 323 in Tausch, 2003) as to 
represent the following policy priorities: 
 
1.  Fiscal discipline: a primary budget surplus of several percent of GDP 
2.  Public expenditure priorities: defined as re-directions of public expenditures towards fields 
with high economic returns such as primary health and education 
3.  Tax reform: cutting marginal tax rates 
4.  Financial liberalization: moderately positive real interest rates and the abolition of 
preferential interest rates (such as for developmentally useful or socially demanded projects) 
5.  Exchange rates: unified and competitive 
6.  Trade liberalization: abolishing quotas (replacing them by tariffs) and reducing tariffs to a 
uniform low level within three to ten years.  
7.  Foreign direct investment: equal treatment with domestic firms. The World Bank calls this the 
elimination of barriers. This principle is also enshrined in the WTO treaties. 
8.  Privatization 
9.  Deregulation: abolishing regulations aiming at achieving developmental or social aims 
10. Property rights: must be guaranteed. 
 
The counter-position, advanced by globalization critics, environmentalists, liberation theologians of all 
denominations, and – most recently – dissidents from the once homogeneous neo-liberal camp would 
hold that unfettered globalization increases the social gaps between rich and poor both within 
countries as well as on a global scale. Most of the adherents of this camp would share the view 
proposed by Cornia and Kiiski that income distribution in the world system has worsened during the 
period of globalization. 
 
The idea that economic and social progress is not linear has many implications for the ascent and 
decline of nations in the world system. The clearest proof of discontinuous development in our age is 
the real income at purchasing power data series available from the international developmental 
                                            
2 See, for example, the highly interesting account on how international economists see the reasons for the 
“Turkish melt-down” at the website of the National Bureau of Economic Research 
http://www.nber.org/crisis/turkey_report.html   5
institutions. Large parts of our globe were once richer, in real terms, than in 2000; a great number of 
countries experienced real decades of economic impoverishment over the last ¼ of a Century. The 
UNDP 2002 electronic data base
3 easily permits such a calculation from 1975 to 2000. The UNDP 
data tell you in which year since 1975 the highest income was reached. Normally, you would expect 
that a country had 25 years of progress since 1975, but this is not the case. Many nations reached their 
maximum national average welfare in the 1980s, several of them even before. When you subtract from 
the number 2000 the year with the highest real income since 1975, you arrive at a global map of 
development failure since 1975, and you arrive equally at a map of the failures of globalization since 
1975. 63 nations lost 10 or more years of their development; and only 70 of 159 ranked countries had 
their highest average real welfare level in 2000. The record holders of development failure in these 
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Map 1: lost development years since 1975 in the world system 
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Legend: no data for Cuba, French Guyana, Greenland, West Sahara, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Serbia, 
Montenegro, Libya, Iraq, the Dem. Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, 
Somalia, Afghanistan, Myanmar, and North Korea 
 
 
The Latin American social scientist Osvaldo Sunkel first proposed in his essay ’Transnational 
capitalism and national disintegration (in Latin America)’ the still provocative thought that 
transnational investment and integration might go hand in hand under certain conditions with an 
increasing relative social polarization between rich and poor in the host countries of the evolving 
transnational system and on the international level. At that time, Sunkel said: 
 
‘The interpretation so far advanced suggests that the international capitalist system contains an 
internationalized nucleus of activities, regions and social groups of varying degrees of importance in 
each country. These sectors share a common culture and ‘way of life’, which expresses itself through 
the same books, texts, films, television programs, similar fashions, similar groups of organization of 
family and social life, similar style of decoration of homes, similar orientations to housing, building, 
furniture and urban design. Despite linguistic barriers, these sectors have a far greater capacity for 
communication among themselves than is possible between integrated and marginal persons of the 
same country who speak the same language (...) Modernization implies the gradual replacement of the 
traditional productive structure by another of much higher capital intensiveness (...) On the one hand, 
the process of modernization incorporates into the new structures the individuals and groups that are 
apt to fit into the kind of rationality that prevails there; on the other hand, it expels the individuals and 
groups that have no place in the new productive structure or who lack the capacity to become adapted 
to it. It is important to emphasize that this process does not only prevent or limit the formation of a 
national entrepreneurial class, as indicated by Furtado, but also of a national middle class (...) and 
even a national working class. The advancement of modernization introduces, so to speak, a wedge 
along the area dividing the integrated from the segregated segments (...) In this process, some 
national entrepreneurs are incorporated as executives into the new enterprises or those absorbed by 
the TRANCO (i.e. transnational corporations), and others are marginalized; some professionals, 
forming part of the technical staff and the segment of employees are incorporated, and the rest are 
marginalized; part of the qualified labor supply and those that are considered fit to be upgraded are 
incorporated, while the remainder are marginalized. 
 
The effects of the disintegration of each social class has important consequences for social mobility. 
The marginalized entrepreneur will probably add to the ranks of small or artesanal manufacture, or 
will abandon independent activity and become a middle class employee. The marginalized sectors of 
the middle class will probably form a group of frustrated lower middle class people trying to maintain 
middle class appearance without much possibility of upward mobility and terrorized by the danger of 
proletarization. The marginalized workers will surely add to the ranks of absolute marginality, where, 
as in the lower middle class, growing pools of resentment and frustration of considerable 
demographic dimension will accumulate (...) Finally, it is very probable that an international mobility 
will correspond to the internal mobility, particularly between the internationalized sectors (...) The 
process of social disintegration which has been outlined here probably also affects the social 
institutions which provide the bases of the different social groups and through which they express 
themselves. Similar tendencies to the ones described for the global society are, therefore, probably 
also to be found within the state, church, armed forces, political parties with a relatively wide popular 
base, the universities etc.’ (Sunkel, 1972: 18-42).   8
 
While debates abound, hard-core social scientific evidence on the contradictory effects of 
globalization is needed more than ever before.  
 
 
The intense debate about globalization and social welfare in the world system 
 
 
On the surface, there seems to exist a certain kind of agreement among the political and the research 
community world wide that globalization since 1980 negatively affected the lives of around 1.5 
thousand million people on earth, whose per-capita incomes were lower than in earlier decades. These 
1.5 thousand million people live in around 100 countries; while 15 nations experienced rapid capitalist 
development over the last decade (UNDP, 1996, 1997). 
 
No question that the world economy is characterized at present, as happened in earlier periods, by a 
quantitative and qualitative jump in the degree of globalization (Arrighi and Silver, 1999; Boswell and 
Chase-Dunn, 2000; Cornia and Kiiski, 2001). Luttwak defines this present phase as ‘turbo capitalism’ 
by private enterprise, liberated from government regulation, unchecked by effective trade unions, 
unfettered by concerns for employees or communities, and unhindered by taxation or investment 
restrictions. Globalization is generally understood to be the growing transborder flow of goods, 
services, capital and labor. The following UNDP 2000 numbers might illustrate this: 
 
•  World exports are more than 21% of world GNP 
•  Foreign direct investments are above 400 thousand million $ 
•  Daily currency exchanges are 1500 thousand million $, i.e. the annual world currency trade is 
18.6 times the yearly world GNP 
•  International bank credits are above 4200 thousand million $ 
 
There is a never-ending flow of literature on the interrelation between globalization and poverty, with 
a very wide array of research results. Nobody in his minds would negate that we are confronted with 
the phenomenon of globalization – just to suffice to draw our attention here to the fact that foreign 
assets per world GDP fluctuated in the following fashion since 1870: 
 
Graph 1: The Waves of Globalization since 1870 in the World Economy 
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Legend: our own compilation from Crafts, 2000 
 
Summarizing the unique UNCTAD World Investment Report 2002 data base
4, freely available on the 
Internet, one is lead to the following conclusions: 
 
1.  there was a tremendous increase in the process of globalization in the 1990s, but 
2.  this process experienced a sharp decline in its growth rate already prior to the 09/11 attacks in 
New York, indicating a qualitative and quantitative reversal in the capitalist world economy. 
 
Both inward and outward investments increased tremendously until the year 2000, and declined 
sharply in 2001. Also the value of cross-border mergers and acquisitions declined sharply in that year.  
 
Graph 2: globalization 1980 – 2000 in the world system 
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Graph 4: world FDI flows and world cross-border mergers halted in 2001, well before the 
September 11 terrorist attacks 
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At the same time, it has been established fairly well enough that there is a continuing phenomenon of 
world poverty. But what beyond that? Is globalization really the cause of world poverty? Or is rather 
the absence of globalization and foreign investment to blame for the continued misery in countries, 
say, like Myanmar, while outward-looking policies dramatically increased the lot of wide strata of the 
population in countries like China, Thailand and India over the last decades? 
 
This growing international controversy on globalization and social inequality – the main contributions 
were written amongst others, by the Australian Treasury, 2001; Crafts, 2000; Dollar and Kraay, 2001; 
Lindert and Williamson, 2001a, 2001b; Lundberg and Squire, 1999; Melchior, Royal Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000; and Schultz, 1998 – can be summarized as follows: 
 
•  Initial attempts by pro-globalization scholars (Dollar and Kraay, 2001) to prove the positive 
effects of globalization by selecting the post-1980 globalizing countries Argentina, 
Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, 
Haiti, Hungary, India, Jamaica, Jordan, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Nepal, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, Philippines, Rwanda, Thailand, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe as the most 
successful development performers of the world are not convincing. Of these 24 “mega-
performers”, 8 are immediately “knocked out” because of their serious economic, social and 
political collapse, such as the political and economic events in Argentina (financial crash 
2001), Bangladesh (child labor on the increase, millions face contamination from poisoned 
water, 15000 children die each year from pollution in Dakha alone, the Asian Development 
Bank diagnoses “slow economic growth during the past decades and rising income inequality 
are the primary reasons for slow progress in poverty reduction”), Brazil (financial crash 
1998), Colombia (civil war, 2 million people live on the streets of Bogota, the capital, alone),   12
Mexico (except for a brief period in 1997, Mexico has never fully recovered from the crash of 
1994), Nepal (civil war with more than 7000 deaths since 1994), Rwanda (genocide and civil 
war 1994) and Zimbabwe (after months of withholding finance, bringing Zimbabwe to the 
brink of collapse, the International Monetary Fund has finally agreed to provide a 14-month 
standby loan of US$193 million. This is to enable the country to resume its repayments to its 
international creditors. For the first time since independence in 1980, Zimbabwe is $20 
million a month behind in its foreign debt payments, resulting in a $190 million deficit for 
1999). Of the remaining 16 countries, 4 more have to be discounted because Cote d’Ivoire, 
Haiti, Jamaica, and Mali are among the 26 countries that in reality had the most dramatic 
development instability in the entire world economy since 1975 in real terms (see above) 
and lost 20 or more of their development years since 1975
5. Thus only half of the countries 
chosen qualify for a further analysis of their “development success”. 
 
•  The other much publicized Dollar/Kraay 2000 study also does not prove clearly enough that 
globalization – as understood in this study – leads 1:1 to an increased well-being of the poorer 
population. Although the absolute income levels of the poor are indeed clearly affected by 
overall preceding growth, and although growth policies lead to pro-poor policies (with Dollar 
and Kraay implying that pro-globalization policies lead to pro-growth policies), it should be 
noted that their globalization master variable is exports + imports per GDP and thus does 
not measure at all important other aspects of exposure to globalization, i.e. a negative resource 
balance (i.e. foreign saving determines accumulation) or MNC penetration (FDI per total 
GDP; FDI = foreign direct investment i.e. the control of transnational capital over the entire 
economy of the host country) or unequal exchange (or, as Gernot Kohler prefers, „unequal 
transfer“) (1/ERDI; ERDI = exchange rate deviation index, i.e. a low global market value of 
the currency of a country compared to the purchasing power due to the process of unequal 
transfer). The Dollar and Kray measure
6 in a way must be considered as an absurdity, insofar 
                                            
5 internet country documentation: Le Monde Diplomatique, United States Department of State; Guardian; 
Washington Post; and World Socialist Website.  
6 The correlations of the Dollar/Kray measure with UNDP indicators of poverty are the following. Several 
correlations support Dollar/Kray, while correlations, contradicting the thesis that globalization is good for the 
poor (including small ones), are printed in bold letters. It should be known, however that the number of 
countries, for which calculations are possible, are sometimes relatively small; i.e. the strong trade-off between 
trade orientation and median poverty reduction is based on only 26 countries; the trade-off between trade 
orientation and 11 $ per capita and day poverty level reduction is based on only 11 countries.  
 
Long-term unemployment (as % of labour force), 2000      0,237 
Tertiary net enrolment ratio (female as % of male), 1998      0,183 
Human development index (HDI) value, 2000       0,180 
Human development index (HDI) value, 1995       0,177 
People who are functionally illiterate (% age 16-65), 1994-98      0,167 
life expectancy, 1970-75  0,161 
Life expectancy 2000  0,148 
GNP per capita  0,136 
growth acceleration  0,134 
GDP per capita annual growth rate (%), 1975-2000       0,116   13
as the large country United States is less globalized than the relatively small and world 
economically relatively isolated country Belarus! 
 
•  Results that speak of a supposed growing international inequality depend on whether income 
is measured at market exchange rates (growing world inequality) or real purchasing power 
(lessening world inequality). The divergence between these two processes also opens up the 
question of unequal transfer, defined by world systems theories as the difference between 
purchasing power and income at market exchange rates (see below). 
 
•  While the Dollar and Kraay-study 2000 must be considered the flagship pro-globalization 
study today, careful econometric globalization-skeptical evidence seems to suggest – see 
especially the pooled regression results from time series in 38 countries, reported in Lundberg 
and Squire – that globalization affects different social strata in a different manner. Without 
going into the econometric details here, it is sufficient to mention that Lundberg and Squire 
report a regression slope of –2.87840 (t-value 2.06, and thus significant at the 5 % level) for 
the variable ‘world economic openness’ on the income growth of the bottom 40 % of the 
respective population, while the top 40 % reap significant benefits from globalization (slope + 
9.89084, significant even at the 1 % level). ). The divergent interpretations and evaluations of 
these two flagship studies were part and parcel of further controversies.
7 
 
                                                                                                                                        
GDP per capita annual growth rate (%), 1975-2000       0,113 
Ratio of estimated female to male earned income      0,108 
Malaria cases (per 100,000 people), 2000      0,081 
Female economic activity rate (as % of male rate), 2000       0,029 
GDP per capita annual growth rate (%), 1990-2000       0,021 
GDP per capita annual growth rate (%), 1990-2000       0,021 
Tuberculosis cases (per 100,000 people), 1999      -0,013 
Human poverty index (HPI-2) value (%), 2000       -0,016 
life expectancy increases  -0,025 
People living with HIV/AIDS, adults (% age 15-49), 2001      -0,025 
Proportion of the population below $4 a day (1990 PPP US$), 1996-99      -0,041 
% of population not using improved drinking water sources (%), 2000       -0,139 
Infants with low birth-weight (%), 1995-2000      -0,157 
Underweight children under age-five (%), 1995-2000      -0,157 
Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 (% of cohort), 1995-2000      -0,162 
Population below income poverty line (%), $2 a day (1993 PPP US$), 1983-2000      -0,217 
Adult illiteracy rate (% age 15 and above), 2000   -0,254 
Proportion of the population below 50% of median income, 1987-98      -0,539 
Proportion of the population below $11,00 a day (1994 PPP US$), 1994-95      -0,694 
 
 
7 See The Guardian Newspaper Tuesday, July 4, 2000.   14
•  A preliminary final word on these controversies seems to be the recent finding reported by 
World Bank and Carnegie researcher Branko Milanovic, who established that at low average 
income levels, it is the rich who benefit from openness. As incomes rise, it is the relative 
incomes of the poor and and the middle class that rise compared to the rich.
8 
 
•  Results on human development indicators – like the ‘Human Development Index’, life 
expectancy or education data rather tend to confirm the hypothesis that today, we have a 
flattening of international inequalities. Never before in history we have had so many people 
around the world with such high life expectancies, and the world distribution of lived life 
times around the world has dramatically improved (see especially Melchior, 2000 and Crafts, 
2000). World average life expectancy has increased from 55.0 years in 1962 to 66.6 years in 
1997; with the GINI Index of the intra-country world lived lifetimes decreasing during the 
same period from 0.237 to 0.114 (Melchior, 2000). However, as we show in this article, the 
most spectacular cases of rapid life expectancy development took place precisely in regimes, 
which might be termed “Arab socialist” or “Kemalist”. 
 
•  Results differ widely whether we speak about absolute numbers of people living in poverty – 
say the 1 $ or 2 $ per capita and day threshold in real terms (these have risen according to 
some studies and during certain, but not all time periods since the 1960s) and the percentages 
of total population, falling under a given poverty line (decreasing in most studies, in most of 
the world regions). 
 
•  A recent summary of World Bank research results was presented by Chen and Ravallion
9: 
These materials render themselves for further rigorous testing and calculations (see also 
appendix). It emerges that there was nowhere in the major world regions a rapid, uniform 
reduction in the percentage of people falling under the 2 $ a day poverty threshold, but 
rather very strong cyclical fluctuations, and ups and downs along the waves of recession that 
hit the world in the 1980s and 1990s (economic maturity and the position in the international 
division of labor seems to determine that Eastern Europe, East Asia and Latin America were 
affected by the “shock waves” of international recession and hence a set-back in poverty 
reduction earlier on than South Asia, the Middle East and Subsaharan Africa). Only South 
Asia India never experienced an absolute rise in the percentage of poor people since the 
1980s, while all other world macro-regions, including East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa at least once 
in their development history since the 1980s also experienced once in the period also an 
increase in the number of poor people as compared to the earlier periods, thus  set-back in 
poverty reduction. Thus, while the percentage of poor people according to the World Bank 
concept “2 $ a day” was reduced in the entire region from 66,7 % to 52,9 %, only South Asia 




                                            
8 http://econ.worldbank.org/files/17877_wp2876.pdf
9 http://econ.worldbank.org/files/36297_wps3341.pdf
10 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3518029.stm and 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/601.cms
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•  the wave of the world recession of the early 1980s badly affected the Middle East, while 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia still experienced a period of relative poverty reduction. The 
end of the 1980s was a good period for all world regions, with a general decline in relative 
poverty rates. The turn of the decade with its recession devastatingly hit first East Asia and 
Eastern Europe, with the tide then spreading to the Middle East and Latin America. Latin 
America was worst hit by the crisis of the early 1990s and did not manage to benefit from the 
“Clinton boom” years, while the Middle East reduced its poverty first in the middle of the 
1990s only to see an increase again at the turn of the decade and the millennium. At any rate it 
is impossible to say that globalization is uniformly good for the poor –in a regional as well as 
in a time-series perspective. 
 
 
Graph 5a: World Poverty: Percentage of People with less than 2 $ a Day Per Capita Income – 
absolute numbers 
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Graph 5b: World Poverty: Percentage of People with less than 2 $ a Day Per Capita Income – 





















































Theories explaining backwardness and disarticulation 
 
 
After the “ultimate triumph” of the market economy on a global scale (Fukuyama) as the result of the 
collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, an intensive debate about the development prospects of 
Europe’s Southern and Southeastern neighbors set in.  
 
On a global economy level, neo-liberal authors like Barro; Barro and associates; Crafts; Dadush and 
Brahmbatt; Dollar and Kraay and Weede generally tend to think that with the establishment of 
“economic freedom” positive patterns of development will prevail in practically all countries.  
 
Cultural theories of development tend to stress that at present development perspectives for the large 
region between Morocco in the West and Iran in the East are not good. Their principal spokesperson 
today is Huntington, but also such diverse sources as the UNDP’s Arab Human Development Report 
(2002) or the World Bank’s MENA Report (2002) tend to highlight the various development   17
constraints in that region. While the UNDP stresses the lack of democracy, human resource 
development and gender equality as the main development blocks, the World Bank highlights the 
negative heritage of “Arab Socialism” or past state sector influence.  
 
Dependency authors by contrast  explain backwardness and stagnation by the ever-growing 
dependent insertion of these countries into the world economy. Starting with the writings of Perroux, 
Prebisch and Rothschild in the 1930s, their leading spokespersons, like Addo; Baran; Bello; Cardoso; 
Cordova; Cordova and Silva - Michelena; Dubiel; Feder; Flechsig; Frank; Frank and associates; 
Froebel  et al.; Gonzales Casanova; Griffin; Griffin and associates; Kent; Linnemann and Sarma; 
Müller et al.; Raffer; Senghaas; Singer; So; Sunkel; and Woehlcke all would stress the unequal and 
socially imbalanced nature of development in regions that are highly dependent on investment from 
the highly developed countries. Short-term spurts of growth notwithstanding, long-term growth will be 
imbalanced and unequal, and will tend towards high negative current account balances. Many of these 
authors focused their attention on Latin America; their leading spokesperson in the Islamic world is 
the Egyptian economist Samir Amin. 
 
Later world system analyses – that started with the writings of the Austro-Hungarian socialist Karl 
Polanyi after the First World War - tended to confirm and expand this dependency argument. 
Capitalism in the periphery, like in the center, is characterized by strong cyclical fluctuations, and 
there are centers, semi-peripheries and peripheries. The rise of one group of semi-peripheries tends to 
be at the cost of another group, but the unequal structure of the world economy based on unequal 
transfer tends to remain stable. Authors from the world system approach, like Arrighi; Arrighi and 
associates; Beaud; Bornschier; Chase - Dunn; Chase - Dunn and associates; Frank and associates; 
Goldfrank; Goldstein; Hopkins; Hopkins and Wallerstein; Kiljunen; Modelski; Raffer; Ross and 
Trachte; So; Tausch and associates; Walker; and Wallerstein tended to discard the “culturalist” 
explanations, offered by Huntington, and rather would support the argument that world economic 
position, and not culture, determines conflict. Wallerstein comes clearly up in defense against 
demonizing the Arab/Islamic world and thinks that opposing forces against the present world order 
will increase: 
 
This brings me to my very last theme. Can the West do without a demon? I doubt it at the moment. The 
West is facing a massive crisis - not merely economic, but fundamentally political and social. The 
capitalist world-economy is in crisis as an historical social system. I cannot review here the crisis in 
detail, something I have done elsewhere on several occasions, but I raise these issues to insist that the 
consequence is a great deal of confusion and self-doubt in the West, a situation which always evokes 
the need for demons. This same confusion and self-doubt pervades the Islamic world, as is evident 
from the zigzagging tactics of all the main actors. The secularist forces are in disarray. The Islamist 
forces are not very clear, and not at all agreed among themselves, what their real political program is 
or ought to be. Once again, we should put this in the context of the world-system as a whole, and not 
limit our attention to the Islamic world. Systems that are in crisis enter into a chaotic period, out of 
which eventually emerges a new order. Their trajectories bifurcate, and it is intrinsically impossible to 
predict the branch that will prevail. In practice this means two things. Even small pressures in one 
direction or another may be decisive, since the system is far from equilibrium. And the social struggle 
is therefore extremely acute. The question that arises therefore is how the sides in the struggle for 
shaping the successor social system will align themselves. When the struggles were less acute, the 
lines seemed to be sharp. That is why we can speak of antisystemic movements within the modern 
world-system. These movements thought they knew what they were about and who their primary 
enemy was. So did the forces that defended the existing system. What the last twenty-five years has   18
taught us all - I think of it as the lesson of the world revolution of 1968 - was that our vision of the 
struggle was deeply flawed that opponents were not real opponents, and allies not real allies, 
whichever side one was on. In this sense, the Islamists are profoundly correct in saying that we have 
to recalibrate our understanding of what are the issues that divide the existing historical system and 
what are the alternative historical possibilities of a possible reconstructed world-system. Their 
critique is on the mark, but what of their solution? As I have said, I do not believe they are sure of 
what solution they really intend. Those of us who do not share some or most of their premises and are 
heirs of a more secularist tradition find it difficult to accept most of what they offer as first steps to a 
better future. What I do feel is that there is a need for a genuine dialogue, or multilogue, about the 
essential limitations of our existing world-system, and the parameters of our historical alternatives. 
Personally, I think the basic conflict is that between those who seek to establish/reestablish a 
hierarchical world order in which some are privileged and most others not and those who wish to 
construct a maximally democratic and egalitarian order. I think that each requires different kinds of 
value-systems to undergird it, and that the historic world religions may have much to teach us about 
what is crucial in such value-systems. The real problem is that among the secularist and the 
fundamentalist camps in all parts of the world, there are persons on both sides of what I anticipate 
will be the great politico-social struggle of the coming fifty years. I think myself that posing the issue 
as one of secularism versus fundamentalism is distracting us in a very major way from clarity of 
vision. And clarity, not demons, is what we need most at the present time. (Wallerstein, 1997: 
http://fbc.binghamton.edu/iwislam.htm)  
 
Dependency and world system theory generally hold that poverty and backwardness in poor countries 
– like the Islamic world - are caused by the peripheral position that these nations have in the 
international division of labor. Ever since the capitalist world system evolved, there is a stark 
distinction between the nations of the center and the nations of the periphery. Former Brazilian 
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, when he was still a social scientist, summarized the 
quantifiable essence of dependency theories as follows: 
 
•  there is a financial and technological penetration by the developed capitalist centers of the 
countries of the periphery and semi-periphery 
•  this produces an unbalanced economic structure both within the peripheral societies and 
between them and the centers 
•  this leads to limitations on self-sustained growth in the periphery 
•  this favors the appearance of specific patterns of class relations 
•  these require modifications in the role of the state to guarantee both the functioning of the 
economy and the political articulation of a society, which contains, within itself, foci of 
inarticulateness and structural imbalance (Cardoso, 1979) 
 
A rising degree of monopolization in the leading center countries over time determines that, in order to 
keep the share of wages at least constant, a rising exploitation of the raw material producers sets in to 
offset the balance. There is a massive, internationally published evidence that speaks in favor of 
dependency theory. However, it would be wrong to portray dependency simply in terms of MNC 
penetration, and to neglect other aspects of that relationship. Such authors as Singer and Tausch have 
put emphasis on the resource balance as an indicator of the weight of foreign saving. Other 
formulations of dependency insisted on ‘unequal exchange’ which, according to one such 
formulation, hampers development (i.e. double factorial terms of trade of the respective country are < 
1.0; see Raffer, 1987, Amin, 1975). Labor in the export sectors of the periphery is being exploited, 
while monopolistic structures of international trade let the centers profit from the high prices of their   19
exports to the world markets in comparison to their labor productivity. Since double factorial terms of 
trade are simply net barter terms of trade weighted by productivities (F) of X, exports, and M, imports, 
the formula 
 
((PX * FX)/(PM*FM)) = 1 denotes the conditions of ‘equal’ exchange as opposed to unequal transfer: 
 
((PX * FX)/(PM*FM)) = < 1.0  
 
Nations with  
 
((PX * FX)/(PM*FM)) = > 1.0  
 
are the countries that benefited from unequal exchange. 
 
Empirical support for Raffer’s and Gernot Kohler’s reformulation of the theory of unequal transfer is 
overwhelming. Losses or gains from unequal transfer are calculated as the difference between a "fair 
value" of exports/imports and the "actual (unfair) value" of exports/imports. The estimation formula is: 
 




d = the exchange rate deviation index (also designated as "ERD" or “ERDI” in the literature) 
 
X = the volume of exports from a low- or middle-income country to high-income countries (valued at 
the actual exchange rate) 
 
T = the unrecorded transfer of value (gain or loss) resulting from unequal transfer 
 
The transfer of value from the peripheries to the center, according to this reasoning, is gigantic: 
 
Unequal transfer 1965 and 1995, by Center/Periphery 
 
          Unequal transfer 
         Gain (+) 
        Loss (-) 
 
    CENTER    PERIPHERY 
   (% of OECD GDP)  (% of NON-OECD GDP) 
 
1965   +1.4%         - 1.8 % 
1995   +8 %           -24 % 
 
(Number of countries: OECD N=19 (1965) and N=22 (1995); NON-OECD N=88 (1965) and N=97 
(1995)) (see Kohler/Tausch, 2002). 
   20
Neo-dependency and world system schools (see Tausch and Prager, 1993) would fear in addition that 
the most recent tendencies of world capitalism will strongly work against high female employment 
and create female unemployment, and they would especially expect two hypotheses to hold  
 
(i) transnational capital marginalizes female labor power  
(ii) the dynamics of growth turn away from those countries, where women still have a strong position 
on the labor market.  
 
The measurement scale, compatible with such hypotheses, would be the share of women in total 
employment and its trade-off with growth rates. The gender empowerment indicator series, first 
developed by the UNDP for the UNO-Women-Conference in Beijing 1995, provides a further testing 
ground for the different feminist social theories of world development. 
 
However,  neo-liberal thought would caution against such conclusions. Feminism per se might 
positively affect development patterns, but it might also work like a ‘distribution coalition’ that tries 
to influence – like all distribution coalitions – the results of the market via political pressure. Instead 
of changing the sexist distribution of human capital endowments, and thus changing the “starting 
capital” of women in society, feminism, the argument would say, tries to directly influence distributive 
relations via politics alone. The result could be – like with any distribution coalition – long-run 
stagnation and worsening income and other inequality. 
 
Our theory has to be qualified in one important further respective. Militarism will under certain 
circumstances be a ‘substitute’ for a Keynesian strategy and might have positive consequences for 
employment, and hence, perhaps also distribution issues. Apart from that, it is not entirely clear 
whether – like it or not - a negative short term or middle term relation between militarism and 
economic growth is to be ruled out entirely. Earlier research by Tausch (1993 – 2002) replicated some 
of the surprising findings by Weede in this respect. 
 
Other schools of thought (Holzmann et al.; Modigliani and European Roundtable of Industrialists) 
have stressed recently the importance of pension reforms in a globally aging society as a 
determinant of growth and development. Aging societies and inadequate pension systems, and not 
culture, economic freedom or dependency alone, are to blame for the negative development 
perspectives in many countries. Without adequate pension reform, aging will be an increasing 
burden on the comparative growth and development perspectives of the aging richer nations. 
 
Ever since the writings of Colemann (1965), also education  should be mentioned among the 
determining variables of the development performance of a country. Education and human capital 
formation figure prominently in the “Human Development Reports” of the United Nations 
Development Programme as variables which determine positively the development outcome. For the 
UNDP it has been self-evident over the last decade that gender empowerment and the re-direction of 
public expenditures away from defense will positively contribute to a positive development outcome.  
 
However, neo-liberal thought would caution against such premature conclusions. Public education 
expenditures are still public expenditures, and it is entirely conceivable that in the long run public 
education expenditures might negatively affect the development chances of a society, not because 
they are education expenditures, but because they are still public expenditures. For such a theoretical 
understanding, University reform and University privatization would be important political steps to 
achieve a more viable development.   21
 
 
Developing the research design 
 
 
The almost unlimited number of empirical studies on peripheral capitalism and development on a 
world level in the B-phase of the Kondratieff cycle from 1965 onwards go back, in a way, to the 
classic essay published by Johan Galtung in the Journal of Peace Research (Galtung, 1971). For 
Galtung, income inequality, and hence, relative poverty in the nations of the world system is linked to 
trade partner concentration of the peripheral country and a trade structure that relies on the exports of 
raw materials and the imports of finished products. Bornschier, Chase-Dunn, and their school later on 
reformulated the argument: not only income inequality, but also long term economic growth are being 
negatively determined by dependency from transnational capital, to be measured by a weighted share 
of transnational investment penetration per the economic and demographic size of a nation. Later 
essays extended the argument to other indicators of human well-being, the environment as well as 
democratic stability. Macroquantitative analyses modeled around the dependency/world system 
school generally have confirmed dependency arguments. According to these quantitative data 
analyses, there are powerful influences at work, which cause inequality and external imbalances in the 
periphery. Flagship essays and book publications of this school were written among others by Beer 
and Boswell; Birdsall; Bornschier; Bornschier and associates; Boswell; Boswell and associates; 
Bradshaw; Bradshaw and Huang; Bullock and Firebaugh; Chase - Dunn; Chase - Dunn and associates; 
Crenshaw; Delacroix and Ragin; Dixon; Dixon and Boswell; Evans and Timberlake; Fiala; Firebaugh; 
Juchler; Kentor; London; London and Robinson; London and Ross; London and Smith; London and 
Williams; Moaddel; Muller; Muller and Seligson; Nollert; Nollert and Fielder; Ragin and Bradshaw; 
Robinson and London; Rubinson; Russell; Tausch; Tausch and associates; Timberlake and Kantor; 
Timberlake and Williams; Trezzini and Bornschier; and Van Rossem. 
 
There has been a tendency in more recent cross-national research to focus not only on such variables 
as economic growth, income inequality and a few other indicators of social well-being, but to interpret 
“well-being” more widely to include also democracy, the environment, gender inequality and human 
development. Research results by Alderson and Nielsen; Beer; Bullock and Firebaugh; Burns et al.; 
DeSoysa and Oneal; Dixon, Fain et al.; Firebaugh and Beck.; Firebaugh; Hertz et al.; Kick et al.; 
Korzeniewicz and Moran; London and Williams; Meyer; Shen and Williamson; Shin, Smith; Tausch; 
Ward; Wimberley; and Wimberley and Bello in general terms indicate that there is reason to believe 
that the march of global capitalism not only negatively affects the distribution of economic values in 
the world system, but also of democracy, human development, gender equality and the quality of the 
environment. 
 
The present essay is well placed within that tradition, but qualifies these results in important 
respects. What are the negative social and ecological consequences of the dependent insertion into the 
world economy on a global scale and in the Southern and Southeastern neighborhood of Europe? 
Countries as far apart as large parts of Africa and Asia, just as Poland from 1795 - 1918, did not 
constitute a national state during the important era of the Industrial Revolution. Their economies were 
geared to the needs of others, i.e. their colonizers. The structural heterogeneity between the different 
economic sectors on the one hand and the ‘modern’, export oriented sector, the medium sector and the 
‘traditional sector’ in agriculture, industry and services, became the main reason for the unequal 
income distribution in the countries of the periphery. Colonial trade, foreign investment in the 19th 
Century, import substitution in the first half of the 20th Century, and the new international division of   22
labor that we observe from the middle of the 1960s onwards did not really change the structures of 
inequality in the world system. While mass demand and agricultural structures (Elsenhans, 1983) were 
responsible for the transition from the tributary mode of production in Western Europe to capitalism 
from the Long 16th Century onwards, periphery capitalism was and is characterized by the following 
main tendencies (Amin, 1973 - 1997): 
 
1.  regression in both agriculture and small scale industry characterizes the period after the 
onslaught of foreign domination and colonialism 
 
2.  unequal international specialization of the periphery leads to the concentration of activities in 
export oriented agriculture and or mining. Some industrialization of the periphery is possible 
under the condition of low wages, which, together with rising productivity, determine that 
unequal exchange sets in (double factorial terms of trade < 1.0; see Raffer, 1987 ) 
 
3.  these structures determine in the long run a rapidly growing tertiary sector with hidden 
unemployment and the rising importance of rent in the overall social and economic system 
 
4.  the development blocks of peripheral capitalism (chronic current account balance deficits, re-
exported profits of foreign investments, deficient business cycles of the periphery that provide 
important markets for the centers during world economic upswings) 
 
5.  structural imbalances in the political and social relationships, inter alia a strong ‘compradore’ 
element and the rising importance of state capitalism and an indebted state class 
 
For this reason, our concept of dependence at least includes three dimensions:  
 
•  unequal transfer 
•  MNC penetration 
•  the resource balance. 
 
The analysis of development patterns in the 1990s and beyond is complicated by the fact that 
capitalism develops not smoothly, but with very strong and self-repeating ups and downs, called 
cycles. Our analysis starts from well-known empirical research results of Joshua Goldstein, Volker 
Bornschier, and Luigi Scandella on this issue (Tausch, 1997, 1998). Cyclical fluctuations have also a 
profound effect on cross-national comparisons of economic growth and societal development in the 
medium and long run. What could have been spectacular long-run growth, in the end might turn out to 
be just a short run cyclical spurt after a long recession. For that reason, we include “development 
stability” among the dependent variables of our analysis. 
 
Cycle time plays, as we already stated, an important role in our approach. Arrighi’s thought is 
especially worthwhile mentioning here: that the logic of accumulation on a world scale shifts along 
time, and that we again witness during the 1980s and beyond a deregulated phase of world capitalism 
with a logic, characterized - in contrast to earlier regulatory cycles - by the dominance of financial 
capital. Arrighi further teaches us that even a century can be a ‘short run’ in the evolution of world 
capitalism. For Arrighi, there are signal crises of world capitalism (the usual Kondratieff depressions), 
and there are terminal crises of the world system, like the great crash of the early 1340s, which marked 
the beginning of the Genoese age, the 1560s, which marked the beginning of the Dutch era, the 1750s 
and 1760s, which marked the beginning of the British era, and the 1930s, which were the terminal   23
crisis of British world capitalist dominance. Regulation can be successful, like after 1560, and 1930, 
and deregulation can be successful, like after 1340, 1760, and - most probably - the 1980s (compiled 
from Arrighi, 1995).  
 
The long cycle literature, largely overlooked by macroquantitative development studies, tells us why 
there is a recurrent pattern of instability in the social orders both at the level of national society as well 
as at the level of the international system. It also explains the often-puzzling aspect, how different 
studies, using different time perspectives, reach different results. There is no single ‘correct’ theory of 
economic growth and development, but only theories that explain correctly growth and development at 
a given, cyclical time period. So, to be correct, our results are valid for the 1990s, and it is entirely 
possible that during other time periods, other results might be achieved. 
 
Long cycles, themselves to be explained by at least 13 different types of theories, by themselves are 
quite a strong argument in the debate about the long-run viability of the world-wide market economy: 
the recurrence of cycles, depressions and wars was thematically portrayed, amongst others, by 
Scandella (1998) and Goldstein (1988), furthermore Bornschier and Suter (1992), Bornschier (1988, 
expanded and updated English version 1996), Tausch (1998) and Arrighi (1995). The intense 
controversy about cycles should only be mentioned briefly here; for the policy-maker perhaps more 
important is the fact that after the economic crisis of 1825, the stock exchange collapse of 1873, the 
Black Friday of 1929 and the world recession starting in 1973/75, world capitalism has experienced 
quite severe downswing-phases that hit with elementary weight especially the countries of the 
periphery and the semi-periphery. The Kondratieff cycles of approximately 40-60 years duration and 
the Kuznets cycles, 18-22 years long, are especially relevant for our understanding of the ups and 
downs of world economics and politics. And add to this the lagged movement of world prices and 
interest rates, which are part and parcel of the cycle structure (Scandella, 1998; Bornschier and Suter, 
1992; Tausch, 1998). It is very probable that the long boom of the 1990s now comes to a close, and 
that the world economy enters anew a B-phase of the long economic cycle. 
 
Tausch, 1998; and Tausch and Herrmann, 2002 reached the conclusion that stocks of achieved 
globalization – measured by the UNCTAD indicator transnational investment stocks per total GDP in 
1985 – significantly and negatively affected 15 of the reported 19 development dimensions in 123 
countries
11 with fairly complete data during the period from 1965 to around 1993 – with the 
development dimensions ranging from economic growth to human development, gender 
empowerment, life expectancy, human and civil rights performance, economic equality etc. 
Controlling variables were – in a sociological and political science tradition – government 
expenditures, trade dependency, social security expenditures, fertility, years of United Nations 
membership of a country and the non-linear trade-off between development levels and development 
performance, among others. Table 1 summarizes these results
12: 
 
Table 1: The effects of MNC penetration on 19 dimensions of development, 1980s and 1990s (123 
countries with fairly complete data) according to Tausch/Herrmann 
                                            
11 For this sample there were fairly complete data for the following 38 Islamic countries available: Algeria; 
Bangladesh; Benin; Burkina Faso; Cameroon; Chad; Comoros; Cote d’Ivoire; Egypt; Gabon; Gambia; Guinea-
Bissau; Guyana; Indonesia; Iran; Jordan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Maldives; Mali; Mauritania; Morocco; 
Mozambique; Niger; Nigeria; Oman; Pakistan; Saudi Arabia; Sierra Leone; Somalia; Surinam; Syria; Togo; 
Tunisia; Turkey; Uganda; United Arab Emirates 







































12 1,393  110  destabili
zation 
and war 
0,880  0,381  13,200  social security effort, government 
expenditures, trade dependency, UN 
membership years, women in parliament, 
women in the labor force, fertility rate, 
military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff 
development level, % territory used for 
agriculture 
0,180 
11 7,423  111  green 
house 
index 
0,880  0,381  42,400  social security effort, government 
expenditures, trade dependency, UN 
membership years, women in parliament, 
women in the labor force, fertility rate, 
military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff 
development level 
0,000 
12 1,193  110  ethnowa
rfare 
0,940  0,349  11,500  social security effort, government 
expenditures, trade dependency, UN 
membership years, women in parliament, 
women in the labor force, fertility rate, 
military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff 
development level, % territory used for 
agriculture 
0,297 
11 31,349  111  DYN life 
expecta
ncy 
-1,600  0,112  75,600  life expectancy in the starting period, trade 
dependency, UN membership years, women 
in parliament, women in the labor force, 
military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff 
development level, violations of civil rights, 
terms of trade 
0,000 




1,980  0,050  34,500  social security effort, government 
expenditures, trade dependency, UN 
membership years, women in parliament, 
women in the labor force, fertility rate, 
military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff 
development level, % territory used for 
agriculture 
0,000 
6 50,487  116  maternal 
mortalit
y 
2,300 0,023  72,300  trade  dependency,  terms of trade, violations 
of civil rights 
0,000 




2,540 0,013  25,200  fertility rate, military personnel rate, 
nonlinear tradeoff development level 
0,001 







-3,400  0,001  30,300  social security effort, government 
expenditures, trade dependency, UN 
membership years, women in parliament, 
women in the labor force, fertility rate, 
military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff 
development level, % territory used for 
agriculture 
0,000 




-4,000  0,000  55,100  social security effort, government 
expenditures, trade dependency, UN 
membership years, women in parliament, 
women in the labor force, fertility rate, 
military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff 
development level 
0,000 




expenditures, trade dependency, UN 
membership years, women in parliament, 
women in the labor force, fertility rate, 
military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff 
development level, % territory used for 
agriculture 
6 66,116  116  life 
expecta
ncy 
-4,700 0,000 77,400  trade  dependency,  terms of trade, violations 
of civil rights 
0,000 






-4,800  0,000  37,700  social security effort, government 
expenditures, trade dependency, UN 
membership years, women in parliament, 
women in the labor force, fertility rate, 
military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff 
development level 
0,000 




-5,100  0,000  82,200  social security effort, government 
expenditures, trade dependency, UN 
membership years, women in parliament, 
women in the labor force, fertility rate, 
military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff 
development level 
0,000 




5,200  0,000  56,800  social security effort, government 
expenditures, trade dependency, UN 
membership years, women in parliament, 
women in the labor force, fertility rate, 
military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff 
development level 
0,000 





-5,800  0,000  44,300  social security effort, government 
expenditures, trade dependency, UN 
membership years, women in parliament, 
women in the labor force, fertility rate, 
military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff 
development level, % territory used for 
agriculture 
0,000 




5,930  0,000  65,100  social security effort, government 
expenditures, trade dependency, UN 
membership years, women in parliament, 
women in the labor force, fertility rate, 
military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff 
development level 
0,000 
11 73,939  111  mean 
years of 
ecuation 
-9,400  0,000  88,000  social security effort, government 
expenditures, trade dependency, UN 
membership years, women in parliament, 
women in the labor force, fertility rate, 
military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff 
development level 
0,000 




-12,000  0,000  87,100  social security effort, government 
expenditures, trade dependency, UN 
membership years, women in parliament, 
women in the labor force, fertility rate, 
military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff 
development level 
0,000 




-12,000  0,000  87,000  social security effort, government 
expenditures, trade dependency, UN 
membership years, women in parliament, 
women in the labor force, fertility rate, 
military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff 
development level, violations of civil rights 
0,000 
 
Legend: our own calculations, based on the F-VERT and T-VERT routines of the EXCEL computer 
program, re-affirming the results reported in Tausch/Herrmann, 2001. Only the first 4 equations, 
whose explanatory variables are printed in indented letters, would need a future re-formulation, while   26
all the other equations, including those for life expectancy, the Beijing-process indicators (gender 
empowerment and gender development) and the human development index are highly significant. 
 
 
A later and partial replication of these results came to the conclusion that in 134 countries
13 under 
investigation with fairly complete data from 1960 to 1995 – including the world of former 
Communism - both the UNCTAD variable – stocks of MNC capital per total GDP – as well as the 
new indicator of unequal transfer (simply based on the reciprocal value of the exchange rate deviation 
index, i.e. 1/ERDI
14) negatively and significantly affected several development processes (see below; 
error probability 10 % or less in the two-tailed t-test). It should be noted that in this presentation, we 
already considered duly that “good effects” are “good effects” and that “bad effects” are “bad effects” 
when presenting our results; i.e. a development strategy that increases, say, under 60 mortality rates 




Table 2: the effects of unequal transfer and MNC penetration on world development in 134 
countries (including Eastern Europe and the former USSR), covering the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s 




 Model  based 
on: 
R



















                                            
13 This sample included the following 35 Islamic countries with fairly complete data (data of entry into the 
Organization of Islamic Conference in brackets): Albania, Republic of (1992); Algeria, People's Democratic 
Republic of (1969); Azerbaijan, Republic of (1991); Bahrain, State of (1970); Bangladesh, People's Republic of 
(1974); Benin, Republic of (1982); Burkina Faso (1975); Cameroon, Republic of (1975); Comoros, Federal 
Islamic Republic of the (1976); Cote d'Ivoire, Republic of (2001); Egypt, Arab Republic of (1969); Gabon, 
Republic of (1974); Gambia, Republic of the (1974); Guinea-Bissau, Republic of (1974); Guyana, Republic of 
(1998); Indonesia, Republic of (1969); Jordan, Hashemite Kingdom of (1969); Kazakhstan, Republic of (1995); 
Kyrgyzstan, Republic of (1992); Malaysia (1969); Maldives, Republic of (1976); Mali, Republic of (1969); 
Mauritania, Islamic Republic of (1969); Morocco, Kingdom of (1969); Mozambique, Republic of (1994); Niger, 
Republic of (1969); Nigeria, Federal Republic of (1986); Oman, Sultanate of (1970); Pakistan, Islamic Republic 
of (1969); Sierra Leone, Republic of (1972); Surinam, Republic of the (1996); Tajikistan, Republic of (1992); 
Togo, Republic of (1997); Tunisia, Republic of (1969); Turkey, Republic of (1969); Uzbekistan, Republic of 
(1995) 
14 At the top of the international rank scale of global exploitation according to the ERDI concept (exchange rate 
deviation; the deviation of the nominal exchange rate from the real purchasing power parity rate) we find 
countries like Switzerland, Luxemburg, Scandinavian countries, and Japan, while nations like Nicaragua, China 
and Mozambique come at the bottom. It would be wrong to start from the assumption - as conventional 
economics is inclined to do - that the ERDI or 1/ERDI phenomenon - or call it unequal transfer - is an 
autonomous consequence of a relatively high price level in the non-tradable sector. If it were only so, there 
would be, among others, a high correlation between state sector expenditures (influencing the amount of non-


















56% 11,86  -1,57











1/ERDI 91,30%  96,7  -2,45   UN  membership 






91,00% 95,04  -2,08    UN  membership 




















1/ERDI 52,50%  10,2  -0,68  educational level, labor 




52,00%  9,9  -0,45  educational level, labor 









for the top 
20%) 
1/ERDI 41,00%  6,52  -0,17  population growth  absolute GNP 
 UNCTAD 
indicator 




1/ERDI 95%  161,5 -1,14  state sector 
expenditures 
population growth 
                                                                                                                                        
15 (p<.10, two-tailed test) 
16 throughout this work, predictors, printed in bold letters, are significant predictors (error probability 10 %, two-
tailed test).   28
 UNCTAD 
indicator 
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Explanation of economic 
growth 




56% 11,86  -1,57  120 13  0,119  0,000 229 
Explanation of child 
survival infant mortality 
1/ERDI  91,30% 96,7 -2,45 120  13 0,016 0,000  332 
UNCTAD 
indicator 
91,00% 95,04 -2,08  120  13  0,040 0,000  231;  327 
Explanation of general 
survival (early death) 
1/ERDI 89,40%  93,14  -2,87  122  11  0,005  0,000  332 
UNCTAD 
indicator 
89,00% 93,12 -2,84  122  11  0,005 0,000  328 
Explanation of democracy 
(political repression) 
1/ERDI  52,50% 10,2 -0,68 120  13 0,498 0,000  331 
UNCTAD 
indicator 
52,00% 9,9 -0,45  120 13  0,654  0,000  328 
Explanation of distributing 
the benefits of growth 
(income concentration for 
the top 20%) 
1/ERDI  41,00% 6,52 -0,17 120  13 0,865 0,000  331 
UNCTAD 
indicator 
41,00% 6,5 -0,16  120 13  0,873  0,000  329 
Explanation of life 
expectancy 
1/ERDI 95%  161,5  -1,14  120  13  0,257  0,000  331 
UNCTAD 
indicator 
95% 161,3  -1,16  120 13  0,248  0,000 329 
 
 
Legend: our own calculations, based on the F-VERT and T-VERT routines of the EXCEL computer 
program, re-affirming the results reported in Kohler/Tausch, 2002. Only the equations, whose 
explanatory variables are printed in bold letters, are acceptable, while the other equations, including 




Questions of measurement of the multivariate analysis 
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Our final sample – determined exclusively by data availability – had the following geographical shape: 
 
 













The choice of the 109 countries was determined by the availability of a complete data series for 




•  % population, aged >65y, 1998 
•  % women in government, ministerial level 
•  (I-S)/GDP (calculated from UNDP) 
•  state interventionism (absence of economic freedom; Heritage Foundation and Wall Street 
Journal website for economic freedom
17, 2000) 
                                            
17  http://www.freetheworld.com/; also: http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/. We used the latter 
website as the source of our data. It has to be kept in mind, that the “worst” countries on the economic freedom   30
•  EU-membership by 2000 
•  Islamic conference membership (OIC website
18) 
•  ln (GDP PPP pc)^2 
•  ln(GDP PPP pc) 
•  military expenditure as % of GDP 
•  MNC PEN 1995 (UNCTAD) 
•  public education expenditure per GDP 




The following dependent variables were used; with listwise deletion of missing values each time 




•  % people not expected to survive age 60 
•  CO2 emissions per capita 
•  development stability (year with highest real income minus year with lowest real income) 
since 1975 (calculated from UNDP) 
•  ESI-Index (Yale/Columbia environment sustainability index project website
19) 
•  Factor Social Development (Tausch, 2001b, calculated from 35 UNDP social indicators, SPSS 
factor analysis
20) 
                                                                                                                                        
scale have the numerically highest values, while the best countries have the numerically lowest values. Lao 
People's Dem. Rep. – the economically “unfreest” country in our sample, has the numerical value 4.6, while the 
economically freest country, Singapore, scores 1.45. We thus decided to call our indicator “state 
interventionism” 
18 http://www.oic-oci.org/ there the icon “members” 
19  http://www.ciesin.org/indicators/ESI/ We have chosen the 2001 data series at 
http://www.ciesin.org/indicators/ESI/archive.html. The general description of this indicator says that the  
 
‘Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) is a measure of overall progress towards environmental 
sustainability, developed for 142 countries. The ESI scores are based upon a set of 20 core "indicators," each of 
which combines two to eight variables for a total of 68 underlying variables. The ESI permits cross-national 
comparisons of environmental progress in a systematic and quantitative fashion. It represents a first step 
towards a more analytically driven approach to environmental decision making.’ 
 
20 Female life expectancy; life expectancy, 1995-2000; life expectancy, 1970-75; male life expectancy; human 
development index; female literacy; male literacy; contraceptive prevalence; daily supply of calories; 
immunization against measles; public health expenditure; doctors per inhabitants; average cigarette 
consumption; female tertiary students as % of male tertiary students; parliamentary seats held by women; gender 
empowerment; women's GDP per capita in purchasing power; growth of female economic activity; public 
education expenditure; women in government, ministerial level; women in government, all levels; female share 
in professional and technical workforce; women in government, sub-ministerial level; female share in 
administrative and managerial workforce; female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate; 
teen-age mothers; food import dependence; share of top 20% compared to bottom 20% in income distribution; 
female economic activity rate; TBC cases per 100,000 inhabitants; HIV rate; infants with low birth-weight; 
maternal mortality rate; infant mortality rate; % of people not expected to survive age 60.   31
•  female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate 
•  female share in total life years (calculated from UNDP – share of female life expectancy in the 
sum of male and female life expectancy) 
•  GDP output per kg energy use (“eco-social market economy”
21) 
•  GDP per capita annual growth rate, 1990-98 
•  human development index 
•  life expectancy, 1995-2000 
•  Political rights violations (Freedom House, 2000
22) 
•  share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20% 
•  unemployment (UN social indicators website) 
 
 
The following countries featured in the analysis: Albania; Algeria; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; 
Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Belarus; Belgium; Belize; Bolivia; Botswana; Brazil; 
Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Costa Rica; Côte 
d'Ivoire; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Egypt; El Salvador; Estonia; Ethiopia; Fiji; 
Finland; France; Gabon; Gambia; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; 
Hungary; India; Indonesia; Iran, Islamic Rep. of; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; 
Kenya; Kyrgyzstan; Lao People's Dem. Rep.; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Lithuania; Luxembourg; 
Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Malta; Mauritania; Mexico; Moldova, Rep. of; Mongolia; 
Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Pakistan; Panama; 
Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Russian Federation; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Singapore; 
Slovakia; Slovenia; South Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sweden; Switzerland; Syrian Arab Republic; 
Tajikistan; Thailand; Tunisia; Turkey; Uganda; United Kingdom; United States; Uzbekistan; 
Venezuela; Yemen; Zambia; Zimbabwe 
 
Our geographical presentation of the variables used in the analysis will be kept to a minimum, since 
we mention all the data in the appendix. Among the dependent variables, we just mention MNC 
penetration,  unequal transfer and the resource balance as the three “master variables” of 
dependency. Unequal transfer is strongest in the periphery, and weakest in the centers, with the semi-
periphery showing medium levels of exposure to unequal transfer. Our map might be even termed to 
be an update of this Wallersteinean concept to the realities of the turn of the Century and Millennium: 
 
 
Map 3: unequal transfer in the world system 
 
 
                                            
21 This term is most probably an Austrian invention. The governing Conservative People’s Party – to be precise, 
its former Chairman Dr. Josef Riegler – seems to have invented this term in the late 1980s. For more on that 
debate:  http://www.nachhaltigkeit.at/bibliothek/pdf/Factsheet11OekosozMarktw.pdf; and Michael Rösch, 
Tubingen University at http://tiss.zdv.uni-tuebingen.de/webroot/sp/spsba01_W98_1/germany1b.htm. As an 
indicator of the reconciliation between the price mechanism and the environment we propose the indicator GDP 
output per kg energy use; the term ‘eco-social market economy’ neatly grasps all the aspects of this empirical 
formulation 
22 Taken here from Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, edition 2002. The political freedom data referring to the 
year 2000 can also be downloaded at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm   32
 
1/ERDI
calculated from UNDP sources
3,78 bis 7,48  (31)
2,73 bis 3,78  (34)
2,16 bis 2,73  (36)
1,43 bis 2,16  (34)




Foreign saving, for its turn, is strongest in many parts of Latin America, Southern Africa, in the “new 
Europe” and in China and in several countries of Southeast Asia: 
 
Map 4: foreign saving in the world system 
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(I-S)/GNP
calculated from UNDP sources
3,4 bis 16   (32)
1,4 bis  3,4  (28)
0,6 bis  1,4  (29)
0,2 bis  0,6  (31)





In general terms, we observe today high levels of MNC penetration in the “dominion economies” like 
Australia and Canada, in Western Europe, in some parts of Eastern Europe, in Central Asia, other parts 
of the former USSR, in many parts of Latin America, Southern and Western Africa, in Egypt, in 




Map 5: MNC penetration in the world system 
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FDI per GDP 2000
UNCTAD data series
45 bis 272  (42)
27 bis  45  (32)
19 bis  27  (28)
13 bis  19  (27)
0 bis  13  (42)
MNC penetration, 2000
 
Legend: missing values for Greenland, Suriname, French Guyana, West Sahara, Bosnia/Herzegovina, 






FDI per GDP 2000
UNCTAD data series
45 bis 272  (42)
27 bis  45  (32)
19 bis  27  (28)
13 bis  19  (27)
0 bis  13  (42)
MNC penetration, 2000
 
   35
 
 
During the 1990s, penetration by transnational capital dramatically increased in many parts of Europe 
(especially in what was described by Donald Rumsfeld
23, US Secretary of Defense, recently as “the 
new Europe”); in eastern Latin America, in Southern Africa, in Central Asia and in South and 
Southeast Asia. However, there was a dramatic decrease of MNC penetration in most countries of 
the Arab world during the second half of the 1990s: 
 
Map 6: the increase/decrease of MNC penetration in the world system 
 
 
calculated from the %-values
FDI per GDP 1995, 2000
17 bis 139  (49)
11 bis  17  (31)
9 bis  11  (11)
4 bis  9  (33)
-79 bis  4  (43)






Among the dependent variables perhaps only the environmental stability index might be not so 
well known in the macro-quantitative research community. As it was stated, the ESI Index is a 
measure of the overall progress towards environmental sustainability and was developed for 142 
countries. ESI scores are based upon 20 core indicators, each of which combines two to eight variables 
for a total of 68 underlying variables. It is the first time in the research literature that a single yardstick 
of sustainable development has been developed: 
 
Map 7: environmental stability in the world system 
                                            
23 See also: http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2003/01/24012003172118.asp





ranging from ... to
56,5 bis 73,9  (29)
51,3 bis 56,5  (28)
47,1 bis 51,3  (28)
42,1 bis 47,1  (27)
23,9 bis 42,1  (30)
environmental stability index
 
The picture for the region of the MENA countries is rather mixed, with Turkey being classified ahead 





ranging from ... to
56,5 bis 73,9  (29)
51,3 bis 56,5  (28)
47,1 bis 51,3  (28)
42,1 bis 47,1  (27)
23,9 bis 42,1  (30)
environmental stability index  37
 
The Yale/Columbia project also calculated a “capacity” variable that shows the underlying chances of 
a country to realize an environment-friendly policy. The residuals from the linear standard regression 
comparing environment political capacity and environment policy (with capacity on the x-axis and the 
ESI index on the y –axis) shows how several nations, including large parts of Latin America, but also 
many parts of East Central and Eastern Europe and Turkey performed much better than might have 
been expected on the basis of their limited capacities; while the United States, China, India and states 
on the Arab Peninsula did not realize enough their existing policy potential for a sustainable 
development strategy (interestingly also Germany, its red-green government notwithstanding): 
 
 
Map 8: environment policy capacity and environment policy outcomes 
 
 
is better than capacity variable
residuals from ESI/CAP Yale/Col data
5,7 bis 11,2  (26)
2,4 bis  5,7  (30)
-1  bis  2,4  (27)
-5,6 bis  -1   (29)
-21,7 bis  -5,6  (30)





Summarizing the main theoretical expectations, we could present the following diagrams. The 
variables for the “Washington Consensus” are: 
 
 
•  state interventionism (absence of economic freedom; Heritage Foundation and Wall Street 
Journal website for economic freedom, 2000). Effect on development: - 
•  MNC PEN 1995 (UNCTAD). Effect on development: + 
•  competitive exchange rates (calculated from UNDP, concept: 1/ERDI). Effect on 
development: +   38
 
 
The “Washington Consensus” would thus expect: 
 






















The “UNDP” approach could be measured by the following variables 
 
 
•  % women in government, ministerial level. Effect on development: + 
•  military expenditure as % of GDP. Effect on development: - 




Graph 7: development according to the UNDP 
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Gender empowerment















The dependency model would expect the following relations to hold: 
 
 

















The bivariate results for unequal transfer 
 
Already our bi-variate analysis indicates that the new indicator series on unequal transfer, proposed by 
Kohler/Tausch, might serve as a tool to analyze social cohesion in the world system. The bivariate 
Pearson/Bravais correlations of unequal transfer with the UNDP social data set are overwhelming and 
show how unequal transfer negatively affects human well being in the world system: 
 






explained in % 
 
women's GDP per capita  -0,78  60,80 
gender empowerment  -0,74  54,80 
GDP per capita PPP -0,71  50,40 
main telephone lines per 1000 people  -0,70  49,00 
GNP per capita  -0,66  43,60 
human development index  -0,66  43,60 
GDP output per kg energy use  -0,64  41,00 
daily supply of calories, 1998  -0,61  37,20 
Televisions per 1000 people  -0,61  37,20 
male life expectancy  -0,54  29,20 
female literacy  -0,54  29,20 
life expectancy, 1995-2000  -0,54  29,20 
female life expectancy -0,53  28,10 
male literacy  -0,52  27,00 
contraceptive prevalence rate  -0,51  26,00 
tax revenue as % of GDP  -0,46  21,20 
internet hosts per 1000 people  -0,44  19,40 
public health expenditure per GDP  -0,43  18,50 
gross domestic savings rate  -0,42  17,60 
central government expenditures as % of GDP  -0,40  16,00 
% immunization against measles  -0,38  14,40 
economic growth, 1975-98  -0,36  13,00 
% parliamentary seats held by women  -0,32  10,20 
growth of female economic activity (1975=100)  -0,32  10,20 
GNP per capita annual growth rate, 1975-90  -0,30  9,00 
female tertiary students as % of males  -0,28  7,80   41
GNP per capita annual growth rate, 1990-98  -0,28  7,80 
doctors per 100.000 people  -0,27  7,30 
public education expenditure per GDP  -0,26  6,80 
% women in government, ministerial level  -0,25  6,30 
% women in government, all levels  -0,25  6,30 
female unpaid family workers as % of all unpaid family 
workers 
-0,24 5,80 
% women in government, subministerial level  -0,20  4,00 
% female administrators and managers  -0,18  3,20 
% immunization against TB  -0,18  3,20 
overall budget surplus/deficit as % of GDP  -0,17  2,90 
% female professional and technical workers  -0,15  2,30 
gross domestic investment  -0,08  0,60 
homicide rate  0,01  0,00 
female unemployment rate  0,03  0,10 
youth female unemployment rate  0,04  0,20 
military expenditure as % of GDP  0,08  0,60 
male unemployment rate  0,09  0,80 
share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20% 0,09  0,80 
youth male unemployment rate  0,12  1,40 
HIV rate  0,15  2,30 
food imports as % of merchandise imports  0,20  4,00 
female economic activity rate as % of male economic 
activity rate 
0,22 4,80 
juvenile convictions as % of all convictions  0,23  5,30 
TBC cases per 100.000 inhabitants  0,26  6,80 
female economic activity rate  0,35  12,30 
% infants with low birth-weight  0,38  14,40 
teen-age mothers as % of all mothers  0,39  15,20 
maternal mortality ratio  0,45  20,30 
% people not expected to survive age 60  0,50  25,00 
infant mortality rate  0,56  31,40 
food consumption as % of total household consumption  0,57  32,50 
 
 




1 indicator political democracy 
 
•  Political rights violations (Freedom House, 2000 )   42
 
4 indicators human development 
 
•  % people not expected to survive age 60 
•  Factor Social Development (Tausch, 2001b, calculated from 35 UNDP social indicators, SPSS 
factor analysis ) 
•  human development index 
•  life expectancy, 1995-2000 
 
3 indicators environmental quality 
 
•  CO2 emissions per capita 
•  ESI-Index (Yale/Columbia environment sustainability index project website) 
•  GDP output per kg energy use 
 
1 indicator development stability 
 
•  development stability (year with highest real income minus year with lowest real income) 
since 1975 (calculated from UNDP) 
 
1 indicator growth  
 
•  GNP per capita annual growth rate, 1990-98 
 
2 indicators social inclusion 
 
•  share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20% 
•  unemployment (UN social indicators website) 
 
2 indicators gender justice 
 
•  female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate 
•  female share in total life years (calculated from UNDP – share of female life expectancy in the 
sum of male and female life expectancy) 
 
These variables are explained by the following predictors: 
 
 
3 indicators of dependency 
 
•  (I-S)/GDP (calculated from UNDP) (resource balance) 
•  MNC PEN 1995 (UNCTAD) 
•  unequal transfer (calculated from UNDP, concept: 1/ERDI) 
 
1 variable (non)adherence to the advice by international financial institutions 
   43
•  state intervenmtionism (absence of economic freedom; Heritage Foundation and Wall Street 
Journal website for economic freedom, 2000) 
 
2 variables world political or world cultural identities 
 
•  EU-membership  
•  Islamic conference membership (OIC website) 
 
1 variable aging society 
 
•  % population, aged >65y, 1998 
 
1 variable political feminism 
 
•  % women in government, ministerial level 
 
1 variable militarism 
 
•  military expenditure as % of GDP 
 
1 variable public education effort 
 
•  public education expenditure per GDP 
 
2 control variables for development level, interacting 
 
•  ln(GDP PPP pc) 
•  ln (GDP PPP pc)^2 
 
We have to start here from the assumption that the basic tools of multivariate macro-quantitative 
analysis in political science and sociology are known to the audience of this article (for further 
literature on the subject, see Achen; Clauss and Ebner; Huang; Jackman; Kriz; Krzysztofiak. and 
Luszniewicz; Lewis - Beck; Microsoft Excel; Opp and Schmidt). 
 
A sophisticated re-analysis of the tendencies of world development in the 1990s should start from the 
assumption that the development level has a decisive, non-linear trade-off with subsequent 
development performance: poor countries increase rapidly their average life expectancy or economic 
growth and they quickly reduce their income inequality etc. 
 
Social scientists interpreted this effect mainly in view of an acceleration of economic growth in 
middle-income countries vis-à-vis the poor countries and in view of the still widening gap between the 
poorest periphery nations ('have-nots') and the 'haves' among the former Second and Third World 
(Tausch/Herrmann, 2002): 
 
(Equation 1) development performance = a1 + b1* ln (PCItn) - b2* (ln (PCItn))2 
 
The same function is also applied to income inequality and the rest of our 14 indicators, following a 
famous essay published by S. Kuznets in 1955. Growth and development accelerate with   44
redistribution, and then stagnate. In general terms, we explain development performance by the 
following standard multiple cross-national development research equation: 
 
(Equation 2) development performance  1990 - end 1990s = a1 +- b1*first part curvilinear function of 
development level +- b2*second part curvilinear function of development level +- b3...*transnational 
investment per GDP (UNCTAD) mid 1990s +- b4...*unequal transfer (1/ERDI) +- b5...* foreign saving 
+- b6...* military expenditures per GDP +- b7...* aging +- b8...* public education expenditures per 
GDP +-b9 * membership in the Islamic Conference +- b10 * European Union membership +- b11 * 
absence of economic freedom (state interventionism) 
 




The final results for 109 countries  
 
 
In general terms, several but not all aspects of the presented theories are confirmed, while other central 
assumptions of both the “Washington Consensus” and of its dependency theory counterpart are 
rejected. Also, theories about aging; feminist theories; human resource theories; military Keynesian 
theories/peace theories (i.e. theories maintaining that militarism has a very bad effect on long-run 
development); globalization critique and international economic integration theories have to tally with 
both positive and negative effects of their key indicators on different measurements of social, 
environmental and economic welfare, indicating that the time of the “quick fixes” has definitely gone 
and that contemporary development realities are very complex indeed. It should be noted that in this 
and in the following presentations, we already considered duly that “good effects” are “good effects” 
and that “bad effects” are “bad effects” when presenting our results; i.e. a development strategy that 
increases, say, under 60 mortality rates, is a bad strategy and thus has negative effects: 
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the indicator is determined 









































































positive  development stability (year 
with highest real income
minus year with lowest real 
income) since 1975 
 




negative  CO2 emissions per capita
(Kyoto) 








positive  GDP output per kg energy 
use  (eco-social market
economy) 
 
positive                        negative .. positive negative .. negative  negative  .. positive  .. .. 72,1 16,8 78
gender 
justice 
positive  female economic activity 
rate as % of male economic 
activity rate 
positive                  negative .. negative positive positive .. negative ..  negative positive positive 51,4  8,47  96 
gender 
justice 
positive  female share in total life 
years 
negative  positive  ..                    negative  .. .. .. negative  .. .. .. positive  49,5 7,84 96
                      
growth                               positive  GNP per capita annual
growth rate, 1990-98 








negative  % people not expected to 
survive age 60 (survival) 

















the indicator is determined 
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negative share  of
income/consumption richest 
20% to poorest 20% 
(income redistribution) 




negative unemployment  (UN)
(employment) 








positive  human development index  negative  positive  negative  ..                      .. .. .. .. .. .. .. positive  91,8 80 86










































































It must be recalled that our concept of development is multi-dimensional. Our indicators correspond 
to the following dimensions and thus are much more compatible with work being carried out over the 




Graph 9: our concept of development 
 

















Also, our determinants of the development process are thought to be multi-dimensional: 
 
 
Graph 10: the determinants of development  
 
   48




















Our results can now be summarized briefly as follows: 
 
Aging is part and parcel of the structure of industrialized societies, East and West. Aging contributes 
to a generalized scarcity of labor, which in turn leads to improved distributive relationships between 
the rich and the poor. However, several negative effects must also be considered properly – especially 
the negative effects of an aging population structure on the process of human development, which is 




aging: % population, aged 
>65y, 1998 
 
GDP output per kg energy use (eco-social market 
economy) 
positive 
female economic activity rate as % of male economic 
activity rate 
positive 
share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20% 
(income redistribution) 
positive 
unemployment (UN) (employment)  positive 
CO2 emissions per capita (Kyoto)  negative 
female share in total life years  negative 
% people not expected to survive age 60 (survival)  negative 
life expectancy, 1995-2000 negative 
Factor Social Development  negative   49
human development index  negative 
 
 
Political feminism has an aggregate positive effect on many phenomena of human and ecological 
development, but it fails to transform political power into improved employment and distribution 
structures. This is due mainly to the process of distribution coalition formation, featuring so 
prominently in neo-liberal theories of economic growth (see especially, the writings of Weede). 
 
 
political feminism % 
women in government, 
ministerial level 
 
CO2 emissions per capita (Kyoto)  positive 
female share in total life years  positive 
% people not expected to survive age 60 (survival)  positive 
life expectancy, 1995-2000  positive 
Factor Social Development  positive 
human development index  positive 
GDP output per kg energy use (eco-social market 
economy) 
negative 
female economic activity rate as % of male economic 
activity rate 
negative 
share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20% 
(income redistribution) 
negative 
unemployment (UN) (employment)  negative 
 
 
As one of the three main indicators of dependency, the reliance on foreign savings eases the 
distribution burden against the poorer segments of society during the accumulation process, but it has 




foreign saving (I-S)/GDP 
 
share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20% 
(income redistribution) 
positive 
CO2 emissions per capita (Kyoto)  negative 
human development index  negative 
ESI-Index (sustainability)  negative 
Political rights  negative 
 
 
Absence of economic freedom (state interventionsim), paradoxically enough, increases the 
rationality of the societal resource allocation and leads towards an improved development stability but 
it fails to resolve two basic issues: overall environmental stress and societal sexism in the employment   50








CO2 emissions per capita (Kyoto)  positive 
GDP output per kg energy use (eco-social market 
economy) 
positive 
development stability (year with highest real income 
minus year with lowest real income) since 1975 
positive 
ESI-Index (sustainability)  negative 
female share in total life years  negative 





Military expenditures have a certain Keynesian effect but they contribute towards a worse 
environmental balance. Military expenditures lead towards a drying up of what Marxists term “the 
reserve army of labor”, which, in turn, leads to a certain better social cohesion and employment gender 
balance. But militarized structures consume large amounts of fossil fuel, with advanced air forces 
especially contributing to that process. 
 
 
female economic activity rate as % of male economic 
activity rate 
positive 
share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20% 
(income redistribution) 
positive 
CO2 emissions per capita (Kyoto)  negative 





MNC penetration contributes to an improved ESI Index and towards better female employment, but 
it has negative consequences for human survival and life expectancy. In addition, an interesting 
phenomenon worthy of further research is the interconnection between decaying public services, 
decaying public transport and decaying public health services in the host countries of transnational 
investment on the one hand and the strategic policies of transnational corporations on the other hand, 
concentrated on the private sector, private transport, private medical services and the private 
automobile. The strengthening triple alliance between the MNCs, local capital and the state is a net 
result of the globalization process, and it still has dire social consequences as well. 
 
 
dependency on foreign 
capital MNC PEN 1995 
 
female economic activity rate as % of male economic 
activity rate 
positive   51
ESI-Index (sustainability)  positive 
% people not expected to survive age 60 (survival)  negative 
life expectancy, 1995-2000 negative 
 
 
Human resources and human development investments ever since the publication of the first United 
Nations Human Development Reports in the early 1990s are regarded as the key towards a socially 
equitable and sustainable development. However, as often happens in development theory, the early 
optimism regarding the effects of one variable has soon to be qualified. 
 

























There are very surprising clear-cut negative interactions between public education expenditure and an 
eco-social market economy and political democracy. Positive effects exist as well, but they are not 
statistically significant. A plausible intervening variable, which we did not as yet consider in our 




expenditure per GDP 
 
GDP output per kg energy use (eco-social market 
economy) 
negative 
Political rights  negative 
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Unequal transfer has the most clear-cut negative results of all dependency indicators on the process 
of development, as understood in this investigation; especially on democracy, the environment, gender 
justice and employment. The positive effect on income redistribution has to be seen in the context of 
the siphoning-off of the surplus value from periphery countries that reduces the share of the richest 20 





share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20% 
(income redistribution) 
positive 
GDP output per kg energy use (eco-social market 
economy) 
negative 
Political rights  negative 
female economic activity rate as % of male economic 
activity rate 
negative 
ESI-Index (sustainability)  negative 
CO2 emissions per capita (Kyoto)  negative 
female share in total life years  negative 
unemployment (UN) (employment)  negative 
 
 
There are very diverse views nowadays on the European Union. As a recent paper, published in the 
journal “Parameters” of the US Army maintains (Wilkie, 2003): 
 
“Still, there are those on both sides of the Atlantic who believe that the European Union, as an old-
fashioned socialist bureaucracy, is “fundamentally unreformable” and also culturally hostile to the 
United States” (Wilkie, 2003: 46)
24
 
There is a wide range of literature now available that highlights the negative effects of European 
integration in a globalized world economy (for a survey of the literature and politometric evidence, see 
Tausch and Herrmann, 2001). In the present research design, the most considerable effect is the 
negative trade-off between EU membership and political democracy, once you control for the other 




Political rights  negative 
 
 
The “real existing” Union will have a lot to do to fulfill the Lisbon agenda to become by 2010 “…the 
most competitive and dynamic, knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable 
economic growth, creating more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”
25. The race between the 
Euro and the Dollar on the world currency markets has added to the sense of competition between the 
two systems that years ago were still considered to be the “Atlantic West”. But even a first brief look 
                                            
24 http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02winter/wilkie.htm 
25 http://www.bmaa.gv.at/view.php3?f_id=51&LNG=en&version=   53
at the EU’s statistical website, Eurostat
26 shows how far “old Europe” (quotation from Donald 
Rumsfeld; in Brussels “newspeak” simply “the EU-15”) or for that matter also “the old and the new 
Europe” (the “EU-25” now comprising 25 European states, including 8 former Communist states in 
East Central Europe, Cyprus and Malta after the enlargement of May 1
st 2004) are still away from this 
goal of becoming the most competitive and dynamic economy in the world. 
 
Our results about the European Union might be considered more provocative still, when we also 
consider that – contrary to popular assumptions – membership in the Islamic Conference is not an 
impediment against political democracy. Our results clearly contradict many of the expectations 
inherent in the writings of Professor Samuel Huntington. 4 development indicators – 2 for the 
environment, 1 on human development, and 1 on democracy – are positively and significantly 
determined by membership in the Islamic Conference, once you properly control for the effects of the 
other influencing variables. However, gender justice and redistribution remain the “Achilles heel” of 
today’s members in the Islamic Conference, strengthening the cause of those who advocate – like in 
the United Nations Arab Human Development Report – more social inclusion and more gender justice 






Political rights  positive 
GDP output per kg energy use (eco-social market 
economy) 
positive 
CO2 emissions per capita (Kyoto)  positive 
life expectancy, 1995-2000  positive 
share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20% 
(income redistribution) 
negative 





The well-known acceleration and maturity effects of development have to be qualified in an 
important way. Ever since the days of Simon Kuznets, development researchers have applied curve-
linear formulations in order to capture these effects. However, the results for equation 1 above are not 
as clear-cut as one might have expected; and – in addition – the direction of the influence does hardly 
correspond with the equation. The curve-linear function of growth, being regressed on the natural 
logarithm of development level and its square, is sometimes called the 'Matthew's effect' following 
Matthew's (13, 12): 
 
'For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance: but whosoever hath 
not, for him shall be taken away even that he hath' 
 
Social scientists interpreted this effect mainly in view of an acceleration of economic growth in 
middle-income countries vis-à-vis the poor countries and in view of the still widening gap between the 
                                            
26 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/newcronos/reference/display.do?screen=detailref&language=de&product=E
U_strind&root=EU_strind/strind/ecobac/eb011   54
poorest periphery nations ('have-nots') and the 'haves' among the semi-periphery countries (Jackman, 
1982). Their hypothesis is only partially confirmed here – there is no significant acceleration at low 
levels of development, but a significant econonmic growth stagnation/saturation effect. The first 




development ln(GDP PPP 
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development ln (GDP PPP 
pc)^2 
 
female economic activity rate as % of male economic 
activity rate 
positive 
life expectancy, 1995-2000  positive 
share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20% 
(income redistribution) 
positive 
ESI-Index (sustainability)  positive 
female share in total life years  positive 
human development index  positive 
Factor Social Development  positive 




Implications for policy 
 
 
By far the most negative influence on development is wielded by unequal transfer, followed by the 
aging process (especially without pension reform) and certain negative aspects of feminist 
distribution coalitions in society: 
 
 
 % negative effects  % positive effects % insignificant 
effects 
 




42,9 28,6 35,7   55
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ln(GDP PPP pc) 
0,0 7,1  92,9 
 
 
By far the most positive effects on social, ecological and economic development come about by the 
maturity effects of development, followed by the positive aspects of feminism, the aging process 
and membership in the Islamic Conference: 
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MNC PEN 1995 
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foreign saving (I-
S)/GDP 




ln(GDP PPP pc) 




14,3 0,0 85,7 
EU-membership 7,1  0,0  92,9 
 
 
With all the talk about dependency, globalization or the “Washington Consensus” notwithstanding, it 
is shown that feminism, pension reform, the maturity effects of capitalism as well as unequal 
transfer open up new horizons of future development debates. The variables 
 
•  political feminism % women in government, ministerial level 
•  aging: % population, aged >65y, 1998 
•  maturity effects development ln (GDP PPP pc)^2 
•  unequal transfer 
 
are far more relevant in explaining our 14 development dimensions than the traditional “stars” of the 
debate, the political and left and right, pro- and anti-globalization movements, culturalist development 
theories etc. notwithstanding. The variables 
 
•  Islamic conference membership 
•  absence of economic freedom (state interventionsim) 
•  foreign saving (I-S)/GDP 
•  military expenditure as % of GDP 
•  dependency on foreign capital MNC PEN 1995 
•  public education expenditure per GDP 
•  acceleration effects development ln(GDP PPP pc) 
•  EU-membership 
 
on the other hand do not have so many significant effects (insignificant effects > 50 %) as the “new” 
variables (insignificant effects < 50 %), which were analyzed in this article and which will determine 
future development outcomes in a decisive way:   57
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The (meager) effects of the “Washington Consensus” variables on development are the following. 
Relationships, contradicting the basic assumptions of the theory, are printed in bold letters: 
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% people not expected to survive age 60 
(survival) 
..  negative 
CO2 emissions per capita (Kyoto)  positive  .. 
development stability (year with highest real 
income minus year with lowest real income) since 
1975 
positive  .. 
ESI-Index (sustainability)  negative  positive 
Factor Social Development  ..  .. 
female economic activity rate as % of male 
economic activity rate 
negative positive 
female share in total life years  negative  .. 
GDP output per kg energy use (eco-social market 
economy) 
positive  .. 
GNP per capita annual growth rate, 1990-98  ..   
human development index  ..  .. 
life expectancy, 1995-2000  ..  negative 
Political rights  ..  .. 
share of income/consumption richest 20% to 
poorest 20% (income redistribution) 
.. .. 
unemployment (UN) (employment)  ..  .. 
 
In addition, it should be noted that a central assumption of the “Washington Consensus” – competitive 
exchange rates – could be operationalized by “1/ERDI” and amounts to “unequal transfer”. 
 
The results for the dependency explanation of world development are the following. Relationships 










% people not expected to survive age 60 
(survival) 
.. negative  .. 
CO2 emissions per capita (Kyoto)  negative  ..  negative 
development stability (year with highest real 
income minus year with lowest real income) since 
1975 
.. ..  .. 
ESI-Index (sustainability)  negative  positive  negative 
Factor Social Development  ..  ..  .. 
female economic activity rate as % of male 
economic activity rate 
..  positive  negative 
female share in total life years  ..  ..  negative 
GDP output per kg energy use (eco-social market 
economy) 
.. ..  negative 
GNP per capita annual growth rate, 1990-98  ..    .. 
human development index  negative  ..  ..   59
life expectancy, 1995-2000 ..  negative  .. 
Political rights  negative  ..  negative 
share of income/consumption richest 20% to 
poorest 20% (income redistribution) 
positive  ..  positive 
unemployment (UN) (employment)  ..  ..  negative 
      




Let us turn to issue of Islamic development efficiency. The empirical record, presented in this essay, 
speaks a clear language in favor of Islamic democracy and against those in the West that attempt to 
treat Islamic cultural heritage as a general development burden. A careful reading of what theologians 
– most notably, also leading Christian experts on Islam among them – positively have to say on 
Islamic humanism and its interesting institutions of zakat and sadaqat
27 is in stark contrast to the 
contemporary rhetoric of cultural warfare; basic Islamic institutions have enormously many aspects to 
offer to world development. A glance at the literature could easily convince anyone about the richness 
of Islamic social doctrine and Islamic social philosophy (Abdullah and Khoury, 1984; Armstrong, 
2001; Khoury, 1980, 1981, 1991; Kunzmann and associates, 1996; Russell, 1999; Tibi, 1985, 1992, 
2001). Zakat is the first institution of social security in the world system. Payment of 2 ½ percent of 
savings of the zakat fund is one of the fundamental duties of a Muslim. The State is responsible to 
collect zakat and makes arrangements for its distribution; while sadaqat is paid at no fixed rate (see 
also: The Light of Islam website at http://home.swipnet.se/islam/articles/Non-Muslim.htm).  
 
Our evidence shows that the majority of Islamic countries transformed their “growth” much better to 
the benefit of “life quality” (average life expectancy) than most other societies around the globe. 
 
At the same time, the UNDP data set shows that life expectancy as the most direct indicator of life 
quality in the world system has dramatically increased in the regions of the Middle East and in the 
Andean countries of Latin America, while in Southern Africa and in Eastern Europe there was a 
stagnation over the long period 1970 – 2000: 
 
 
Map 9: where development in the world 1970 – 2000 was really pro-poor 
 
                                            
27 In the framework of the ecumenical dialogue between Christianity and Islam the prayer meeting of His 
Holiness the Pope at the Omayadd Mosque in Damascus on the 6
th of May, 2001 should be especially 
mentioned: http://www.kuftaro.org/English/wot/on_the_occasion_of_the_visit_of.htm;  
http://www.catholic-forum.com/saints/pope0264qr.htm
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UNDP data; increases in years
from .. to
11,1 bis 21,5  (33)
7,4 bis 11,1  (31)
5,8 bis  7,4  (33)
3,5 bis  5,8  (35)
-13,1 bis  3,5  (32)
alle anderen   (1)
life exp. increases 1970-2000
 
Legend: missing values for West Sahara, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Sierra Leone, 




UNDP data; increases in years
from .. to
11,1 bis 21,5  (33)
7,4 bis 11,1  (31)
5,8 bis  7,4  (33)
3,5 bis  5,8  (35)
-13,1 bis  3,5  (32)
alle anderen   (1)
life exp. increases 1970-2000
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Seen in such a way, the contrary of common beliefs is true: “Kemalism”, “Arab socialism” and other 
“isms” were quite successful, while the “Washington Consensus” strategies put in place after 1989 in 
Eastern Europe and the former USSR proved to be one of the utmost development failures in human 
history. 
 
At a time, when leading protagonists of the “Consensus” proclaim that growth is simply good for the 
poor, it is time to reckon by quantitative means the complicated relationships between growth and the 
social and ecological dimensions of growth. 
 
Protagonists of the thesis that growth is good for the poor would have to expect a 1:1 correlation 
between these two variables. But this is clearly not the case, as our scatter plott from UNDP figures 
shows: 
 
Graph 11: economic growth and life expectancy increases 
 
 
growth and life expectancy increases












-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15






































High growth and high life expectancy increases are certainly good for the poor; but equally interesting 
are the cases of those countries that had negative economic growth (<0.0 % per annum) and yet 
experienced a life expectancy increase of more than 9 years all over the period of the 1970s, 1980s, 
and 1990s. These countries were Libya, Saudi-Arabia, Bolivia, Algeria, Iran, Nicaragua, Peru, United 
Arab Emirates, El Salvador, Senegal, and Comoros. So, if growth is good for the poor, is stagnation 
also good for the poor? 
 
There were indeed high-growth countries (real growth per capita > 3.0 % per annum) with dramatic 
life expectancy increases of 9 years or more – countries that correspond to a revised “growth is good 
for the poor” theory. These countries were Bhutan, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Maldives, Laos, India, South   62
Korea, Chile, Cape Verde, Thailand, Equatorial Guinea, and Malaysia. However, the problem for the 
Dollar and Kray school of thought is here that these countries were not precisely “shining examples” 
of world economic openness. In reality many of them combined “openness” with various degrees of 
import substitution and government control. Their long-run growth was really good for the poor. But 
what about the high-growth country Botswana (> 3.0 % per annum) that had a life expectancy reversal 
of 8.7 years since the 1970s, brought about by the AIDS epidemic and rampant poverty? Let us further 
compare these success stories and failure stories in the world system: was really economic freedom 
responsible or to blame for their development success or failure? 
 
 




Summary Economic Freedom Ratings, 1970 to 1997 (scale ranges 
from 0 (complete command economy) to 10 (highest value)). The 
present scale differs from the scale, used throughout the rest of this 
essay 
        
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995  1997  Change 
during 
1990s 
Botswana  (failure)  NR 3,9 4,7 5,6  6 6,8  6,6  0,7 
Chile  (success)  3,7 3,7 5,9  6  7,4  8,2  8,2  0,8 
India (success)  4  3,6 4,3 4,1 4,1 5  5,8  1,8 
Indonesia  (success)  4,8  5  5,2 5,9 6,8  7,3  7,2  0,4 
Malaysia  (success)  6,5 6,4 7,1 7,3 7,7  7,6  7,5 -0,2 
South Korea (success)  6,3  5,6 5,7  6  6,6  7,7 7,3  0,7 
Thailand  (success)  6,4 5,6 5,8 6,1 6,8  7,6  8,2  1,4 
 




Our final test for this is a multiple regression analysis that explains life expectancy increases in the 
years since 1970 by the levels of life expectancy (and its square) already reached in 1970 and by 
economic growth 1975 – 2000: 
 












0,46732761 -0,01331198 1,41730518 -29,2749294 
0,13387574 0,00387424 0,44130905 12,1686364 
0,16470681  4,96843806    
9,66203683 147     
715,533059 3628,75039       63
3,49075644 -3,43602192  3,2115933  T-Test 
 
 
Legend: as in all EXCEL 5.0 outprints in this work, first row: unstandardized regression coefficients, 
second row: standard errors, last row: t-Test and direction of the influence. The values immediately 
below the standard errors are R^2 (third row, left side entry), F, and degrees of freedom (fourth row). 
Two-tailed test, 10 % error probability; all predictors are significant. The the entire equation is 
significant at the 0.00 level according to the F-Test. 
 
The following graph shows that a non-linear formulation for the trade-off between historic life 
expectancy levels and subsequent life expectancy increases is more adequate than a linear one: 
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It emerges that the Islamic countries are among the best performers on this scale (i.e. as measured by 
the residuals from equation (3)) in the entire world system. The countries in Map 10 marked in dark 
colors are really those where growth (or stagnation) was in benefit for the poor, while the countries, 
marked in white colors, are the ones where growth (or stagnation) did not benefit the poor, irrespective 
of life expectancy levels reached back in 1970. 
 
 
Map 10: human development efficiency in the world system 
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residuals from the above
regression ranging from .. to
2,9 bis  12   (30)
1,5 bis  2,9  (29)
0,1 bis  1,5  (28)
-2,6 bis  0,1  (33)





Legend: there are missing data for Greenland, Cuba, Dominica, Guatemala, Poland, West Sahara, 
Chad, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, the 
Congo, Eritrea, Tanzania, Yemen, Qatar, Afghanistan, and Kazakhstan 
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residuals from the above
regression ranging from .. to
2,9 bis 12   (30)
1,5 bis  2,9  (29)
0,1 bis  1,5  (28)
-2,6 bis  0,1  (33)




Legend: there are missing data for Greenland, Cuba, Dominica, Guatemala, Poland, West Sahara, 
Chad, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, the 
Congo, Eritrea, Tanzania, Yemen, Qatar, Afghanistan, and Kazakhstan. 
 
 
Looking back on short-run dynamics and long-term stagnation 
 
 
A constant feature of dependency theories, especially Volker Bornschier’s development 
theory is the idea that penetration by transnational capital causes short-term dynamism but 
long-term stagnation. In general terms, we observed at the beginning and in the mid 1990s 
high levels of existing penetration in the “dominion economies” like Australia and Canada, in 
Western Europe, in many parts of Latin America, Southern and Western Africa, in Egypt, in 
Tunesia and on the Arab Peninsula, and in China and Southeast Asia. During the 1990s, 
penetration by transnational capital dramatically also increased in many parts of Europe 
(especially in what was described by Donald Rumsfeld
28, US Secretary of Defense, recently 
as “the new Europe”); in eastern Latin America, in Southern Africa, in Central Asia and in 
South and Southeast Asia. However, there was a dramatic decrease of MNC penetration in 
most countries of the Arab world during the second half of the 1990s. 
                                            
28 See also: http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2003/01/24012003172118.asp
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In order to test the relevance of the dependency model proposed by Volker Bornschier, based 
on MNC penetration and its increases over time, with the new data series provided by 
UNCTAD (independent variables MNC penetration 1995 and increases of MNC penetration 
1995 - 2000) and the UNDP (HDR, 2000; independent variables: development level and all 
dependent variables), and try to project its consequences for the Muslim world, we calculated 
the multiple regressions for 14 development dimensions: 
 
development performance = a1 +- b1*first part curvilinear function of development level +- 
b2*second part curvilinear function of development level +- b3...*transnational investment 




n = 164 countries
29 complete data for GDP PPP, MNC Penetration, DYN MNC 
Penetration, unequal exchange 
 
This leads to the following results. Bornschier’s theory receives confirmation by the reported 
performance of the human development indicator increases, and the economic growth theory 
is confirmed as well, but not at the 5 % level, and several other social indicators correspond in 
their performance to Bornschier’s implicit assumptions, but in several other cases the 
dynamism/stagnation approach has to be reversed. 
 
 
 T-value  and 
direction of 












at 10 % 
level yes 
                                            
29 The countries with complete data were: Albania; Algeria; Angola; Antigua and Barbuda; Argentina; Armenia; 
Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Barbados; Belarus; Belgium; Belize; Benin; 
Bhutan; Bolivia; Botswana; Brazil; Brunei Darussalam; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; 
Canada; Cape Verde; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Comoros; Congo; Congo, Dem. 
Rep. of the; Costa Rica; Côte d'Ivoire; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Dominica; Dominican 
Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Estonia; Ethiopia; Fiji; Finland; France; Gabon; 
Gambia; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Grenada; Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; 
Honduras; Hong Kong, China (SAR); Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iran, Islamic Rep. of; Ireland; Israel; 
Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Korea, Rep. of; Kyrgyzstan; Lao People's Dem. Rep.; Latvia; 
Lebanon; Lesotho; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Macedonia, TFYR; Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Maldives; 
Mali; Malta; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Moldova, Rep. of; Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; Namibia; 
Nepal; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Panama; Papua New 
Guinea; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Romania; Russian Federation; Rwanda; Saint 
Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; Samoa (Western); Saudi Arabia; Senegal; 
Seychelles; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; Solomon Islands; South Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Swaziland; 
Sweden; Switzerland; Syrian Arab Republic; Tajikistan; Tanzania, U. Rep. of; Thailand; Togo; Trinidad and 
Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Uganda; Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United 
States; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Vanuatu; Venezuela; Viet Nam; Yemen; Zambia; Zimbabwe   67
 
% parliamentary seats held by 
women 
3,0633431 -2,657935  confirmed  yes 
female economic activity rate as % 
of male economic activity rate 
3,6572896 -3,838198  confirmed  yes 
GDP output per kg energy use  4,1828965  -3,485711  confirmed  yes 
change in human development 
index, 1990-98 
0,1104156 -0,049958  confirmed  no 
gender empowerment  0,6812837  -0,079334  confirmed  no 
GNP per capita annual growth rate, 
1990-98 
0,4226642 -0,200435  confirmed  no 
share of income/consumption 
richest 20% to poorest 20% 
-1,721939 1,5509028  confirmed  partially 
% people not expected to survive 
age 60 










growth of female economic 
activity (1975=100) 
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That foreign capital so dramatically withdrew from several Muslim regions in the world 
economy should be kept in due consideration in future research. The above model shows that 
in the Muslim world a number of processes of sustainable development, like: 
 
% people not expected to survive age 60 
CO2 emissions per capita 
growth of female economic activity (1975=100)   68
human development index 
infant mortality rate 
maternal mortality ratio 
teen-age mothers as % of all mothers 
 
in reality benefited by the withdrawal of transnation capital from the region, while the 
processes: 
 
% parliamentary seats held by women 
female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate 
GDP output per kg energy use 
change in human development index, 1990-98 
gender empowerment 
GNP per capita annual growth rate, 1990-98 
equitable income distribution (as measured by the share of income/consumption richest 20% 
to poorest 20%) 
 
in reality suffered from the lack of dynamism associated with the massive withdrawal of 
foreign capital. 
 




In the post-WWII-world in which the often neglected great political economist Franco Modigliani 
(1918 – 2003) – who won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1985 - wrote his path-breaking essays on 
the life cycle, savings and the wealth of nations, the division between the centers, the peripheries and 
the semi-peripheries was relatively stable. Franco Modigliani’s political economy has a tremendous 
message not only for the developed world, but also for the countries of what was once called the 
“Third World”, and the Muslim world in particular. Modigliani above all shows to us what happens 
with the saving rate, and in his later work he dramatically advocated overhauling the pension systems 
based in so many countries on the “pay as you go” principle. 
 
The world system approach, pioneered today, above all by Giovanni Arrighi and Andre Gunder Frank, 
however teaches us that the centers of gravity in the world economy are dramatically shifting towards 
the Asia-Pacific region, and that the days of “Eurocentrism” are outnumbered: 
 
 
Map 11: the political economic geography of saving rates today 
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as % of GDP
UNDP data 1998
24,1 bis 51,4  (29)
19,4 bis 24,1  (33)
14,7 bis 19,4  (32)
7,1 bis 14,7  (31)
-42,7 bis  7,1  (34)
saving rate
 





as % of GDP
UNDP data 1998
24,1 bis 51,4  (29)
19,4 bis 24,1  (33)
14,7 bis 19,4  (32)
7,1 bis 14,7  (31)
-42,7 bis  7,1  (34)
saving rate
 
Note: missing values for Greenland, Antarctica, and several countries in the Balkan region, Africa and West Asia 
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Modigliani’s central hypotheses on savings are from the standpoint of world system theory: 
 
1) saving rates are independent of per capita incomes 
2) economic growth rates determine saving rates 
 
 
Savings still ARE clearly a function of per capita incomes and the position of a country in the world 
system, but the geographical map of world savings dramatically changes. The following graph shows 
that cross-national variations in per capita income explain 30 % of saving: 
 
 
Graph 13: per capita income and the saving rate 
 
 
Modigliani: income per capita and saving rate
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The correlations of the savings process indicate that it cannot be separated from the today so 
dramatically changing center – periphery structure that characterizes the entire world system. We just 
highlight the following interesting relationships. World system and dependency scholars have always 
maintained that conditions of economic and social “injustice” drain the societal savings rates and 
block productive investments in the periphery and the semi-periphery. On the other hand, conditions 
of mass demand, economic justice and economic growth provide a powerful impetus for the savings 
rate. It is more than symbolic that the highest negative correlation of the savings rate is with the 
variable: food consumption as % of total household consumption, while the highest positive 
correlation of the saving rate is with the UNDP human development index. “Social justice” enhances 
savings. 
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Table 6: correlations of the investment rate, and the saving rate with variables of the UNDP 
Human Development Report 2000 
 
 




saving rate, 1998 
difference between the 
correlations of savings 
with the UNDP HDR 
variables and the 
correlations of 
investments with the 
UNDP HDR variables, 
1998 
 
food consumption as % of total household 
consumption 
-0,120 -0,465  -0,345 
unequal transfer  -0,076  -0,420  -0,343 
teen-age mothers as % of all mothers 0,110  -0,418  -0,528 
infant mortality rate  -0,142  -0,407  -0,264 
maternal mortality ratio  -0,186  -0,396  -0,210 
% people not expected to survive age 60  -0,154  -0,395  -0,241 
food imports as % of merchandise imports  0,084  -0,392  -0,476 
youth female unemployment rate  -0,272  -0,349  -0,077 
share of income/consumption richest 20% to 
poorest 20% 
-0,226 -0,323  -0,097 
female unemployment rate  -0,233  -0,301  -0,068 
youth male unemployment rate  -0,328  -0,271  0,057 
TB cases per 100.000 inhabitants  -0,125  -0,255  -0,130 
homicide rate  -0,158  -0,224  -0,066 
HIV rate  -0,194  -0,213  -0,019 
male unemployment rate  -0,297  -0,208  0,089 
juvenile convictions as % of all convictions  -0,406  -0,204  0,202 
female economic activity rate  -0,105  -0,183  -0,078 
% infants with low birth-weight  -0,088  -0,162  -0,074 
female economic activity rate as % of male 
economic activity rate 
-0,111 -0,106  0,005 
military expenditure as % of GDP  -0,115  -0,105  0,010 
central government expenditures as % of GDP  0,253  -0,090  -0,343 
% female administrators and managers  -0,066  -0,083  -0,017 
% women in government, subministerial level  0,183  -0,012  -0,195 
rapes per 100.000 women aged >15 y.  0,091  0,006  -0,085 
% women in government, all levels  0,080  0,046  -0,034 
public education expenditure per GNP  -0,025  0,064  0,088 
tax revenue as % of GDP  0,162  0,072  -0,090 
female unpaid family workers as % of all unpaid 
family workers 
-0,062 0,092  0,153 
change in human development index, 1975-80  0,186  0,095  -0,091 
male suicide rate per 100.000 inhabitants  -0,008  0,109  0,117 
% female professional and technical workers  -0,036  0,109  0,146 
doctors per 100.000 people  -0,055  0,120  0,175   72
change in human development index, 1980-85  0,086  0,121  0,035 
net foreign direct investment as % of GNP  0,319  0,150  -0,169 
public health expenditure per GDP  0,133  0,154  0,022 
growth of female economic activity (1975=100)  -0,020  0,155  0,176 
change in human development index, 1985-1990  0,095  0,164  0,069 
% women in government, ministerial level  -0,065  0,168  0,233 
female tertiary students as % of males  -0,089  0,188  0,277 
% immunization against TB  0,206  0,198  -0,008 
change in human development index, 1990-98  0,224  0,218  -0,006 
internet hosts per 1000 people  -0,096  0,223  0,318 
% parliamentary seats held by women  -0,024  0,250  0,273 
gender empowerment  -0,131  0,259  0,389 
% population, aged >65y, 1998  0,023  0,273  0,250 
      
injuries and deaths from road accidents per 
100.000 inhabitants and year 
-0,005 0,301  0,306 
% immunization against measles  0,174  0,313  0,139 
GDP output per kg energy use  0,050  0,316  0,266 
GNP per capita annual growth rate, 1990-98  0,412  0,329  -0,082 
divorce rate as % of marriages  0,108  0,332  0,225 
% population, aged >65y, 2015  0,029  0,333  0,303 
population, aged >65 y, 2015  0,029  0,333  0,303 
life expectanccy, 1970-75  0,061  0,334  0,273 
female suicide rate per 100.000 inhabitants  0,105  0,335  0,230 
average cigarette consumption per adult and year  0,095  0,347  0,252 
Televisions per 1000 people  0,017  0,353  0,336 
CO2 emissions per capita  -0,023  0,359  0,382 
overall budget surplus/deficit as % of GDP  0,098  0,364  0,266 
GNP per capita annual growth rate, 1975-90  0,229  0,373  0,144 
women's GDP per capita  -0,142  0,375  0,518 
female literacy  0,148  0,377  0,229 
economic growth, 1975-98  0,403  0,394  -0,009 
GNP per capita  -0,040  0,397  0,437 
main telephone lines per 1000 people  0,022  0,403  0,381 
female life expectancy  0,135  0,403  0,268 
male literacy  0,151  0,406  0,255 
life expectancy, 1995-2000  0,138  0,411  0,273 
male life expectancy  0,141  0,418  0,277 
daily supply of calories, 1998  0,106  0,432  0,326 
GDP per capita PPP  -0,013 0,461  0,474 
contraceptive prevalence rate 0,197  0,488 0,291 
human development index  0,095  0,511  0,416 
 
 
Hence, foreign savings become an important indicator of the center-periphery structure of the world 
system and its changing nature (with its ongoing shifts favoring mainly the Asia – Pacific region) as 
well. Giovanni Arrighi proposed in his provocative analysis of the ‘Long 20th Century’ (1995) the   73
thought that the logic of accumulation on a world-scale is governed by the ups and downs in the 
succession of regulation and de-regulation, starting from the Venetian (regulatory) and Genoese 
(deregulated) era of capitalism, followed by the Dutch (regulatory) and British (deregulated) era, and 
the US hegemony, which - after 1945 - was a regulatory model. From the late 1970s, however, we 
witness, Arrighi’s argument goes on, again the renewed rise of a deregulated model of world 
capitalism.  
 
The often-bemoaned end of the Keynesian era has its real basis; Arrighi’s argument goes, in the 
shifting accumulation pattern of world capitalism. We agree with Arrighi that the rise of financial 
capitalism and the decline of productive capitalism are always connected to major shifts in the location 
of the centers of world capitalism, first from Venice to Genoa, followed by the shift from Genoa to 
Amsterdam, from Amsterdam to London, from London to New York, and from there on to the 
capitalist archipelago of East Asia of yesterday, perhaps to be followed by South Asia today (Arrighi, 
1995). Arrighi also introduced the important notion that there is certain coexistence in the time-
perspective between the ‘different logics’, so that elements of the waning and elements of the 
emerging order might coincide for years. Arrighi’s sequential model of world capitalism is also a 
historic interpretation of the old Marxist notion of financial expansion - > material expansion- 
>financial expansion (MCM’), and as such radically challenges the notion of ‘unchanging’ general 
laws of rise and decline. Following Arrighi, we postulate that regulatory strategies might have been 
well compatible with growth under the rise of the Venetian, Dutch, and American era, while at the 
time of the rise of ‘deregulation’, such deregulatory strategies and not ‘big government’ will be 
conducive to economic growth.. 
 
 
The past economic growth rate of a country explains – as Modigliani correctly expected – the societal 
saving rate, but the relationship is smaller than Modigliani suggested: 
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Modigliani: growth source of savings
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Foreign savings are significantly determined by the maturity effects of a society (natural logarithm 

































































-1,162 10,769 -0,908 -2,167  0,879 2,0173 4,5383 1,3139 -0,365 1,7257 -0,253 1,0607 -22,16
  1,3694 21,525 3,6296 4,7828 1,6674 0,7419 3,705 0,8046 3,4895 4,0403 0,1851  0,5989  81,978
  0,3783  11,675             
  3,8035  75             
  6221,7  10224             
t-Test -0,848  0,5003  -0,25  -0,453  0,5271 2,719  1,2249 1,6329 -0,105 0,4271 -1,368  1,7712  -0,27 
 
 
Legend: as in all EXCEL 5.0 outprints in this work, first row: unstandardized regression coefficients, second row: standard 
errors, last row: t-Test and direction the influence (error probability 10 %, two-tailed test. Significant predictors are printed in 
bold letters. The values immediately below the standard errors are R
^2 (third row, left side entry), F, and degrees of freedom 
(fourth row). The error probability (F) for the entire equation is 0,0002. 
 
                                            
30 time series correlation coefficient for each country of the world system with foreign direct investments per 




% population, aged >65y, 1998  0,399 
% women in government, ministerial level  0,618 
World Bank pension reform  0,803 
Absence of economic freedom  0,652 
military expenditure as % of GDP  0,600 
globalization (time series trend )  0,008 
public education expenditure per GDP  0,224 
unequal transfer  0,107 
EUmembership 0,917 
Islamic Conference  0,671 
ln(GDP PPP pc)  0,175 





Gross domestic savings at first sight do not vary systematically with pension reform over time from 
1960 to 1999, as the following comparison between European reformers (Denmark, Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom), 2 typical non-reformers by around 2000 (Austria and 
France), the US (non-reformer until 2005) and Chile (reform country) shows: 
 
 
Graph 15: gross domestic saving rates over time since 1960 in European non-reform and reform 
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non-reformers France and Austria




However, Modigliani was right in assuming – to put in the language of world system theory -  that the 
dynamics of saving rates reflect the underlying dynamic of the world capitalist system. Our following 
map clearly shows this: 
 
 
Map 12: the dynamics of saving rates in the 1990s – correlation of saving rates with the time axis 
since 1990 
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correlation saving rate 
over time, IMF/IBRD 1990s
0,59 bis  0,98  (33)
0,22 bis  0,59  (34)
-0,23 bis  0,22  (33)
-0,59 bis -0,23  (33)
-1  bis -0,59  (35)
growth in saving rates
 
 
Legend: missing values for Antarctica, some African and Balkan countries 
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correlation saving rate 
over time, IMF/IBRD 1990s
0,59 bis  0,98  (33)
0,22 bis  0,59  (34)
-0,23 bis  0,22  (33)
-0,59 bis -0,23  (33)




Legend: missing values for Antarctica, some African and Balkan countries 
 
 
In the countries of the European Union, the following time series correlations of the saving rate could 
be observed in the 1990s: 
 
 














Germany -0,39101826   79







United Kingdom  0,16584087 












Our map 12 again shows the relevance of the “Re-Orient” hypothesis by Professor Andre Gunder 
Frank and the dramatic decline and growing impoverishment of the Euro-Atlantic region. The future 
of the world system lies in the Pacific. 
 
Now, where would world system approaches, as described above, and Modigliani have agreed on the 
strategies that would follow from our analysis? As it is well known, Modigliani, Ceprini and 
Muraldihar stated in their August 2000 analysis that replacing the existing pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) 
method of financing Social Security benefits with a fully funded system will indeed entail many 
benefits. In the framework of the world system approach and under the constraints of today’s capitalist 
world economy, analyzed in this essay, one cannot but agree to that formulation: 
 
1. The funded system is more cost effective in the sense that it requires a smaller contribution for a 
given set of benefits.  
 
2. The funded system is more stable and financially resilient because under PAYGO the required 
contribution rate depends on the rate of growth of payrolls.  
 
3. The funded system in contrast to PAYGO results in a large accumulation of assets and thus makes a 
valuable contribution to national saving, the stock of productive capital and national income.  
 
Modigliani and associates went on to say: 
 
“In conclusion, we propose a permanent solution for Social Security resting on two pillars. The first is 
a fully-funded system, which permits a dramatic reduction in the required payroll tax. It also improves 
the resiliency of the system to changes in payroll growth, and contributes to capital formation. The   80
second is the current structure of defined benefits. It is secured by investing the pension accumulation 
in a single portfolio – representing a share of America’s wealth and reflecting its economic 
performance – and by swapping the return of that portfolio for a sure real rate guaranteed by the U.S. 
government. The approach we advocate clearly shifts to the government the risk that the market return 
deviates from that guaranteed to Social Security. But we contend that the US government is in a 
position to absorb this risk because of its size and indefinite life and the consequent ability to spread 
the risk of a single cohort of workers over a large number of cohorts and that it should be prepared to 
underwrite that risk to give to older Americans the peace of mind that they deserve. We conclude with 
a plea that the lucky occurrence of a large surplus not be used to cut taxes or increase current 
spending, or to temporarily fix the inefficient, unreliable, poorly designed PAYGO system. Instead, we 
propose using the surplus in a productive way, in the best interest of the country, both for the present 
and especially for the future, by making the transition to the more efficient and reliable funded system. 
And let us remember that while the Social Security bomb has a long fuse, the remedies suggested here 
have a fuse at least as long. The time for a decision is right now! “ (Modigliani et al., 2000) 
 
 
Modigliani and associates have shown that first, under PAYGO the contributions, which are in effect 
compulsory saving, are used to finance the pensions and hence consumption. Second, - with a growing 
host of other economists – Modigliani firmly believed that PAYGO is financially unsound and forever 
at risk of insolvency because the contribution required for the promised benefits is highly sensitive to 
variations in population structure and productivity growth. With a funded system, the contribution is 
largely invariant from either variable. It is sensitive to the rate of return on financial assets, but 
moderately in the relevant range.  
 
Modigliani and associates recommend investing these assets in a common fund holding a strictly 
indexed portfolio of all marketable securities, (equity and debt), managed by the government and/or 
private managers on the basis of the lowest bidder.  
 
Modigliani has foreseen that the transition to a new pension system will not be without costs: 
 
“Unfortunately, there are costs in the transition from the PAYGO to the funded system as saving needs 
to be boosted, at least temporarily, to fund the unfunded pension liability. We lay out an operational 
program for the transition in which these costs are shown to be transitory and contained within 
moderate limits-something like an additional payroll levy averaging some 3.2% for some 15 years. We 
argue that for the U.S. these costs can and should be absorbed by the Government by redirecting to SS 
(i.e. Social Security) the share of the large budget surplus anticipated over the next 15 years, which 
the Administration as well as Congress seems to be ready to pledge toward saving the PAYGO system 
and taking advantage of the surplus already accumulated in the Trust Fund and expected to continue 
in the near future. In this case, the transition can be accomplished without any additional levy, though 
this is achieved at the cost of a long transition. We suggest that our permanent solution is preferable 
to that presently advocated by the Administration, which is but a temporary one, and also to the set of 
proposals that goes under the misnomer of “privatization” of Social Security. These proposals 
generally involve only partial funding, and hence a substantially higher long-run contribution rate. 
But, what is worse, their basic feature is the principle of mandated contributions to individually 
managed accounts. These are not only much more expensive to manage, but also imply giving up the 
social welfare promoting principle of defined benefits in favor of a defined contributions approach 
with its serious risks-especially for poorer, less sophisticated participants-and high cost to 
government if a minimum outcome is guaranteed. Last, but not least, they would contribute   81
importantly to increase unnecessarily and arbitrarily the inequalities in the distribution of pension 
income. “ (Modigliani et al., 2000). 
 
 
The present author has shown however
31 that in the framework of a capitalist world economy, 
characterized by sharp ascent and decline of different nations that struggle with the challenges of 
aging, the introduction of a World-Bank type of pension reform will be closely associated with a 
dynamic development of key basic human needs indicators: 
 
absence of high share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20% 
female life expectancy in % of male life expectancy 
female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate 
Factor Social Development 
human development index 
female life expectancy 
absence of teen-age mothers as % of all mothers 
absence of HIV rate 
absence of infant mortality rate 
life expectancy, 1995-2000 
absence of % people not expected to survive age 60 
 
As stated, these results suggest that World Bank pension reforms, contrary to the negative picture 
presented by most globalization critics in the literature, dynamize the societies of the countries that 
opted for reform. Non-reform in Europe will further increase the peripherization of the continent 
which already set in with the secular declining economic growth rates since the beginnings of the 
1960s that often even accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s. For the Muslim world, these tendencies 
imply the necessity to seriously think about pension reform before the process of population 
stagnation sets in.  
 
 
Tectonic shifts in the international system, pension funds and the Muslim world 
 
 
Considering the overwhelming influence of the process of unequal transfer for world poverty, it 
should be noted that the last years brought about dramatic shifts in the structure of unequal transfer. 
 
To recall, poverty is determined to 2/3 by unequal transfer. The exchange rate deviation index, or 
ERDI Index, i.e. the reciprocal value of our indicator for unequal transfer, neatly determines the 
buying power of the poorest 20 % in the nations of the world system: 
 
 
Graph 16: ERDI Index and buying power of the poorest 20 % in the countries of the world 
system 
 
                                            
31 http://www.gallileus.info/gallileus/members/m_TAUSCH/publications/107882936307/109542807699/
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ERDI index and income of the poorest 20 %
y = 8623,3x 
2   + 2795,7x - 305,35 
R 








0  0,2  0,4  0,6 0,8 1 1,2  1,4 
ERDI-Index (GDP pc $/GDP pc PPP-$)
buying power of the 
poorest 20 %  in PPP $ 
 
 
Source: Our own calculations from UNDP sources 
 
 
To recall, the heyday of unequal transfer meant increases in poverty in East Central Europe and in the 
Muslim world in the 1990s. ILO statistics clearly show that in East Central Europe and the MENA 
region – an international development bureaucracy shorthand expression for large parts of the Muslim 
world between Morocco and Iran – were the only world regions which saw an increase in the 
percentage of people affected by poverty between 1990 and 1999, and lost in value terms against the 
centers: 
 





Millions of people 
< 1 $ a day 1990 
% pop < 1 $ a day 
1990 
Millions of people 
< 1 $ a day 1999 
% pop < 1 $ a day 
1999 
 
East Asia and 
Pacific 
486 30,5  279 15,6 
Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia 
6 1,4  24  5,1 
South  Asia  506 45  488 36,6 
Latin America 
and Caribbean 
48 11 57 11,1 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
5 2,1  6 2,2   83
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
241 47,4  315 49 
Total 1292 29,6  1169 23,2 
     
absolute and 
relative values
Millions of people 
< 2 $ a day 1990 
% pop < 2 $ a day 
1990 
Millions of people 
< 2 $ a day 1999 
% pop < 2 $ a day 
1999 
 
East Asia and 
Pacific 
1114 69,7  897  50,1 
Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia 
31 6,8  97 20,3 
South  Asia  1010 89,8  1128 84,8 
Latin America 
and Caribbean 
121 27,6  132 26 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
50 21 68 23,3 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
386 76  480 74,7 
Total 2712 62,1  2802 55,6 
     
1990 = 100 Millions of people 
< 1 $ a day 
% pop < 1 $ a day Millions of people 
< 2 $ a day 
% pop < 2 $ a day 
 
 
East Asia and 
Pacific 
57,4 51,1 80,5 71,9 
Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia 
400  364,3 312,9 298,5 
South  Asia  96,4 81,3 111,7  94,4 
Latin America 
and Caribbean 
118,8 100,9 109,1 94,2 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
120 104,8  136 111 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
130,7 103,4 124,4 98,3 
Total  90,5 78,4 103,3  89,5 
     
changes since 
1990
Millions of people 
< 1 $ a day 
% pop < 1 $ a day Millions of people 
< 2 $ a day 
% pop < 2 $ a day 
 
 
East Asia and 
Pacific 
-207 -14,9  -217 -19,6 
Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia 
+18 +3,7  +66 +13,5 
South Asia  -18  -8,4  +118  -5 
Latin America 
and Caribbean 
+9 +0,1  +11  -1,6 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
+1 +0,1  +18  +2,3 
Sub-Saharan  +74 +1,6  +94 -1,3   84
Africa 
Total -123  -6,4  90  -6,5 
 
 
Thus, the final balance of globalization since 1990 was the income impoverishment of Eastern Europe 
and the Muslim world in the Middle East and North Africa: 
 
 
Table 9: Changes in the social structure of the world system, 1990 - 1999 
 
 
changes since 1990 
 
% pop < 2 $ a day 
Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia 
13,5 
Middle East and North 
Africa 
2,3 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -1,3 
Latin America and Caribbean  -1,6 
South Asia  -5 




Source: our own calculations from ILO sources, 2003 (Report of the Director-General: “Working out 
of Poverty”. International Labor Conference 91
st Session 2003, ILO, Geneva) 
 
 
The wave of global politics and economics in the 1990s negatively affected the social balances in 
many countries. Several European countries, but also in Japan and even in the US, inequality and 
globalization are on the increase since 1980, as the present author could confirm in his recent works 
based on the data series of the ILO, the UTIP project at the University of Texas, and the World 
Bank
32. Malaysia and Jordan are practically the only major Muslim country with a falling rate of 
inequality since 1980: 
                                            
32 see especially: ‘Die EU-Erweiterung und die soziale Konvergenz. Ein „Working Paper“ zur Globalisierung 
und wachsenden Ungleichheit im neuen und alten Europa’ Studien von Zeitfragen, ISSN-1619-8417, 38(2): 1 – 
185  http://druckversion.studien-von-zeitfragen.net/Soziale%20Konvergenz%20EU-Erweiterung.pdf; 
furthermore:  ‚Soziale und regionale Ungleichgewichte, politische Instabilität und die Notwendigkeit von 
Pensionsreformen im neuen Europa’ Schriftenreihe des Zentrums für europäische Studien, Universität Trier, 
Band 56, ISSN 0948-1141 http://www.uni-trier.de/zes/schriftenreihe/056.pdf; see also: ‚Towards a European 
Perspective for the Common Mediterranean Huse and the Positive Development Capability of Islamic 
Countries’ In ‚ European Neighbourhood Policy: Political, Economic and Social Issues’ (Fulvio Attina and Rosa 
Rossi (Eds.) Università degli Studi di Catania Facoltà di Scienze Politiche: 145 – 168, available at: 
http://www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/cjmEBOOKSengl.htm, and finally: (Ed., together with Peter Herrmann, 
University of Cork, Ireland) DAR AL ISLAM. EUROPE, THE WORLD SYSTEM AND THE ULTIMATE EU-
ENLARGEMENT. Contributors: Samir Amin, Syed M. Ahsan, Pat Cox, Andre Gunder Frank, Peter Herrmann, 
Gernot Köhler, Victor Krassilchtchikov, Rabbi Michael Lerner, Syed Mansoob Murshed, Hans-Heinrich Nolte,   85
 
 
Model (1) time series correlations suggest: Strong tendency towards globalization (>0.5), tendency 
towards slow growth (<0.0), tendency towards rising inequality (>0.0) – the worst of all worlds 













Russian Federation  







Model (2) Strong tendency towards globalization (>0.5), but tendency towards higher growth (<0.0), 
and tendency towards rising inequality (>0.0) – model: globalization with growth – at an inequality 













Cote d'Ivoire  
Czech Republic  
Denmark  
Ethiopia  
                                                                                                                                        
John R. Oneal, Kunibert Raffer, Bruce Russett, Clara Mira Salama, David Skidmore, Arno Tausch, The First 
Declaration of Alexandria, Alfred Tovias, Patrick Ziltener. © Nova Science Hauppauge, New York, 2004, 
available at: http://www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/cjmEBOOKSengl.htm



















Slovak Republic  
Sweden  
Tanzania  
Trinidad and Tobago  
United Kingdom  
United States  
Venezuela, RB  
 
 
Model (3) Strong tendency towards globalization (>0.5), tendency towards higher growth (<0.0), 
and tendency towards falling inequality (<0.0) – model: redistribution with growth under 





Costa Rica  
Croatia  









Model (4) Stronger tendency towards globalization (>0.5), tendency towards slower growth (<0.0), 
and tendency towards falling inequality (<0.0) 
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Korea, Rep.  






Model (5) tendency towards weaker globalization (> 0.5), tendency towards slower growth (<0.0), 









Congo, Dem. Rep.  






Model (6) tendency towards weaker globalization (< 0.5), tendency towards higher growth (<0.0), 






Central African Republic  






Iran, Islamic Rep.  
Kuwait  
Macedonia, FYR  
Malta  
New Zealand  





Slovenia    88
Spain  
Syrian Arab Republic  
Tunisia  
Uruguay  
Yemen, Rep.  
 
 
Model (7) tendency towards weaker globalization (<0.5), tendency towards higher growth (<0.0), 












Model (8) tendency towards weaker globalization (<0.5), tendency towards slow growth (<0.0), and 












It is now simply unthinkable that changes in the structure of unequal transfer will not affect the entire 
system. The center received inputs to the tune of around 8 % of its current GDP through to the middle 
of the 1990s, however at the end of the 1990s we seem to have arrived at a historical junction where 
this very structure seems to evaporate and be substituted by another one: 
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UNDP figures for 2002
ranging from ... to ...
4,36 bis 8,63  (32)
3,26 bis 4,36  (33)
2,37 bis 3,26  (29)
1,46 bis 2,37  (34)
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DYN 1/ERDI 1998 - 2002
UNDP figures ranging from .. to
0,88 bis  5,03  (33)
0,36 bis  0,88  (31)
0,15 bis  0,36  (31)
-0,18 bis  0,15  (33)








DYN 1/ERDI 1998 - 2002
UNDP figures ranging from .. to
0,88 bis  5,03  (33)
0,36 bis  0,88  (31)
0,15 bis  0,36  (31)
-0,18 bis  0,15  (33)
-2,5  bis -0,18  (33)
DYN 1/ERDI 1998-2002




gains/losses in world 
1998-2002 (=-1*(DYN ERDI*100/ERDI 98))
7 bis  48  (33)
-8 bis  7  (31)
-19 bis  -8  (28)
-33 bis -19  (34)
-308 bis -33  (35)







gains/losses in w. econ pos.
1998-2002 =-1*((DYN ERDI*100)/ERDI 98)) 
7 bis  48  (33)
-8 bis  7  (31)
-19 bis  -8  (28)
-33 bis -19  (34)
-308 bis -33  (35)
change in world econ. pos. 
 






gains/losses in w. econ pos.
1998-2002 =-1*((DYN ERDI*100)/ERDI 98))
7 bis  48  (33)
-8 bis  7  (31)
-19 bis  -8  (28)
-33 bis -19  (34)
-308 bis -33  (35)
change in world econ. pos. 
 
 
The main winners and losers of these changes are: 
 
Table 10: the main winners and losers at the turn of the 21




Country code  changes in 
unequal transfer 
1998 – 2002: 
increases (+) or 











Nicaragua -2,49  3,30  5,79 
Angola -2,29  2,50  4,79 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. of the 
-1,56 5,91 7,48 
Turkmenistan -1,31  2,61  3,92 
Moldova, Rep. of  -1,25  3,88  5,12 
Kyrgyzstan -1,03 5,06 6,10 
Romania -0,95  3,20  4,15   93
Yemen -0,95  1,62  2,57 
Jamaica -0,63  1,32  1,95 
Zimbabwe -0,63  3,67 4,31 
Honduras -0,61  2,68  3,29 
Mexico -0,59  1,42  2,01 
Jordan -0,57  2,34  2,91 
Armenia -0,51  4,00  4,51 
Comoros -0,44  3,33  3,78 
Sudan -0,40  4,41  4,81 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
-0,37 1,28 1,66 
Oman -0,35  1,67  2,02 
Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
-0,33 1,50 1,83 
Albania -0,30  3,17  3,46 
Panama -0,28  1,47  1,76 
Bulgaria -0,28  3,66  3,94 
Saint Lucia  -0,27  1,14  1,42 
Congo -0,26  1,20  1,46 
Samoa (Western)  -0,25  3,33  3,58 
Mongolia -0,24  3,82  4,05 
Azerbaijan -0,24  4,30 4,53 
Saint Kitts and 
Nevis 
-0,22 1,50 1,72 
Venezuela -0,21  1,43  1,65 
Kenya -0,21  2,59  2,80 
Hungary -0,20  2,07  2,27 
Indonesia -0,19  3,95  4,14 
Kuwait -0,19  1,07  1,25 
Barbados -0,18  1,64  1,82 
Bahrain -0,16  1,56  1,72 
Côte d'Ivoire  -0,14  2,15  2,28 
Madagascar -0,13  2,77  2,91 
Bahamas -0,12  1,06  1,18 
Cyprus -0,10  1,37  1,47 
Lebanon -0,09  1,12  1,22 
Ecuador -0,09  1,89  1,98 
Costa Rica  -0,08  2,08  2,16 
Czech Republic  -0,08  2,32  2,40 
Grenada -0,05  1,75  1,80 
Guatemala -0,04  2,10 2,14   94
Nigeria -0,04  2,61  2,65 
United States  -0,02  0,99  1,01 
Georgia -0,02  3,44  3,46 
Tanzania, U. Rep. 
of 
-0,01 2,17 2,18 
Saudi  Arabia  0,00 1,47 1,47 
El  Salvador 0,01 2,20 2,18 
Ireland  0,03 1,17 1,15 
Dominican 
Republic 
0,04 2,64 2,60 
United  Kingdom  0,04 0,99 0,95 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
0,05 1,14 1,10 
Lithuania  0,06 2,59 2,53 
Canada  0,06 1,29 1,23 
Iceland  0,10 1,00 0,90 
Sierra  Leone  0,10 3,38 3,27 
Norway  0,10 0,87 0,77 
Malaysia  0,12 2,34 2,22 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
0,12 2,96 2,83 
Korea, Rep. of  0,13  1,69  1,57 
Algeria  0,14 3,23 3,09 
Japan  0,14 0,86 0,72 
Zambia  0,14 2,32 2,18 
Portugal  0,15 1,53 1,38 
Belize  0,16 1,88 1,72 
Sweden  0,16 0,97 0,81 
Malta  0,17 1,79 1,63 
Israel  0,17 1,24 1,07 
Lao People's 
Dem.  Rep. 
0,17 5,59 5,42 
Macedonia, 
TFYR 
0,18 3,47 3,30 
Finland  0,18 1,03 0,86 
Switzerland 0,18 0,82 0,64 
Latvia  0,19 2,56 2,37 
Slovenia  0,19 1,65 1,46 
Spain  0,19 1,34 1,15 
Poland  0,21 2,16 1,95 
Gabon  0,22 1,74 1,52 
Denmark  0,23 0,96 0,73 
Netherlands  0,23 1,12 0,89   95
Belgium  0,25 1,16 0,92 
Hong Kong, 
China (SAR) 
0,25 1,13 0,88 
Italy  0,26 1,29 1,02 
Estonia  0,27 2,55 2,29 
France  0,27 1,12 0,85 
Australia  0,27 1,36 1,09 
New  Zealand  0,28 1,46 1,18 
Kazakhstan 0,29 3,55 3,27 
Austria  0,29 1,15 0,86 
Slovakia  0,29 2,91 2,62 
Germany 0,29 1,13 0,83 
Benin  0,31 2,59 2,28 
Greece  0,31 1,50 1,19 
Singapore  0,35 1,15 0,80 
Guyana  0,35 4,71 4,36 
Mali  0,36 3,09 2,73 
Dominica  0,38 2,00 1,62 
Turkey  0,39 2,42 2,03 
Sri  Lanka  0,40 4,08 3,68 
Niger  0,44 4,14 3,70 
Egypt  0,45 2,81 2,36 
Fiji  0,45 2,37 1,91 
Viet  Nam  0,46 5,28 4,82 
Morocco  0,46 3,13 2,67 
China  0,49 4,63 4,14 
Nepal  0,51 6,02 5,51 
Bolivia  0,52 2,77 2,25 
Vanuatu  0,52 3,00 2,48 
Chad  0,53 4,25 3,72 
Tunisia  0,53 3,15 2,62 
Haiti  0,54 3,91 3,37 
Luxembourg  0,55 1,30 0,74 
Russian 
Federation 
0,56 3,42 2,86 
Burkina  Faso  0,57 4,19 3,62 
Croatia  0,58 2,04 1,46 
Peru  0,62 2,37 1,75 
Chile  0,62 2,38 1,76 
Senegal  0,65 3,16 2,51 
Botswana  0,65 2,64 1,99   96
Mauritius  0,68 2,91 2,23 
Uruguay  0,75 2,17 1,42 
India  0,77 5,49 4,72 
Malawi  0,77 3,26 2,49 
Central African 
Republic 
0,77 4,50 3,73 
Togo  0,84 5,00 4,16 
Thailand  0,88 3,40 2,53 
Philippines 0,89 4,28 3,39 
Belarus  0,93 3,83 2,90 
Bangladesh 0,94 4,83 3,89 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 
of 
0,95 4,05 3,10 
Solomon  Islands  0,95 3,50 2,55 
Colombia  1,01 3,44 2,43 
Cameroon  1,04 3,46 2,42 
Pakistan  1,11 4,76 3,65 
Cape  Verde 1,14 3,83 2,69 
Guinea-Bissau  1,15 5,00 3,85 
Swaziland  1,36 4,08 2,73 
Brazil  1,56 3,00 1,43 
Namibia  1,57 4,24 2,67 
Cambodia  1,59 6,43 4,83 
Mozambique  1,63 5,36 3,73 
Guinea  1,70 5,06 3,36 
Papua New 
Guinea 
1,71 4,36 2,65 
Gambia  1,73 6,00 4,27 
South  Africa  1,82 4,38 2,56 
Eritrea  2,17 6,33 4,16 
Paraguay  2,18 4,62 2,44 
Tajikistan  2,27 5,08 2,81 
Burundi  2,36 6,43 4,07 
Mauritania  2,39 6,20 3,81 
Uganda  2,41 5,88 3,46 
Ukraine  2,46 5,72 3,26 
Ghana  2,50 6,95 4,45 
Argentina  2,55 4,05 1,50 
Ethiopia  2,89 8,62 5,74 
Uzbekistan 3,17 5,33 2,16 
Rwanda  3,25 6,12 2,87   97
Lesotho  3,29 6,14 2,85 




By and large, it is shown that the member countries of the “old” EU-15 are on the losing side in 
that transnational equation. No “old” European country improved its position, on the contrary, 
“old Europe” becomes a region that is itself a victim of unequal transfer. It also emerges that 
ceteris paribus the Muslim world indeed became the main loser of these tectonic shifts. A positive 
sign of a regression coefficient must be interpreted as an increase of the negative phenomenon in the 
structures of unequal transfer: 
 
 
Table 11: the determinants of a rising rate of unequal transfer, 1998 – 2002 
 
 
 changes in (un)equal transfer 1998 – 2002: 
explaining changes in unequal transfer, 1998 – 
2002 (first column, Table 10) 
 
left column: unstandardized regression coefficients




aged >65y, 1998 
0,097 0,273  r^2=0,145 F  =  1,2416 0,354 
% women in 
government, 
ministerial level 
0,103 0,095    df  =  95  1,085 
(I-S)/GNP -1,835  1,490      -1,231 
Absence of 
economic freedom 
-0,158 0,231     -0,683 
military 
expenditure as % 
of GDP 
-0,001 0,009     -0,064 




0,003 0,052      0,065 
unequal transfer  0,007  0,005      1,266 
EU-membership 
years by 2004 
-0,009 0,050     -0,177 
Islamic 
conference 
0,418 0,220      1,902 
ln(GDP PPP pc)  -0,001  0,008      -0,176 
ln (GDP PPP 
pc)^2 
0,015 0,013      1,167 
pension reform  -0,034  0,036      -0,959 
Constant 7,644  5,710      1,339 
                                            
33 (p<.10; two-tailed test)   98
 
Legend: the error probability for the entire equation is rather unsatisfactory (p = 0,264); the error 
probabilities for the predictors are: 
 
% population, aged >65y, 1998  0,7241 
% women in government, ministerial level  0,2807 
(IS)/GNP 0,2214 
Absence of economic freedom  0,4963 
military expenditure as % of GDP  0,9491 
MNC PEN 1995  0,1424 
public education expenditure per GNP  0,9483 
unequal transfer  0,2086 
EUmembership years by 2004  0,8599 
Islamic conference  0,0602 
ln(GDP PPP pc)  0,8607 
ln (GDP PPP pc)^2  0,2461 
pension reform  0,34 
 
 
It is entirely conceivable that these pressures – as Gernot Kohler has shown – also explain a good part 
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correlation over time
unemployment (ILO)
0,87 bis  1,01  (17)
0,55 bis  0,87  (20)
-0,09 bis  0,55  (20)
-0,7  bis -0,09  (16)
-1  bis -0,7   (23)
DYN unemployment 1980-2001
 







0,87 bis  1,01  (17)
0,55 bis  0,87  (20)
-0,09 bis  0,55  (20)
-0,7  bis -0,09  (16)
-1  bis -0,7   (23)






12,5 bis 30,5  (19)
9,2 bis 12,5  (15)
6,8 bis  9,2  (16)
4,1 bis  6,8  (16)








12,5 bis 30,5  (19)
9,2 bis 12,5  (15)
6,8 bis  9,2  (16)
4,1 bis  6,8  (16)
1,3 bis  4,1  (18)
Unemployment 2000   101
 
It is clear that rising rates of unequal transfer are causing rising rates of unemployment. An 
approximate, admittedly crude measure would be to correlate DYN 1/ERDI (in the short term, 
assuming that this reflects a longer-run tendency as well) with the changes in unemployment over the 
last 2 decades since 1980, observable from the ILO Laborsta data set. A non-linear function explains 
16 % of the rise in unemployment (time series correlations, ILO Laborsta data series). 
 
So, while the Muslim world can optimistically evaluate recent trends in world savings, recent changes 
in unequal exchange rather differentiate between those Muslim countries with a favorable world 
economic prospect and those that further remain in a peripheral status. Inter alia, prospects for the 
following Muslim nations deteriorate due to rising unequal exchange, and they will be faced, 














































DYN 1/ERDI and tendencies in unemployment
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Development is a contradictory and dialectical process. There is no single strategy that has only 
positive results, and there is no strategy that has only negative results. No single development theory 
today captures all these negative and positive effects that interact together. At this stage, perhaps, the 
question will arise – what are the real policy implications, then, of this kind of analysis? It should be 
clear that a reliance on the “Washington Consensus” alone will not “fix” the performance of 
countries beyond a better and more predictable “development stability”. The most consistent   103
consequence of the “dependency” analysis of this essay is the realization that a reliance on foreign 
capital in the short term might bring about positive consequences for employment – especially female 
employment – but that the long-term negative consequences of dependence in the social sphere, but 
also for sustainable development, outweigh the immediate, positive effects. Our three-fold empirical 
understanding of the process of globalization – reliance on foreign savings, MNC penetration and 
unequal transfer, - goes beyond the average analysis of the workings of dependency structures and 
shows how different aspects of dependency negatively affect development performance. The 
integration of the countries of the periphery into larger currency blocs – quite contrary to what 
the “Washington Consensus” has to say about “competitive currencies” - will be one of the most 
important tasks for international development strategies for years to come. Left for themselves in 
the capitalist world economy, the countries of the periphery and semi-periphery will always be victims 
of international currency instabilities. In the light of earlier published analyses, it is no surprise that 
“unequal transfer” (1/ERDI; ERDI being the exchange rate deviation index) is again established to 
be the most important dependency variable, far more important in its negative effects on social and 
sustainable development than the UNCTAD data series on MNC penetration. European Union 
integration, this analysis again shows, on the other hand is not a quick fix for many of the social ills 
of the periphery and semi-periphery. The EU under present conditions fails to have sufficiently 
enough dynamic effects and its democratic deficits become ever more clear. In terms of the size of 
the quantitative effects on the 14 dimensions of development under investigation here, it is shown that 
the new political structures associated with political feminism that substituted patriarchic structures 
inherent in practically all world regions for much of the 19
th and the early 20
th Century have a very 
considerable effect on the development outcomes of today. As we have outlined above, feminism in 
power – i.e. the share of women in positions of political decision making - achieves to transform many 
aspects of development, but, as other “distribution coalitions” before it, creates certain aspects of 
stagnation as well and thus is not free from the effects of the logic of “collective action” that is at the 
heart of the neo-liberal doctrine of today (see especially the works Olson and Weede). In the 21
st 
Century, the process of aging and the necessity of pension reform, closely linked to that process, also 
cannot be overlooked anymore. In our analysis, unequal transfer, aging, and political feminism 
achieve the majority of the significant effects
34 on the 14 development dimensions under investigation 
here, i.e. far more than the “master” variables of earlier debates, like “economic freedom” versus 
“MNC penetration”. As has been argued elsewhere, globalization critics especially must start to look 
at pensions and pension funds seriously – because the way, in which you manage the savings of 
society for old age, you also manage technological innovation and world systems position in general 
(Tausch, 2003). It is also evident from the analysis presented in this article that Islamic culture is not 
a development blockade; on the contrary. Membership in the Islamic Conference has – ceteris paribus 
– a very positive effect on political democracy, on life expectancy, and on our indicators of the Kyoto-
process and the eco-social market economy. Far from being a “religion of the Middle Ages” Islam has 
an important message for the 21
st Century. It is to be hoped that socially progressive forces in the 
MENA countries will achieve a better monetary distribution of incomes and a better gender 
distribution of work in the societies concerned in the future. 
 
It is shown in this article that transnational integration is and remains to be a contradictory process that 
does not lead 1:1 to a greater amount of social cohesion and sustainable development in the host 
countries of transnational penetration. So, in the words of Osvaldo Sunkel again: 
 
 
                                            
34 significant at the 5 % level, one-tailed test, or 10 % level, two-tailed test   104
‘The advancement of modernization introduces, so to speak, a wedge along the area dividing the 
integrated from the segregated segments (…) The effects of the disintegration of each social class has 
important consequences for social mobility. (...) Finally, it is very probable that an international 
mobility will correspond to the internal mobility, particularly between the internationalized sectors 
(...) The process of social disintegration which has been outlined here probably also affects the social 
institutions which provide the bases of the different social groups and through which they express 
themselves. Similar tendencies to the ones described for the global society are, therefore, probably 
also to be found within the state, church, armed forces, political parties with a relatively wide popular 
base, the universities etc.’ (Sunkel, 1972: 18-42). 
 
This picture, drawn more than 3 decades ago, will – in the light of this empirical analysis – correspond 
much more to the trajectory of countries like Turkey over the next decades than optimistic analyses, 
which are shared by the majority of decision makers on a European level. The role of the social 
scientist then will not be “pathfinders to globalization” but to become pathfinders for those millions, 
who will become marginalized by the process of social disintegration that goes along and is part and 
parcel of transnational integration. 
 







Legend: In our tables, very small decimal numbers are abridged according to established mathematical 
conventions, contained in the EXCEL routine. For example, a number 0,000141972 will be abridged 
to 1E-04, i.e. a decimal number rounded to 0,0001 and starting at the fourth number after the decimal 
point with three zeros after the comma. A number 9E-10 equals thus a decimal number with 9 zeros 
after the comma, i.e. 0,0000000009.  
 
 
The multivariate results in detail: 
 
 
Legend: as in all EXCEL 5.0 outprints in this work, first row: unstandardized regression coefficients, 
second row: standard errors, last row: t-Test and direction of the influence. The values immediately 
below the standard errors are R
^2 (third row, left side entry), F, and degrees of freedom (fourth row). 
Error probability <10 %, two-tailed tests. 
 
The two-tailed t-Test for 30 degrees of freedom or more at the 10 % error probability level
35) yields 
the following results: 
 
                                            
























































































































0,050 -0,832  1,371 0,099 0,198 -0,089  0,018 0,218  1,340  -0,032 -0,012 -0,069 2,038 
  0,139 2,184 0,346 0,544 0,162 0,078 0,008 0,075 0,327 0,012 0,019 0,055 8,401 
  0,661  1,328             





           


































































3,199  -65,554  -3,004 -1,500 -0,789 1,541  0,039 -0,692  1,793 -0,167  0,070 -0,749  345,82
4 
  1,159 18,176  2,876 4,525 1,352 0,646 0,064 0,624 2,725 0,102 0,156 0,454 69,912 
  0,664  11,050             





            
T-Test  2,759 -3,607  -1,045 -0,332 -0,584 2,386  0,609 -1,108  0,658 -1,631  0,449 -1,650  4,947 
 
 
































































1,466 -21,178  1,389 -3,431  0,761 0,076 0,002 0,421 -0,588  -0,081  0,007 0,144 74,866 
  0,303 4,842 0,744 1,088 0,342 0,158 0,021 0,154 0,698 0,030 0,038 0,109 19,111 
  0,747  2,630             





           
T-Test  4,831 -4,373  1,867 -3,154  2,225 0,478 0,073 2,728  -0,843  -2,678  0,191 1,322 3,917 
 
 



























































-0,161 3,252  0,008  -0,044 -0,006 0,005  -0,003  0,017 -0,085  0,006 0,003 0,075 -15,996
  0,043 0,669 0,106 0,166 0,050 0,024 0,002 0,023 0,100 0,004 0,006 0,017 2,571 
  0,857  0,406             
 48,130  96,000             
 95,389  15,855             
T-Test  -3,781 4,865  0,079  -0,264 -0,124 0,218  -1,117 0,758  -0,843 1,617  0,481  4,470  -6,221 
 
 







































































3,163 -62,600  -3,215  -14,187  3,716 1,597 -0,095 -1,324 -1,177 -0,203 0,406  2,578  337,17
5 
  1,337 20,956  3,315 5,217 1,559 0,745 0,074 0,720 3,142 0,118 0,179 0,523 80,606 
  0,514  12,740             





           
T-Test  2,366 -2,987  -0,970  -2,719 2,384  2,145  -1,289  -1,839  -0,374  -1,724 2,267  4,927  4,183 
 
 

































































0,712 -10,464  0,107 1,000 -0,433  -0,041  -0,026 -0,220 -0,126 0,034  -0,027 -0,086 42,440 
  0,166 2,688 0,442 0,580 0,189 0,087 0,013 0,081 0,396 0,016 0,022 0,058 10,879 
  0,721  1,377             





           


































































0,254 -2,130  -0,788  1,506 0,087 -0,353  0,021 -0,104  -0,902  0,005 0,009 -0,533  8,206 
  0,341 5,339 0,848 1,358 0,413 0,216 0,019 0,188 0,832 0,030 0,048 0,133 20,532 
  0,302  3,222             





           




















































PPP pc) (GDP 
constan










-0,023 0,497  -0,012 -0,004 0,000  0,000  -1,846  -0,031 -0,013  -0,002  0,000  0,000 0,007 
  0,006  0,022  0,003  0,003  0,001 0,001  0,354  0,092 0,015  0,007  0,000  0,014  0,002 
  0,918     0,053            
              80,005  86,000 
              2,682  0,240 































































-1,752  -0,034 0,332  0,098  36,595  0,562 0,735 0,201 -0,689  -0,987  -0,059 0,429  -
113,47
2 
  0,612 9,588 1,517 2,387 0,713 0,341 0,034 0,329 1,437 0,054 0,082 0,239 36,880 
  0,735      5,829             





              
T-Test  -2,864 3,817  0,370 0,308 0,281 -2,022  -1,022 1,009  -0,687 1,808  -0,718  1,791  -3,077 
 
 




































































-0,758 14,380 -4,267 -0,771 -1,944 -0,384 0,010 -0,633  0,349 0,146 0,056 -1,049  -42,642
  0,446 7,008 1,139 1,581 0,526  1,102  0,253 0,027 0,288  0,048 0,058 0,169 27,240 
  0,604  3,715             
 9,262  73,000             
 1534,2 1007,6              111
29 37 


































































-0,837 15,394 -3,537 -4,608 -0,947 0,973  -0,004 -0,837 -0,297 0,104  0,209  0,246  -19,840
  0,694  1,718  41,705  10,839  1,730 2,552 0,807 0,369 0,052 0,362  0,076 0,092 0,261 
  0,507  6,032             





           



































































-0,228  3,749 0,105  0,019 0,011 -0,005 -0,063 -0,046 0,003  0,006  35,855  -0,702  0,145 
  0,070 1,098 0,174 0,273 0,082 0,039 0,004 0,038 0,165 0,006 0,009 0,027 4,222 
  0,495  0,667             
 7,835  96,000             
 41,866  42,745             








































































) 1975 - 
^1998 
0,803 -4,819  -4,497  8,897 0,371 -1,118  0,040 0,499 0,314 0,107 0,090 -0,796  -4,580 
  1,348 21,138  3,344 5,263 1,573 0,751 0,074 0,726 3,169 0,119 0,181 0,528 81,306 
 0,330  12,850             





              

































































-3,794  65,612  3,076 0,208 0,340 0,309 -0,028 0,672  -1,748 0,035  -0,001 0,217  -
273,18
4 
  0,761 13,217  1,848 1,920 0,876 0,334 0,044 0,374 1,512 0,069 0,075 0,201 57,545 
  0,371  4,444             





           
T-Test  -4,986 4,964  1,665 0,109 0,388 0,925 -0,640  1,795  -1,156 0,507  -0,018 1,079  -4,747 
 
Legend: in our tables, very small decimal numbers are abridged according to established mathematical 
conventions, contained in the EXCEL routine. For example, a number 0,000141972 will be abridged 
to 1E-04, i.e. a decimal number rounded to 0,0001 and starting at the fourth number after the decimal 
point with three zeros after the comma. A number 9E-10 equals thus a decimal number with 9 zeros 
after the comma, i.e. 0,0000000009.    113
 

















































































0,007 0,000 0,299 0,741 0,561 0,019 0,544 0,271 0,512 0,106 0,654 0,102 0,000 %  people  not  expected  to 
survive age 60 
96 15,83 0,000
0,000 0,000 0,065 0,002 0,029 0,634 0,942 0,008 0,402 0,009 0,849 0,190 0,000 CO2  emissions  per  capita  88  21,69 0,000
0,553 0,820 0,182 0,094 0,814 0,140 0,590 0,494 0,921 0,370 0,619 0,135 0,955 development  stability  (year 
with highest real income 
minus year with lowest real 
income) 1975  ^1998 
96 3,937 0,000
0,232 0,159 0,044 0,075 0,244 0,010 0,941 0,023 0,863 0,175 0,026 0,349 0,635 ESIIndex  83  7,102 0,000
0,000 0,000  0,000 0,937 0,792 0,902 0,828 0,267 0,450 0,401 0,109 0,632 0,000 Factor  Social  Development  96  48,13 0,000
0,020 0,004 0,334 0,008 0,019 0,034 0,200 0,069 0,709 0,088 0,026 0,000 0,000 female  economic  activity 
rate as % of male economic 
activity rate 
96 8,468 0,000
0,002 0,001 0,547 0,012 0,819 0,769 0,238 0,097 0,779 0,673 0,517 0,000 0,000 female  share  in  total  life 
years 
96 7,835 0,000
0,000 0,000 0,809 0,089 0,025 0,639 0,047 0,008 0,751 0,039 0,239 0,144 0,000 GDP  output  per  kg  energy 
use 
78 16,82 0,000
0,458 0,691 0,355 0,270 0,833 0,105 0,261 0,584 0,282 0,861 0,848 0,000 0,690 GNP  per  capita  annual 
growth rate, 199098 
92 3,31  0,001
0,000 0,000 0,047 0,552 0,110 0,199 0,979  0,002 0,569 0,993 0,450 0,880 0,000 human  development  index  86  80,01 0,000
0,005 0,000 0,712 0,759 0,779 0,046 0,309 0,316 0,494 life  expectancy,  19952000  0,074 0,475 0,076 0,003 96  22,23 0,000
0,720 0,704 0,000 0,856 0,225 0,257 0,018 0,005 0,000 0,011 0,515 0,207 0,809 Political rights violations  96  15,62 0,000
0,093 0,044 0,000 0,627 0,000 0,133 0,710 0,031 0,753 0,004 0,332 0,000 0,122 share  of 
income/consumption richest 
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Albania  5,83 10,53  22,68  3,70 1,10 8,70 3,10  3,46  0,00 1,00 7,94 63,03 
Algeria  3,69 0,00 -0,08  3,45 3,90 3,50 5,10  3,09  0,00 1,00 8,47 71,82 
Argentina  9,61 8,33 2,51 2,10 1,40 10,80  3,50  1,50  0,00 0,00 9,39 88,24 
Armenia  8,12 0,00 33,14  3,10 3,60 1,20 2,00  4,51  0,00 0,00 7,64 58,32 
Australia  12,10  14,29  0,57 1,90 1,90 27,90  5,50  1,09  0,00 0,00 10,02  100,38 
Austria  14,66  20,00  0,57 2,05 0,80 7,50 5,40  0,86  1,00 0,00 10,05  101,01 
Azerbaijan  6,47 10,00  59,05  34,37  4,20 2,70 6,10 3,00  4,53  0,00 1,00 7,68 
Bahrain  2,83 0,00 -36,07  1,80 5,00 41,10  4,40  1,72  0,00 1,00 9,48 89,89 
Banglades
h 
3,18 5,26 5,09 3,75  0,00  1,60 0,50 2,20  3,89  1,00 7,22 52,07 
Belarus  13,18  2,78 5,97 4,10 1,00  0,00  0,50 5,90  2,90  0,00  8,75 76,59 
Belgium  16,40  3,33 -4,53  2,10 1,50 40,80  3,10  0,92  1,00 0,00 10,05  101,06 
Belize  4,33 0,00 4,99 2,80 1,50 25,80  5,00  71,00  1,72  0,00 0,00 8,43 
Bolivia  3,93 5,88 9,17 2,65 1,80 23,40  4,90  2,25  0,00 0,00 7,73 59,71 
Botswana  2,45 14,29  -1,21  2,95 3,50 23,00  8,60  1,99  0,00 0,00 8,72 75,98 
Brazil  4,95 4,17 2,66 3,50 1,40 6,00 5,10  1,43  0,00 0,00 8,80 77,41 
Bulgaria  15,43  15,00  1,06 3,40 2,50 3,40 3,20  3,94  0,00 0,00 8,48 71,88 
Burkina 
Faso 
2,63 10,00  16,24  3,40 1,50 3,40 3,60  3,62  0,00 1,00 6,77 45,81 
Burundi  2,72 7,69 11,53  4,00 5,80 3,40 4,00  4,07  0,00 0,00 6,35 40,26 
Cambodia  3,07 8,33 9,51 3,00 2,70 12,10  2,90  4,83  0,00 0,00 7,14 50,93 
Chad 3,41 0,00 12,41  3,80 1,40 24,40  1,70  3,72  0,00 1,00 6,75 45,60 
Chile 6,95 13,70  1,33 2,00 1,90 23,80  3,60  1,76  0,00 0,00 9,08 82,46 
China  6,55 2,63 -4,35  3,40 1,90 19,60  2,30  4,14  0,00 0,00 8,04 64,66 
Colombia  4,62 17,65  5,66 2,90 2,60 6,90 4,40  2,43  0,00 0,00 8,70 75,70 
Costa  Rica  4,91 15,00  1,85 2,85 0,60 23,30  5,40  2,16  0,00 0,00 8,70 75,64 
Côte 
d'Ivoire 
2,87 3,13 -6,35  3,45 0,90 16,20  5,00  2,28  0,00 1,00 7,38 54,42 
Croatia  14,04  12,00  9,00 3,50 6,20 2,50 5,30  1,46  0,00 0,00 8,82 77,74 
Cyprus  11,41  0,00 6,49 2,55 4,40 17,80  4,50  1,47  0,00 0,00 9,77 95,43 
Czech 
Republic 
13,44  16,67  1,41 2,20 2,10 14,10  5,10  2,40  0,00 0,00 9,42 88,78 
Denmark  15,22  40,91  -3,35  2,25 1,60 13,20  8,10  0,73  1,00 0,00 10,09  101,91 
Egypt  4,04 6,25 6,46 3,50 2,90 23,40  4,80  2,36  0,00 1,00 8,02 64,32 
El  4,84 6,25 12,65  2,00 0,90 3,10 2,50  2,18  0,00 0,00 8,30 68,94   115
Salvador 
Estonia  13,40  11,76  9,66 2,20 1,20 14,10  7,20  2,29  0,00 0,00 8,95 80,04 
Ethiopia  2,87 5,00 11,85  3,50 3,80 2,90  0,00  4,00  5,74  0,00  6,35 40,35 
Fiji 4,29  9,52  -1,29  3,30 1,40 41,20  5,40  1,91  0,00 0,00 8,35 69,73 
Finland  14,62  28,57  -8,85  2,20 1,50 6,50 7,50  0,86  1,00 0,00 9,94 98,90 
















































Gabon  5,89 3,45 -10,93  3,10 0,30 15,20  2,90  1,52  0,00 1,00 8,76 76,68 
Gambia  1,10  3,00 28,57  10,95  3,40  48,40  4,90  4,27  0,00 1,00 7,28 53,01 
Georgia  12,15  3,85 13,97  3,65 1,00  5,20  8,12 65,89  1,70  3,46  0,00 0,00 
Germany  7,80  1,00  100,13  15,86  8,33 -1,51  2,20 1,50  4,80  0,83  0,00 10,01 
Ghana  3,09  3,10  0,00  9,38 9,70  0,80 12,70  4,20  4,45  0,00  7,46 55,63 
Greece  17,14  4,55 8,27 2,75 4,80 11,20  3,10  1,19  9,54  1,00 0,00  91,06 
Guatemala  3,49 0,00  8,16  8,33 2,70 0,70 15,00  1,70  2,14  0,00 0,00  66,62 
Guyana  4,13 15,00  11,65  3,20 0,90 57,40  5,00  4,36  0,00 1,00 8,13 66,14 
Honduras  3,32 11,11  6,21 3,35 0,80 16,50  3,60  3,29  0,00 0,00 7,80 60,79 
Hungary  14,47  5,26 2,56 2,55 1,30 26,70  4,60  2,27  0,00 0,00 9,23 85,25 
India 4,82 7,89 2,73 3,80 2,10 1,60 3,20  4,72  0,00 0,00 7,64 58,35 




4,24 0,00 1,61 4,55 3,10 2,60 4,00  3,10  0,00 1,00 8,54 72,95 
Ireland  11,36  21,05  -17,78  1,85 0,80 14,40  6,00  1,15  1,00 0,00 9,97 99,50 
Israel 9,71 0,00 11,11  2,75 8,70 7,10 7,60  1,07  0,00 0,00 9,76 95,23 
Italy  17,59  13,04  -4,33  2,30 2,00 5,80 4,90  1,02  1,00 0,00 9,93 98,65 
Japan 16,10  0,00 -1,18  2,15 1,00 0,60 3,60  0,72  0,00 0,00 10,05  101,09 
Jordan  2,86 1,61 21,17  2,90 9,60 9,20 7,90  2,91  1,00  0,00  8,12 65,87 
Kazakhsta
n 
6,95  3,70  8,38  5,00 4,46  1,00 14,60  4,40  3,27  0,00 1,00  70,30 
Kenya  2,99 0,00 7,70 3,05 2,30 8,10 6,50  2,80  0,00 0,00 6,89 47,43 
Kyrgyzsta
n 




3,25 0,00 1,15 4,60 2,40 11,60  2,10  5,42  0,00 0,00 7,46 55,62 
Latvia  13,83  6,67 13,22  2,65 0,70 12,50  6,30  2,37  0,00 0,00 8,65 74,88 
Lebanon  5,72 0,00 40,42  3,20 3,20 1,00 2,50  1,22  0,00 1,00 8,37 70,10 
Lesotho  4,13 6,25 91,24  3,55 3,20 143,80  8,40  2,85  0,00 0,00 7,39 54,67 
Lithuania  12,87  0,00  8,77  5,56 11,90  2,90 1,30 5,80 5,50  2,53  0,00  76,91 
Luxembou
rg 
14,11  25,00  -16,05  1,80 0,80 40,80  4,00  0,74  1,00 0,00 10,42  108,57   116
Madagasc
ar 
2,93  7,97  1,90  2,91  6,63  18,75  3,20 1,40 5,40  0,00 0,00  43,93 
Malawi  2,67 4,17 13,32  3,65 0,80 17,50  5,40  2,49  0,00 0,00 6,26 39,19 
Malaysia  4,00 15,63  -21,80  2,70 1,70 32,30  4,90  2,22  0,00 0,00 9,00 81,08 
Mali  3,66 20,83  10,83  2,90 1,90 6,60 2,20  2,73  0,00 1,00 6,52 42,56 
Malta  11,44  0,00 5,40 2,95 0,80 28,40  5,10  1,63  0,00 0,00 9,71 94,24 
Mauritania  3,23 4,35 13,02  3,80 2,30 8,60 5,10  3,81  0,00 1,00 7,35 54,09 
Mexico  4,54 5,00 1,96 3,00 0,60 14,40  4,90  2,01  0,00 0,00 8,95 80,09 
Moldova, 
Rep. of 
9,60 0,00 28,76  3,20 0,60 6,50 10,60  5,12  0,00 0,00 7,57 57,36 
Mongolia  3,89 0,00 5,80 3,15 2,20 4,20 5,70  4,05  0,00 0,00 7,34 53,88 
Namibia  3,83 8,33 0,17 2,90 2,60 74,00  9,10  2,67  0,00 0,00 8,55 73,13 
Nepal  3,57 3,12 11,23  3,60 0,90 0,90 3,20  5,51  0,00 0,00 7,05 49,75 


















































13,55  27,78  -7,01  2,05 1,80 28,00  5,10  0,89  1,00 0,00 10,01  100,14 
New 
Zealand 
11,64  8,33 -0,65  1,70 1,30 43,10  7,30  1,18  0,00 0,00 9,76 95,21 
Nicaragua  3,06 5,00 32,35  3,60 1,20 19,20  3,90  5,79  0,00 0,00 7,67 58,82 
Nigeria  2,99 6,45 8,23 3,30 0,70 50,00  0,70  2,65  0,00 1,00 6,68 44,60 
Norway  15,66  20,00  -7,06  2,30 2,30 12,80  7,40  0,77  0,00 0,00 10,18  103,61 
Pakistan  3,14 7,14 4,42 3,40 4,20 9,10 2,70  3,65  0,00 1,00 7,45 55,46 
Panama  5,41 5,88 9,30 2,40 1,40 41,00  5,10  1,76  0,00 0,00 8,57 73,37 
Philippine
s 
3,53 9,52 4,26 2,85 1,40 8,20 3,40  3,39  0,00 0,00 8,18 66,85 
Poland  11,61  17,24  5,17 2,80 2,10 6,20 7,50  1,95  0,00 0,00 8,94 79,90 
Portugal  15,35  10,00  8,70 2,30 2,20 17,10  5,80  1,38  1,00 0,00 9,60 92,08 
Romania  12,70  7,69 8,48 3,30 2,20 3,20 3,60  4,15  0,00 0,00 8,64 74,63 
Russian 
Federation 
12,27  7,50 -4,94  3,70 3,20 1,60 3,50  2,86  0,00 0,00 8,77 76,97 
Saudi 
Arabia 
2,81 0,00 -5,22  2,95 12,80  17,50  7,50  1,47  0,00 1,00 9,23 85,12 
Senegal  2,49 3,33 4,71 3,05 1,40 8,30 3,70  2,51  0,00 1,00 7,18 51,48 
Singapore  6,81 0,00 -17,79  1,45 5,10 71,50  3,00  0,80  0,00 0,00 10,09  101,90 
Slovakia  11,16  19,05  11,17  3,00 2,00 4,40 5,00  2,62  0,00 0,00 9,18 84,27 
Slovenia  13,17  0,00 1,45 3,00 1,50 9,40 5,70  1,46  0,00 0,00 9,57 91,54 
South 
Africa 
3,51 14,81  -1,24  2,90 1,60 9,90 8,00  2,56  0,00 0,00 9,05 81,84 
Spain 16,47  17,65  -1,20  2,40 1,40 18,70  5,00  1,15  1,00 0,00 9,69 93,96 
Sri  Lanka  6,39 13,33  6,45 2,90 4,20 10,00  3,40  3,68  0,00 0,00 8,00 63,99 
Sweden  17,45  43,50  -7,01  2,35 2,20 12,90  8,30  0,81  1,00 0,00 9,94 98,72 





3,04 7,50 11,17  4,00 6,30 8,00 3,10  2,83  0,00 1,00 7,97 63,51 
Tajikistan  4,43 6,45 -0,59  4,00 1,20 7,00  2,81  0,00 1,00  48,27  2,20  6,95 
Thailand  5,48 4,00 -16,50  2,70 2,10 10,40  4,80  2,53  0,00 0,00 8,60 74,04 
Tunisia  5,74 3,23 3,20 3,00 1,80 61,00  7,70  2,62  0,00 1,00 8,59 73,87 
Turkey  5,56  2,20  5,00 3,47 2,75 4,40 3,00  2,03  0,00 1,00 8,77 76,87 
Uganda  2,16 13,16  9,41 3,00 2,20 4,70 2,60  3,46  6,98  0,00 1,00  48,71 
United 
Kingdom 
0,47  5,30  1,00  98,41  15,96  23,81  1,90 2,70 17,60  0,95  0,00 9,92 
United 
States 
12,53  26,32  1,40  7,30  0,00 0,00  106,00  1,80 3,20  5,40  1,01  10,30 
Uzbekista
n 
4,49  0,24  1,40  7,70  2,16  1,00 7,63  3,33  4,40  1,00  0,00  58,17 
Venezuela  4,30 3,23 0,06 3,30 1,30 9,00 5,20  1,65  0,00 0,00 8,67 75,12 
Yemen  2,39 0,00  6,50  19,15  3,85  44,80  7,00  2,57  0,00 1,00 6,58 43,27 
Zambia  9,01  43,70  0,00  43,28  2,24 3,33  2,90 1,80  2,20  2,18  0,00 6,58 

















































   118
 























































































Albania 13,900 0,600  -10,000  -0,786 57,900 0,361  72,534 52,022 2,345  -0,484  ..  0,708  72,750 4,000  9,100 
Algeria  18,500  3,300 -9,000  0,178 49,400  0,069 36,272  51,034  1,634 -0,876  0,661  68,890  6,000 6,100 29,800 
Argentina  16,500  3,700 8,000 0,641  72,890  61,500  0,945 44,398  52,418  4,775 4,909 0,824  1,000 ..  15,000 
Armenia  19,800 1,000  -3,000 -6,608 54,800 0,373  85,865 52,266 1,750  -6,510 0,718  70,470 4,000  ..  .. 
Australia  8,900  17,000 23,000 1,861  60,300 1,237  74,898 51,802 3,841  2,672  0,927  78,250 1,000  7,000  6,600 
Austria  10,900  7,300 23,000  2,166 64,200  1,399 64,303  52,093  8,699 1,605 0,901  77,020  1,000 3,200 3,600 
Azerbaija
n 
22,100 4,000  -8,000 -9,765  53,034  41,800 0,216  73,452  0,259  -10,736  ..  69,860 6,000  ..  1,300 
Bahrain 14,600 18,600 -7,000 -1,440 ..  0,579  36,956 51,448 0,687  1,381  0,803  72,860 7,000  ..  .. 
Banglade
sh 
37,900  0,200 23,000  2,366 46,900  -1,723  76,166  50,051  1,709 3,209 0,441  58,130  3,000 4,900 3,300 
Belarus  26,100  0,827  6,000  6,000 -6,000  -1,322  ..  0,735 81,283  54,313  -2,187  0,778  67,980  2,900 2,300 
Belgium  10,100 10,500 23,000 1,913  39,100 1,380  64,495 52,156 4,998  1,690  0,921  77,210 1,000  3,600  7,000 
Belize 13,700  1,600 17,000  2,277 ..  0,459 30,731  50,928  ..  0,536 0,754  74,690  1,000 ..  12,700 
Bolivia  32,800  1,300 -8,000  -0,201  59,400  -0,481  600  57,041  51,366  1,721 2,098 0,631  61,390  1,000 8, 7,400 
Botswana  68,300  51,086  1,400  23,000 5,172  61,800 -0,886 77,632  ..  1,350  0,584  47,390 2,000  ..  15,800 
Brazil 26,800  1,700 22,000  1,153 59,600  0,332 52,329  52,930  4,341 1,268 0,736  66,780  3,000 25,500  9,600 
Bulgaria  18,300  6,500 -9,000  0,179 49,300  0,886 86,741  52,491  0,531 -2,039  0,769  71,050  2,000 4,400 19,400 
Burkina 
Faso 
64,300  45,000  50,893  1,712  44,390  0,100  23,000 1,223  -2,007 90,588  ..  0,290  4,000  10,000 .. 
Burundi  67,800  88,661  (.)  -6,000 -0,403 41,600 -1,793  51,585 ..  -4,155 ..  42,440 6,000  5,300  .. 
Cambodia  46,600  9,000  95,657  ..  1,785  (.)  1,986 45,600  -1,024  51,742  ..  53,360  6,000 6,900 .. 
Chad  56,100 (.)  -4,000 -0,393 45,700 -1,527 76,186 51,581 ..  0,058  ..  47,190 6,000  ..  .. 
Chile  13,800  3,400 23,000  4,237 55,100  0,555 47,061  51,987  2,980 6,635 0,812  74,940  2,000 17,400  7,900 
China 18,000  2,800 22,000  7,494 38,500  0,363 86,158  51,481  0,750 9,227 0,700  69,830  7,000 7,900 3,100 
Colombia  20,700  1,800 22,000  1,731 59,100  0,340 59,071  52,403  3,183 1,524 0,760  70,430  4,000 20,300  14,700 
Costa 
Rica 
11,600  1,400 15,000  0,993 63,200  0,867 44,580  51,525  3,492 2,049 0,789  76,030  1,000 13,000  6,100 
Côte 
d'Ivoire 
63,400  0,900 -16,000  -0,992  43,400  -1,503  50,298  50,611  2,022 1,261 0,401  46,720  6,000 6,200 .. 
Croatia 16,400 3,900  -3,000 -1,418 62,500 0,974  71,561 52,651 2,781  -1,489 0,790  72,640 2,000  ..  15,800 
Cyprus  10,000  7,100 23,000  5,666 ..  0,834 61,589  51,445  4,448 2,558 0,877  77,760  1,000 ..  3,900 
Czech 
Republic 
14,200 12,400 -4,000 0,402  50,200 1,098  84,426 52,392 1,336  -1,604 0,841  73,880  3,500  1,000  8,100 
Denmark  12,800 10,800 23,000 2,145  56,200 1,524  83,642 51,749 9,138  2,529  0,909  75,650 1,000  3,600  4,600 
Egypt 23,000  1,500 23,000  3,528 48,800  -0,153  43,169  51,181  1,684 2,586 0,604  66,270  6,000 4,000 8,100 
El 
Salvador 
23,400  0,700 -4,000  -0,157  48,700  0,191 52,616  52,157  2,459 2,970 0,693  69,130  2,000 16,600  7,000 
Estonia 23,800 11,200 -5,000 -0,099 60,000 0,947  82,155 54,091 0,991  -1,774 0,798  68,680 1,000  6,700  12,600 
Ethiopia  65,500 (.)  -9,000 -0,391 41,800 -1,843 67,264 51,067 0,396  1,036  0,297  43,320 5,000  6,700  .. 
Fiji  14,600  1,000 9,000 0,640 ..  0,316 42,436  51,482  ..  -0,063  0,755  72,660  6,000 ..  5,400 
Finland 11,300 11,600 21,000  52,469  1,000  2,049  73,900 1,529  85,651  4,180  1,206  0,913  76,830  3,600  9,100 
France 11,300  6,200 23,000  1,759 55,500  1,403 75,210  52,473  6,444 1,190 0,914  78,120  1,000 5,600 8,800 
Gabon  48,600 3,300  -11,000  -1,451 54,900 -0,970 75,179 51,268 3,277  0,535  ..  52,420 5,000  ..  .. 
Gambia 53,700 0,200  -12,000  -0,038 44,700 -1,300 77,735 51,696 ..  0,053  0,388  47,000 7,000  12,000 .. 
Georgia  17,500  0,600 -9,000  -3,980  ..  0,233 76,872  52,819  1,619 -11,749  ..  72,730  4,000 ..  11,000 
Germany  10,700  10,500  5,000 1,226 52,500  1,454 68,689  52,020  7,160 ..  0,905  77,210  1,000 4,700 7,900 
Ghana 34,900  0,200 -5,000  -0,129  50,200  -0,757  98,351  51,431  1,021 1,543 0,552  60,000  2,000 5,000 .. 
Greece  8,900 7,700 23,000  1,640 50,900 1,265  56,820 51,617  4,796 1,420 0,869  78,110  1,000 5,400 10,200 
Guatemal 31,100  0,600 -6,000  0,488 49,600  -0,481  39,564  52,254  2,796 1,658 0,603  64,040  3,000 30,000  ..   119
a 
Guyana  700  28,200  1,100 -14,000  -0,249  ..  0,246 48,359  52,583  ..  8,904 0,698  64,410  2,000 7,400 11,
Honduras  22,800  0,700 4,000 0,707 53,100  0,085 45,722  51,713  1,355 1,354 0,644  69,400  3,000 17,100  4,200 
Hungary  21,600  813  6,000 14,000  1,391 62,700  1,103 71,513  52,815  1,871 0,211 0, 70,870  1,000 4,500 5,700 
India  29,700  1,100 22,000  3,048 41,600  -1,001  49,268  50,319  0,889 3,770 0,545  62,590  2,000 5,700 .. 




21,300  3,800 -12,000  -1,012  44,500  279  0,220 35,227  50,597  0,717 2, 0,691  69,220  6,000 ..  .. 


















































































Israel  9,300 9,300 21,000  1,792 50,400  1,217 66,023  51,304  5,241 2,000 0,877  77,750  1,000 6,200 9,300 
Italy  9,000 7,100 23,000  2,162 47,200  1,111 57,344  51,978  6,807 0,994 0,895  78,170  1,000 4,200 9,500 
Japan  8,200  9,300  22,000 2,604  48,600 1,088  66,409 51,910 10,631 1,143  0,916  79,960 1,000  3,400  5,000 
Jordan 19,500  2,500 11,000  1,783 51,700  0,214 32,396  50,972  1,389 1,498 ..  70,150  4,000 5,800 .. 
Kazakhst
an 
-5,943  25,800 10,400 -7,000 -4,743 46,500 0,382  80,196 53,478 0,530  ..  67,640 6,000  ..  13,700 
Kenya  56,300 0,300  14,000 0,461  46,300 -1,278 84,018 50,848 0,680  -0,329 0,503  52,040 6,000  10,000 .. 
Kyrgyzsta
n 





44,900 0,100  10,000 4,345  56,200 -1,372 83,996 51,163 ..  3,475  0,469  53,230 7,000  4,200  .. 
Latvia 25,000  3,700  437  -4,000  -0,100  63,000  0,835 81, 54,284  1,234 -5,536  0,770  68,420  1,000 5,300 12,800 
Lebanon  800  ..  19,000  4,600 9,000 1,994 43, 0,428 37,472  51,298  2,293 5,278 0,718  69,920  6,000 .. 
Lesotho 43,300 ..  22,000 3,499  ..  -0,790 55,776 51,086 ..  0,940  0,556  56,020 4,000  21,500 .. 
Lithuania  23,300  3,700 -4,000  -1,542  57,200  1,026 79,331  53,921  0,879 -4,846  0,785  69,890  1,000 5,200 17,000 
Luxembo
urg 
10,600  20,200  23,000  3,388 ..  1,088 56,564  52,143  5,540 1,883 0,895  76,670  1,000 3,900 2,700 
Madagasc
ar 
38,800 0,100  -21,000  -1,836 38,800 -0,975 77,872 51,295 ..  -1,519 0,478  57,510 2,000  10,200 .. 
Malawi 72,500 0,100  -15,000  0,249  47,300 -1,977 90,276 50,364 ..  0,891  0,375  39,270 3,000  ..  .. 
Malaysia  16,100  5,800 22,000  3,935 49,500  0,403 59,697  51,504  2,103 3,786 0,762  72,000  5,000 12,000  3,900 
Mali  43,200 (.)  -9,000 -0,011 ..  -1,620 80,503 51,211 ..  0,785  0,371  53,300 2,000  12,200 .. 
Malta  8,400  4,800  23,000 8,268  ..  0,691  35,390 51,427 7,152  12,137 0,848  77,160 1,000  ..  6,500 
Mauritani
a 
44,400 1,300  -16,000  -0,601 38,900 -1,599 73,621 51,484 ..  1,287  0,441  53,500 6,000  7,400  .. 
Mexico  18,900  3,700 23,000  1,212 45,900  0,467 46,063  52,062  2,882 1,228 0,775  72,180  2,000 16,200  1,700 
Moldova, 
Rep. of 
25,700  2,700 -9,000  -4,671  54,500  0,605 82,828  52,915  0,651 ..  0,697  67,520  2,000 6,000 7,300 
Mongolia  25,900 3,500  -4,000 -0,130 54,200 0,033  87,049 51,137 ..  -1,811 ..  65,850 2,000  5,600  5,700 
Namibia  52,400 ..  -10,000  -0,615 57,400 -0,780 67,069 50,507 ..  1,121  0,624  52,410 2,000  ..  .. 
Nepal 39,100  0,100 17,000  1,646 45,200  -1,162  66,360  49,784  0,678 2,302 0,449  57,320  3,000 5,900 .. 
Netherlan
ds 
9,300  10,000 23,000 1,823  55,400 1,400  65,198 51,818 5,684  2,119  0,919  77,920 1,000  5,500  3,300 
New 
Zealand 
11,100  8,300 20,000  0,696 59,900  1,312 77,178  51,830  3,764 0,974 0,900  76,900  1,000 17,400  6,000 
Nicaragua  24,300 0,700  -16,000  -3,389 51,800 -0,114 54,236 51,744 0,809  0,915  0,624  67,860 3,000  13,100 9,800 
Nigeria 52,200 0,700  -7,000 -0,706 36,700 -1,439 55,665 51,395 0,343  0,558  0,425  50,080 4,000  12,700 .. 
Norway  2,911  9,100  15,400 23,000  73,000 1,507  83,100 51,884 6,602  3,414  0,932  78,140 1,000  3,700  3,400 
Pakistan  26,700  0,700 21,000  2,744 42,100  -1,053  40,546  50,877  1,145 1,749 0,489  63,950  6,000 4,300 7,800 
Panama  879  11,800  15,100  2,500 9,000 0,954 60,000  0,564 53,909  51,547  3,648 2, 0,770  73,600  1,000 14,700 
Philippine
s 
21,800  0,900 -3,000  0,501 41,600  0,273 60,183  51,329  2,157 0,993 0,739  68,300  2,000 9,700 9,800 
Poland  17,300  811  9,300 16,000  1,564 46,700  1,063 79,337  52,975  1,360 3,679 0, 72,520  1,000 5,300 16,100 
Portugal  12,600  4,900 23,000  2,917 57,100  1,203 70,036  52,303  5,489 2,356 0,858  75,290  1,000  000  5,900 4,




-9,000  0,667  66,560  13,400  29,700 10,700  -0,771 49,100  80,792 54,550 0,556  -7,019 0,769  5,000  12,200 
Saudi 
Arabia 
16,800 14,200 -18,000  -1,696 34,200 0,488  24,853  -1,794  7,000  ..  ..  51,223 1,342  0,715  71,420 
Senegal  47,000  0,400 -17,000  -0,210  47,600  -1,249  71,766  51,772  1,792 0,546 0,405  52,320  3,000 7,500 .. 
Singapore  10,600 19,500 22,000 5,689  ..  0,680  63,901 51,423 3,611  5,994  0,876  77,100 5,000  ..  3,400 
Slovakia  16,400  7,400 -4,000  0,572 61,600  1,051 84,539  52,578  1,146 -0,114  0,822  72,950  1,000 2,600 18,600 
Slovenia  14,600  6,800 6,000 1,213 58,800  0,987 79,559  52,537  3,181 ..  0,857  74,450  1,000 4,200 7,400 
South 
Africa 
50,500 6,900  -12,000  -0,671 48,700 -0,281 58,702 52,793 1,505  -0,379 0,689  54,730 1,000  22,300 5,400 
Spain  10,100  5,900 23,000  1,947 54,100  1,349 54,889  52,221  5,529 1,796 0,891  78,000  1,000 5,400 10,500 
Sri  Lanka  15,300  0,400 23,000  3,278 51,300  0,070 54,382  51,534  2,010 3,653 0,727  73,110  3,000 5,400 8,200 
Sweden  8,700 6,200 21,000  1,179 72,600  1,723 88,808  51,446  4,590 0,484 0,923  78,550  1,000 3,600 4,700 
Switzerla
nd 




20,700  3,100 23,000  1,259 43,600  547  926  68,890  11,200  0,129 35, 51,665  1,202 0, 0,636  7,000 .. 
Tajikistan  25,300 1,000  -8,000 -6,660 42,400  0,659  0,217  77,335 52,201 0,576  -11,637  67,180 6,000  ..  2,700 



















































































Tunisia  19,600  1,800 23,000  2,234 50,800  0,252 45,919  50,845  2,983 2,730 0,688  69,500  6,000 7,800 15,600 
Turkey  20,100  2,900 23,000  2,251 50,800  0,263 59,367  51,870  2,743 2,798 0,726  69,020  4,000 8,200 7,300 
Uganda 76,300 (.)  12,000 2,167  48,700 -1,748 88,132  ..  50,984 ..  3,850  0,401  39,640 6,000  7,000 
United 
Kingdom 
77,180  9,800 9,500 23,000  1,938 46,100  1,330 73,183  51,714  5,136 1,595 0,914  1,000 6,500 5,500 
United 
States 
12,600  23,000  79,936 52,164  0,927  1,000  19,700  1,874  53,200 1,526  3,572  1,758  76,700  8,900  4,800 
Uzbekista
n 
25,100  4,100 -7,000  -2,037  41,300  0,257 83,607  52,339  0,545 ..  0,683  67,520  7,000 5,500 0,400 
Venezuel
a 
17,000  6,500 -12,000  -0,786  53,000  0,455 51,922  51,978  1,423 0,538 0,763  72,410  1,000 14,400  14,900 
Yemen 38,000  1,100  -4,000 -0,590 ..  -1,204 36,224 50,428 1,211  -1,457 0,389  57,990 5,000  7,600  .. 
Zambia 79,500 0,300  -19,000  -2,163 49,500 -1,692 76,158 50,678 0,638  -1,338 0,413  40,090 5,000  13,000 .. 
Zimbabw
e 
74,500 1,600  13,000 0,110  53,200 -1,231 78,011 50,536 0,808  -0,487 0,551  44,130 6,000  15,600 .. 
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  globalization – correlation 
with time axis 1980 - 2001 
growth – correlation with 
time axis 1980 – 2001 
 
inequality – correlation with 
time axis 1980 - 2001 
Albania    0,6202  0,0407  0,3412 
Algeria    -0,309  -0,155  0,4945 
Argentina    0,6686  0,2758  0,4621 
Armenia    0,7608  0,6811  0,0338 
Australia    0,2031  0,1635  0,9271 
Austria    0,7848  0,1916  0,5785 
Azerbaijan    0,7959  0,4095  0,7991 
Bangladesh    0,6644  0,0346  0,9462 
Belgium    0,7835  0,0982  -0,743 
Bolivia    0,7429  0,7673  0,5254 
Brazil    0,5559  -0,058  0,6779 
Bulgaria    0,7215  -0,414  0,8482 
Burundi    -0,4  -0,499  0,7678 
Chile    0,8015  0,2271  0,0647 
China    0,8514  0,0339  0,9629 
Colombia    0,4957  -0,241  0,7491 
Costa Rica    0,9056  0,4592  -0,528 
Cote d'Ivoire    0,5822  0,621  0,6387 
Croatia    0,9047  0,8229  -0,1 
Cyprus    -0,909  -0,247  -0,591 
Czech Republic    0,7051  0,0053  0,949 
Denmark      0,7825 0,2374 0,7026 
Egypt, Arab Rep.    -0,563  -0,368  0,9194 
El Salvador    0,4015  0,7133  0,695 
Ethiopia    0,6858  0,2333  0,7431 
Fiji    -0,006  0,0433  0,0379 
Finland    0,5877  0,0061  0,3943 
France    0,9233  0,1083  -0,075 
Gabon    0,0583  0,115  0,917 
Gambia, The    0,7225  -0,124  0,9451 
Germany    0,7496  0,2414  -0,875 
Ghana    0,4646  0,4915  0,3791 
Greece    -0,469  0,3127  0,7617 
Guatemala    0,0147  0,6817  0,6115 
Honduras    0,7945  0,1149  0,7648 
Hungary    0,7605  0,0948  0,9323 
India    0,8065  0,0987  -0,118 
                                            
36 http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/GDNdata.htm
37 http://laborsta.ilo.org/.  
38 http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/
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Indonesia    0,2286  -0,354  -0,758 
Iran, Islamic Rep.    0,301  0,1712  0,53 
Ireland    0,6234  0,769  0,777 
Israel      0,8512 0,0171 0,6332 
Italy    0,2579  -0,262  0,4941 
Japan    0,4288  -0,464  0,8147 
Jordan    0,1792  -0,263  -0,359 
Kenya      -0,455 -0,304 -0,703 
Kyrgyz Republic    0,7427  -0,123  -0,398 
Latvia    0,8504  -0,212  0,9258 
Lesotho    0,7341  0,1742  0,5112 
Lithuania    0,8195  -0,036  -0,778 
Madagascar      0,6333 0,4645 0,4297 
Malawi    0,662  0,262  0,7718 
Malaysia    0,2089  -0,186  -0,054 
Malta    0,202  0,3153  0,7544 
Mexico    0,7941  0,0238  0,9023 
Moldova    0,846  -0,451  0,8806 
Mongolia    0,8103  -0,328  0,3015 
Nepal    0,7519  0,1214  -0,563 
Netherlands    0,7234  0,5226  0,8167 
New Zealand    0,4086  0,0023  0,8273 
Nicaragua    0,7882  0,2836  -0,067 
Nigeria    0,6278  0,2947  0,9545 
Norway    0,5893  0,0034  0,12 
Pakistan    0,8626  -0,737  0,8276 
Panama      0,6544 0,1293 0,9285 
Philippines    0,7089  0,1701  0,8873 
Poland    0,9762  0,4554  0,7744 
Portugal  0,9207 0,2228 0,7769 
Romania    0,8285  -0,356  0,922 
Russian Federation    0,8337  -0,439  0,597 
Senegal    0,3988  0,1891  0,5737 
Singapore    -0,162  -0,084  -0,958 
Slovak Republic    0,8306  0,1888  0,9617 
Slovenia    0,4035  0,7438  0,8119 
South Africa    0,5166  -0,134  0,7189 
Spain    0,4415  0,2187  0,9428 
Sri Lanka    0,3462  0,1164  -0,626 
Sweden    0,6254  0,1067  0,6772 
Syrian Arab Republic    0,4855  0,0602  0,1503 
Thailand    -0,283  -0,266  0,6762 
Tunisia    -0,082  0,1226  0,8089 
Turkey    0,7793  -0,016  0,8074 
Uganda    0,8504  0,5893  -0,309 
United Kingdom    0,594  0,1656  0,7432 
United States    0,6005  0,4465  0,5563 
Venezuela, RB    0,7574  0,1213  0,8909 
Yemen, Rep.    -0,521  0,4346  0,1253 
Zambia    0,6696  -0,044  0,6846 
Zimbabwe      0,5739 -0,31 0,4364 
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Country code  changes in unequal transfer 
1998 – 2002 
correlation of unemployment 
over time 
 
Albania -0,300  0,766 
Algeria 0,140  0,907 
Argentina 2,550  0,898 
Australia  0,070  0,270 
Austria 0,290  0,358 
Azerbaijan -0,240  0,971 
Bahamas -0,120  -0,574 
Bangladesh 0,940  0,814 
Barbados -0,180  -0,093 
Belarus  0,548  0,930 
Belgium 0,250  -0,708 
Belize  0,030  0,160 
Bolivia 0,520  -0,298 
Botswana 0,650  -0,860 
Brazil 1,560  0,855 
Bulgaria -0,280  -0,329 
Canada 0,060  -0,458 
Chile 0,620  -0,608 
China 0,490  0,064 
Colombia 1,010  0,503 
Costa Rica  -0,080  -0,465 
Croatia 0,580  0,956 
Czech Republic  -0,080  0,883 
Denmark 0,230  -0,971 
Dominican Re-public  0,040  -0,840 
Ecuador -0,090  0,725 
Egypt 0,450  0,725 
El Salvador  0,010  -0,707 
Estonia 0,270  0,964 
Fiji 0,450  -0,597 
Finland 0,180  0,669 
France 0,270  0,012 
Georgia -0,020  -0,917 
Germany 0,290  0,075 
Greece 0,310  0,891 
Guatemala -0,040  -0,701 
Haiti 0,540  0,988   124
Honduras -0,610  -0,705 
Hungary -0,200  -0,926 
Iceland 0,100  -0,598 
India 0,770  0,553 
Indonesia -0,190  0,954 
Ireland 0,030  -0,851 
Israel 0,170  0,662 
Italy 0,260  0,489 
Jamaica -0,630  -0,933 
Japan 0,140  0,789 
Korea, Rep. of  0,130  -0,055 
Latvia 0,190  -0,783 
Lithuania 0,060  -0,195 
Luxembourg 0,550  0,854 
Malaysia 0,120  -0,840 
Mauritius 0,680  0,997 
Mexico -0,590  -0,288 
Moldova, Rep. of  -1,250  -0,978 
Mongolia -0,240  -0,836 
Morocco 0,460  -0,950 
Namibia 1,570  0,921 
Netherlands 0,230  -0,874 
New Zealand  0,280  0,067 
Nicaragua -2,490  0,680 
Norway 0,100  0,473 
Pakistan 1,110  0,789 
Panama -0,280  0,511 
Peru 0,620  0,545 
Philippines 0,890  0,847 
Poland 0,210  0,409 
Portugal 0,150  -0,690 
Romania -0,950  -0,567 
Russian Federa-tion  0,560  0,669 
Saudi Arabia  0,000  0,866 
Singapore 0,350  0,016 
Slovakia 0,290  0,774 
Slovenia 0,190  -0,829 
South Africa  1,820  0,987 
Spain 0,190  0,060 
Sri Lanka  0,400  -0,964   125
Sweden 0,160  0,648 
Switzerland 0,180  0,065 
Tajikistan 2,270  0,979 
Thailand 0,880  -0,139 
Trinidad and Tobago  -0,370  0,120 
Tunisia 0,530  0,030 
Turkey 0,390  -0,841 
Ukraine 2,460  0,882 
United Kingdom  0,040  -0,694 
United States  -0,020  -0,800 
Uruguay 0,750  0,725 
Uzbekistan 3,170  0,775 
Venezuela -0,210  0,555 
Zimbabwe -0,630  -0,872 
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The following critique of the Dollar/Kraay approach as the dominant paradigm of the”growth is good for the 
poor” school should be mentioned: 
 
Problem number 1: The data-set has been questioned. In a statement on Kraay, 2001, James K. Galbraith 
maintains in “Foreign Affairs” July/August 2002  
(http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20020701faresponse8531/james-k-galbraith/by-the-numbers.html):  
 
“It is extraordinary that India, China, and Vietnam should be offered as three of the five major examples of 
globalizing success stories. India's relative success began in the 1980s, partly because strict capital controls and 
long-term official development assistance helped protect it from the debt crisis that occurred in Latin America 
and elsewhere. China grew at first on the strength of agricultural reform and then through a program of 
industrialization financed mainly by internal savings; it has to this day not liberalized its capital account. 
Vietnam and China remain under the control of their communist parties; these are not "Washington consensus" 
countries by any means. 
 
Missing from Dollar and Kraay's list of successes are the true globalizers of recent times, including Argentina, 
until just a few months ago the leading neoliberal poster child, or Russia, now attempting to recover from the 
collapse that followed shock globalization. So too are the erstwhile "Asian tigers" who liberalized in the early 
1990s and failed before the end of the decade. Nor are these examples isolated. World growth rates were 
systematically higher under the structured international financial regime of Bretton Woods from 1945 to 1971 
than they became in the era of deregulation after 1980. 
 
Dollar and Kraay assert that there is no general pattern of rising inequality under globalization. However, the 
source on which they base this assertion, the World Bank's inequality data set, is riddled with gaps and 
implausible measurements. According to these measures, for instance, inequality declined in Canada from 1971 
to 1991 and in Mexico from 1975 to 1994, Spain is one of the most egalitarian countries in Europe, and India 
and Indonesia have general measures of inequality similar to that of Norway. 
 
My own work, in contrast, shows a clear and severe global pattern of rising inequality in industrial pay, 
beginning in the early 1980s. This is based on the United Nations data that permit about 3,000 data points to be 
estimated, roughly five times as many as in the published editions of the World Bank data set (and more than 
three times as many as in a forthcoming edition).  
 
Rising inequality after 1980 is the rule in this data, with limited exceptions mainly in Scandinavia and in 
Southeast Asia before 1997. The patterns strongly suggest that forces of globalization, including high global 
interest rates, debt crises, and shock liberalizations, are associated with rising inequality in pay structures. Pay 
is, of course, the major component of income, and if pay inequalities are rising, it is a good bet that broader 
income and social inequalities are rising too.” 
 
 
Problem number 2: Some of the measures, used by Aaart Kraay and associates in their works to explain 
inequality are highly controversial. Kraay and associates use the straight openness indicator, but also another 
measure, adjusted by the socalled Frankel/Roemer method. But Geoffrey Barrows, who won the 2004 Moffat 
Prize in Economics, however wrote about the complicated econometric procedure, first established by Frankel, J. 
and D. Romer, in their articles “Does Trade Cause Growth?,” American Economic Review, Vol. 89, no. 3 (June 
1999): 379-399, and Frankel, J and D. Romer, “Trade and Growth: an empirical Investigation.” NBER working 
paper No. 5476. Cambridge, MA: March 1996, in his comments at 
http://economics.about.com/library/weekly/aa043004d.htm), maintaining:   127
 
“To see the connection between trade and standards of living, researchers often estimate cross-country 
regressions of income per person on the ratio of exports or imports to GDP.  Many economists have found 
modest positive correlations between the two variables and have usually interpreted the correlation as 
causation.[1]  The problem with concluding causation from correlation is that the correlation may contain a 
simultaneity bias.  If overlooked, the bias would lead OLS estimations to overstate the effect of trade on income.   
 
Frankel and Romer (1999) attempt to correct for the simultaneity bias by instrumenting for trade of a particular 
country with its geographic characteristics.  As these geographic characteristics are truly exogenous, the 
Frankel-Romer IV regression seems plausible; however, if some other variable that affects income were also 
determined by geographic characteristics, then omitting such a variable would cause the Frankel-Romer IV 
regression to overstate the effect of trade on income by omitted variable bias.  After testing a cross-sectional 
data set of 150 countries, Frankel and Romer were unable to conclude that OLS estimates overstate the effect of 
trade on income, though they argue simultaneity bias would cause it to do so.  Rather, Frankel and Romer found 
that OLS understates the effect of trade on income.  If it could be shown that Frankel and Romer omit a relevant 
variable from their IV regression, then omitted variable bias could explain the incompatibility of the Frankel-
Romer hypothesis with the Frankel-Romer findings.  “ 
 
Problem number 3: predictors are highly intercorrelated. For example, we find arable land and total land, and 
we find “rule of law” and we find “democracy”, the R
^2 of these indicators being in our sub-list of countries and 
datapoints with fairly widely available data 68 % 
 
Problem number 4: results are unstable. Even Dollar and Kraay admit in their first version of their 2000 paper 
in Table 5 (page 37 of the March 2000 version) of their still internationally available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/pdfiles/growthgoodforpoor.pdf that for 213 observations, ln Per 
Capita Income, and the export + and the import share in total GDP increase the ln per capita income of the poor, 
but equation 5 in the same Table (introducing inflation, government consumption and the rule of law as further 
predictors) “world economic openness” (i.e. exports + imports per GDP) decreases the incomes of the poor 
(the unstandardized regression coefficient is –0.004, the error probability is only 1.3 %, thus the result is quite 
significant). Our own test with n = 260 observations yields the result that only by including the time point 
openness has the reducing significant effect on economic inequality; while without time frame of reference or 
working with data points for 1980 and after, the effect on the GINI is not significant at all
39. 


















































-0,5558 0,6757 -1,2603 -1,5574 -2,6804 3,2292  6,0882 13,4291 2,5945 41,2215 
  0,9951 0,5275 0,4757 0,7002 1,0207 3,0762 1,8627  11,9944 2,3533 3,0864 
  0,3863  7,4103          





        
T-test  -0,5585 1,2808 -2,6491 -2,2243  -2,6261 1,0498 3,2684 1,1196 1,1025  13,3558 
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Problem number 5: ever since Kurt Rothschild’s famous article in the Economic Journal in 1944, it is known 
that the share of imports – or also of exports - per GDP are a function of the size of nations. Even with the 
mentioned Frankel/Roemer adjustments, the indicator is heavily dependent upon the size of a nation. It emerges 
from the Dollar/Kraay data set that the highest openness over the last decade was to be found in Estonia, Norway 
and Saint Lucia. From the entire Dollar/Kraay data set it emerges that among the 30 most open economies of the 
entire world economy were apart from the obvious small territory cases like Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Saint 
Lucia, Slovenia and Switzerland the two nations Communist Bulgaria before the transformation and Belarus 
under the Lukashenka regime and the heavily social democratic “Consociational Democracy” in the sense of 
Cornell Professor Peter Katzenstein – Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden in the 1980s and 1990s, 
plus the also heavily social democratic Norway during that time. If anything, thus the Dollar and Kraay results 
demonstrate either (what Kraay certainly did not intend) that communism Bulgarian or Lukashenka-style is the 
model, or – better that there is some truth in Professor Peter Katzenstein’s theory about small states, the need for 





















































-0,5240 0,5718 -1,2475 -1,7291 -2,6463 3,0482 5,9664  13,2169 3,0436 0,0000 0,0047  31,7979
  1,0105 0,5881 0,4795 0,8316 1,0761 3,1155 1,9193  12,2033 2,5823 0,0000 0,0591  116,4869
  0,3869  7,4369            





          





















































-1,4484 0,2752 -1,1286 -0,8259 -1,9668 -1,4127 6,6386 18,6259 1,7042 42,2391 
  1,2289 0,7359 0,5688 0,9256 1,3343 3,7329 2,0467  14,4902 3,0365 3,7860 
  0,3651  7,7555          





        
t-test  -1,1786 0,3739 -1,9843 -0,8923 -1,4740  -0,3785 3,2435 1,2854 0,5612  11,1567 
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social compromise and social partnership in such states, and redistribution and development in such nations and 
their ascent in the international system
40. 
                                            
40 see especially: “Corporatism and Change: Austria, Switzerland and the Politics of Industry” (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1984; paperback edition 1987; Spanish translation 1987). In that context, it is worthwhile to analyze the top 30 
“globalizers” according to Dollar and Kraay. We sorted his original data with the EXCEL “sort” routine. It seems that except 
for the cases of communist Bulgaria in the 1980s and postcommunist Belarus, and the then Crown Colony Hong Kong, all 
other countries support rather Katzenstein’s small state theory and not Dollar and Kraay’s own interpretation 
 









0,9014 AUT  Austria  1987 
1,2614 BEL  Belgium  1979 
1,3456 BEL  Belgium  1985 
1,5769 BEL  Belgium  1992 
1,0761 BGR  Bulgaria  1989 
1,2134 BGR  Bulgaria  1984 
0,9689 BLR  Belarus  1993 
1,0415 CHE  Switzerland  1982 
0,8597 DNK  Denmark  1986 
0,9396 DNK  Denmark  1991 
0,8840 EST  Estonia  1993 
1,0722 EST  Estonia  1998 
0,9003 HKG  Hong  Kong  1976 
0,9225 HKG  Hong  Kong  1971 
0,9743 HKG  Hong  Kong  1981 
1,1419 HKG  Hong  Kong  1986 
1,7160 HKG  Hong  Kong  1991 
1,0190 IRL  Ireland  1987 
0,8957 LCA  Saint  Lucia  1995 
2,6691 LUX  Luxemburg  1985 
3,0757 LUX  Luxemburg  1991 
0,9087 NLD  Netherlands  1975 
0,9605 NLD  Netherlands  1981 
1,0302 NLD  Netherlands  1986 
1,1636 NLD  Netherlands  1991 
0,8586 NOR  Norway  1989 
0,8831 NOR  Norway  1979 
0,9553 NOR  Norway  1995 
0,9975 SVN  Slovenia  1992 
0,8465 SWE  Sweden  1995 
 
 
The top 30 anti-globalizers according to Kraay and associates 
 
 
CODE Country YEAR  OPENAV 
 
ARG Argentina  1961  0,0719 
BDI Burundi  1992  0,0819 
BGD Bangladesh  1963  0,0171 
BGD Bangladesh  1973  0,0176 
BGD Bangladesh  1978  0,0193   130
 
                                                                                                                                        
BGD Bangladesh  1988  0,0226 
BGD Bangladesh  1983  0,0228 
BGD Bangladesh  1995  0,0299 
BRA Brazil  1970  0,0613 
BRA Brazil  1986  0,0707 
BRA Brazil  1960  0,0713 
BRA Brazil  1981  0,0726 
BRA Brazil  1976  0,0817 
CHN China  1980  0,0197 
CHN China  1985  0,0362 
CHN China  1990  0,0630 
ETH Ethiopia  1995  0,0772 
IND India  1977  0,0287 
IND India  1988  0,0335 
IND India  1983  0,0338 
IND India  1993  0,0347 
KOR South  Korea  1961  0,0518 
KOR South  Korea  1966  0,0680 
MOZ Mozambique 1996  0,0774 
NPL Nepal  1977  0,0310 
NPL Nepal  1984  0,0367 
NPL Nepal  1995  0,0585 
PAK Pakistan  1990  0,0783 
PAK Pakistan  1985  0,0820 
RWA Rwanda 1983  0,0627 
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Methodological remarks on the Chen/Revallion study 
 
 
                                           
Their materials render themselves for further rigorous testing and calculations. It emerges that the wave of the 
world recession of the early 1980s badly affected the Middle East, while Eastern Europe and Central Asia still 
experienced a period of relative poverty reduction. The end of the 1980s was a good period for all world regions, 
with a general decline in relative poverty rates. The turn of the decade with its recession devastatingly hit first 
East Asia and Eastern Europe, with the tide then spreading to the Middle East and Latin America. Latin America 
was worst hit by the crisis of the early 1990s and did not manage to benefit from the “Clinton boom” years, 
while the Middle East reduced its poverty first in the middle of the 1990s only to see an increase again at the turn 
of the decade and the millennium. The entire evidence, based on calculations
41 from Chen and Ravallion, Table 
 
41 Chen and Ravallion include India and China in the larger South Asia and East Asia regional heading, respectively, but 
report separate values for India and China as well. Thus, the  values for South Asia without India and  East Asia without 
China can be directly calculated. These re-calculated Tables for the number of people below $2 a day are 
 





294  294,8 297,5 291,7 276,4 272,6 272,1 270,7 

















191,1 197,2 214,3 226,1 235,3 223,4 234,6 237,7 




287,9  326  355,2 381,6 410,4 446,8 489,1  516 




1169,8 1108,6 1028,3 1116,3 1079,3 922,2  899,6  864,3 
South 
Asia+India 
821,1 858,6 911,4 957,5  1004,8  1029,1 1039 1063,7 
Total  2449,8 2480,2 2477,5 2653,8 2763,5 2673,6 2737,8 2735,5 
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3, is this. The neat picture that millions were lifted out of poverty in the age of globalization has to be qualified 
on the basis of the very same World Bank figures that are often quoted to qualify that assertion. The above Table 
has the clear follow-up, based again on our calculations from Chen and Ravallion (our own compilations
42 from 
Chen and Ravallion). 











0,8 2,7 -5,8  -15,3  -3,8  -0,5  -1,4 

















6,1 17,1  11,8 9,2 -11,9  11,2 3,1 




38,1 29,2 26,4 28,8 36,4 42,3 26,9 
Total  30,4 -2,7  176,3  109,7  -89,9  64,2 -2,3 
 
 
42 the original Table is: Percentage of population below $2 per day: 
 
  1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2001 
 
East  Asia  84,8 76,6 67,7 69,9 64,8 53,3 50,3 47,4 













28,9 25,2 24,2 21,4 20,2 22,3 24,3 23,2 
South  Asia  89,1 87,2 86,7 85,5 84,5 81,7 78,1 77,2 
India  89,6 88,2 87,3 86,1 85,7 85,2 80,6 79,9   133
 
World Poverty: Percentage of People with less than 2 $ a Day Per Capita Income – percentages of people 
falling into poverty or being lifted out of poverty over the preceeding 3-year period 
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Eastern Europe, Central Asia
Latin America, Caribbean








73,3 76,1 76,1  75  74,6 75,1  76  76,6 
Total  66,7 63,7 60,1 60,8 60,1 55,5 54,4 52,9 
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The following regional aggregates about poverty reduction (+ or – the percentage of people below 2 $ a day as 
compared to the preceding period) emerges: 
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c) Eastern Europe, Central Asia 
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e) Middle East, North Africa 
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